







A Mental Revolution includes eight original 
essays that analyze how the scientific 
management principles developed by 
legendary engineer Frederick W. Taylor 
have evolved and been applied since his 
death in 1915. 
Taylor believed that a business or any 
other complex organization would oper­
ate more effectively if its practices were 
subjected to rigorous scientific study. His 
classic Principles of Scientific Management 
spread his ideas for organization, planning, 
and employee motivation throughout the 
industrialized world. But scientific man­
agement, because it required, in Taylor's 
words, "a complete mental revolution," 
was highly disruptive, and Taylor's famous 
time-motion studies, especially when ap­
plied piecemeal by many employers who 
did not adopt the entire system, helped 
make the movement enormously unpopu­
lar with the organized labor movement. 
Though its direct influence diminished by 
the 1930s, Taylorism has remained a force 
in American business and industry up to 
the present time. 
The essays in this volume discuss some 
of the important people and organizations 
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Scientific management is not any efficiency de­
vice. . . . It is not a new system of figuring costs; 
it is not a new system of paying men . .  . it is not 
holding a stop watch on a man and writing things 
down about him . .  . it is not motion study nor an 
analysis of the movements of men. . .  . It is not 
divided foremanship . .  . it is not any of the de­
vices which the average man calls to mind when 
scientific management is spoken of. . .  . In this 
sense, scientific management involves a complete 
mental revolution. 
F R E D E R I C K W. T A Y L O R , 1 9 1 2 
It is still necessary to go back to Taylor for defini­
tions and fundamental principles. But scientific 
management is a dynamic thing; its principles are 
the principles of growth and change and it is for 
that reason that its progress since the war has been 
sure and swift. 
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Ocientific management has attracted surprisingly little 
attention in the United States in recent years. The handful of 
books and essays that have appeared since the 1950s have focused 
on Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915), the engineer, inventor, and 
publicist who became the first American management theorist to 
reach a large, nontechnical audience. They assume or imply that 
Taylor's influence did not die with him in 1915 but provide only the 
most general indication of the character of that influence. As a 
result, Edward Eyre Hunt's Scientific Management Since Taylor 
(1924) remains the last, best word on American scientific manage­
ment in the post-Taylor era. In the meantime, historians and social 
scientists specializing in European affairs have discovered or 
rediscovered indigenous scientific management movements that 
drew inspiration from the American pioneers but soon developed 
identities of their own. The results of the new scholarship are most 
striking in the case of France, which had the most ambitious man­
agement movement outside the United States, but impressive 
studies in German, British, Russian, Italian, and Japanese history 
have documented the spread of ideas and techniques once assumed 
to be peculiarly American. While it may be premature to speak of 
an international history of scientific management, it is clear that 
Taylor found enthusiastic disciples everywhere and that scientific 
management measurably affected the performance of institutions 
in many countries. 
In recent years there has been a reawakening of interest in the 
United States as well, particularly among younger scholars. Their 
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research promises to close the gap between European and Ameri­
can scholarship and to permit authoritative generalizations about 
the impact of scientific management on managerial theory and 
practice. This volume is a preliminary report of their work. It 
makes no pretense of covering every aspect of the post-1915 
scientific management movement, of treating every subject or 
decade equally, or of providing an unmistakable trail for those 
who follow. The authors have tried, as the saying goes, to do a few 
things well. 
Although the authors have worked as individuals, with varying 
perspectives and values, they share several assumptions. First, 
scientific management did not begin or end with Taylor. The 
starting point for organized, self-conscious activity was his syn­
thesis and extension of systematic management, the late nine­
teenth century effort to bring order and system to manufacturing. 
But Taylor was one creative individual among many; he cast a long 
shadow because he told people what they were ready to hear. The 
movement associated with him and his work evolved during his 
lifetime and continued to evolve after his death. 
Second, though it drew on a rich intellectual and administrative 
heritage, scientific management in practice was highly disrup­
tive. This characteristic accounted for the controversies that often 
accompanied its introduction, for the popularity of short cuts 
designed to preserve the benefits and minimize the trauma of 
scientific management, and for Taylor's attempt to explain his 
objective in nontechnical language. The latter effort led him to 
identify his work with "a complete mental revolution," suggest­
ing the transcendent possibilities of improved management on the 
shop floor and in society. 
Third, scientific management cannot be discussed solely in 
terms of manufacturing operations or work or business adminis­
tration. From the beginning it had wider potential applications. 
Taylor and his followers emphasized ideas and activities —re­
search, planning, communications, standards, incentives, feed­
back—that were applicable to any institution. Their ideal factory 
was a metaphor for a better society. They also spoke the language 
of anti-establishment rebels. Their scorn for the income statement 
and the marketplace as yardsticks of economic success gave them a 
common bond with progressives, socialists, and revolutionaries 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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The essays in this volume are a step toward a new understanding 
of the role of scientific management in America, but many gaps 
remain. There is still little information about the operation of 
industrial enterprises under scientific management and even less 
about the service organizations, large and small, that embraced 
the engineers' ideas and methods. Equally notable is the compara­
tive neglect of American mobilization in World War II, the ulti­
mate triumph of scientific management and mass production. In 
the political realm, the link with Herbert Hoover and his associ­
ates is well documented, but the role of scientific management in 
the New Deal remains to be explored, despite the fact that most 
nonacademic leaders of scientific management in the 1930s had 
become federal government officials by the end of the decade. Nor 
is there any study of the intellectual impact of scientific manage­
ment on government comparable to accounts of the rise of Keyne­
sian theory. Most important, perhaps, there is little information 
on the apparent exhaustion of scientific management in the 1950s 
and after, as planning, standardization, and other fundamentals of 
scientific management became cliches and marketing and finance 
increasingly overshadowed production. The list could be ex­
tended almost indefinitely. 
A final note on terminology. Before 1910, Taylor and his fol­
lowers used various labels to describe their work. At the instiga­
tion of Louis Brandeis, they agreed to employ the term scientific 
management, one of the phrases they had used informally. For the 
next twenty years scientific management meant the ideas and 
techniques of Taylor, his disciples, and those who followed in their 
footsteps. After World War II, when American social scientists 
rediscovered Taylor's work, they often substituted the word Tay­
lorism, which had been widely used in Europe and which enabled 
them to avoid disputes over what was and what was not genuinely 
scientific. In this volume the terms are considered synonymous. 
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 Scientific Management in Retrospect 
Injanuary 1912, Frederick W. Taylor, the center of a highly 
publicized controversy over the effects of "scientific manage­
ment, " testified before a House of Representatives committee 
investigating his handiwork. His first objective, he explained, was 
to "sweep away a good deal of rubbish." Scientific management 
was "not any efficiency device. . .  . It is not a new system of 
figuring costs; it is not a new system of paying men . .  . it is not 
holding a stop watch on a man . .  . it is not time study; it is not 
motion study. . . . " I n fact, it was "not any of the devices which 
the average man calls to mind when scientific management is 
spoken of." On the contrary, it was "a complete mental revolution 
on the part of the workingman" and an "equally complete mental 
revolution on the part of those on management's side. . . . And 
without this complete mental revolution on both sides scientific 
management does not exist. "* 
Taylor's identification of scientific management with a "mental 
revolution" had several purposes. It was the culminating step in a 
long campaign to sell his approach to industrial management as a 
system rather than a series of palliatives for specific problems. It 
was also a defense against criticisms that had arisen from piece­
meal installations and the association of scientific management 
with hostility to unions. Finally, it emphasized a point that Taylor 
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of K. Austin 
Kerr, Patrick Fridenson, Heidrun Homburg, Barbara Clements, Eisuke Daito, 
and the authors of the other essays in this volume. 
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himself had only recently begun to articulate: that successful 
management depended on ideas that were applicable to many 
different kinds of organizations. Taylor's imagery evoked an 
enthusiastic response from engineers and factory managers and 
from a larger group whose interests extended to virtually every 
institution.2 From this point scientific management was both a 
detailed plan for improving the operations of a plant or office and a 
set of prescriptions for improving any activity. Its popularity 
underlined the significance of Taylor's metaphor. 
Taylor and the Origins of Scientific Management 
The journey that ultimately led Taylor to define his work as "a 
complete mental revolution" was long and arduous. It included 
experiences in a variety of industrial enterprises, involvement in 
the emerging engineering profession and in the existing manage­
ment movement, and associations with a corps of associates who 
disseminated the Taylor system. 
The events of Taylor's early years played a large and controver­
sial part in these activities.3 Born in 1856 into an aristocratic 
Philadelphia family, Taylor had the benefit of tutors and exclusive 
schools, extended travel, and associations with the Philadelphia 
elite. After attending Phillips Exeter Academy, he rejected a 
university education in favor of a traditional apprenticeship and an 
industrial career, which began in the machine shop of the Midvale 
Steel Company in 1878. He rose rapidly, thanks to ability and hard 
work and to close personal ties with the Clark family, the principal 
owners of Midvale. In 1885, after receiving an engineering degree 
via correspondence courses from the Stevens Institute of Technol­
ogy, he became the company's chief engineer. His prospects of 
rising still further received a severe jolt the following year when 
the Clarks sold Midvale to a local industrialist who had a son of 
similar age and experience. As a result, Taylor resigned in 1889 to 
head a company that a group of New York financiers had orga­
nized to exploit a novel paper-making process. This experience 
proved to be equally frustrating. The new technology was defec­
tive, the company lost money, and Taylor and his wife were 
unhappy in the Maine frontier town where they had to live. With 
considerable bitterness, Taylor left in 1893 to become a self-
employed consultant. 
Scientific Management in Retrospect • 7 
By that time he had taken important steps toward a new role. 
He had a substantial reputation as an inventor of industrial ma­
chinery and broad experience as an industrial manager. He had 
also undertaken several experiments that forced him to think more 
explicitly about organizations and people. One of these, an effort 
to compute operating times for machine tools with a stopwatch, 
would envolve into time and motion study, his signature contri­
bution to industrial management. 
Most of all, Taylor had become associated with two enterprises 
that were reshaping the industrial environment. The first was the 
rapidly maturing engineering profession, whose advocates sought 
an identity based on rigorous formal education, frequent contact, 
mutually accepted standards of behavior, and social responsibility. 
In factories, mines, and railroad yards, they rejected the empiri­
cism of the practitioner for scientific experimentation and analy­
sis. They acknowledged the primacy of the profit motive, but they 
insisted that reason and truth were essential to continued financial 
success.4 The second, closely related development was the sys­
tematic management movement, an effort among engineers and 
sympathizers to substitute administrative systems for the infor­
mal methods of industrial management that had evolved with the 
factory system. Systematic management was a rebellion against 
tradition, empiricism, and the assumption that common sense, 
personal relationships, and craft knowledge were sufficient to run 
a small factory. In the large, capital intensive, technologically 
advanced operations of the late nineteenth century, "rule-of­
thumb" methods resulted in confusion and waste. The revision­
ists' answer was to replace traditional managers with engineers 
and to substitute managerial systems for guesswork and ad hoc 
evaluations.5 
By the time Taylor began his career as an engineer and manager, 
cost accounting systems, methods for planning and scheduling 
production and organizing materials, and incentive wage plans 
were staples of engineering publications and tradejournals. Their 
objective was an unimpeded flow of materials and information. In 
human terms, proponents of systematic management sought to 
transfer power from the first-line supervisor to the plant manager 
and to force all employees to pay greater attention to the manager's 
goals. Most threatening, perhaps, they advocated decisions based 
on performance rather than on personal qualities and associations.6 
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In the 1890s, Taylor became the most ambitious and vigorous 
proponent of systematic management. As a consultant he intro­
duced accounting systems that permitted managers to use operat­
ing records to guide their actions, production control systems that 
allowed managers to know more precisely what was happening on 
the shop floor, piece rate systems that encouraged workers to 
follow orders and instructions, and related measures. In 1895 he 
employed a colleague, Sanford E. Thompson, to continue his time 
study research with the goal of calculating standards for various 
occupations that would be published and sold to employers. 
Between 1898 and 1901, as a consultant to the Bethlehem Iron 
Company, Taylor introduced all of his systems and vigorously 
pursued his research. This experience, punctuated by controversy 
and escalating conflict with the company's managers, was the 
capstone of his creative career. Two developments were of special 
importance. Taylor's discovery of "high speed steel," which im­
proved the performance of metal cutting tools, assured his fame as 
an inventor. In addition, his effort to introduce systematic meth­
ods in many areas of the company's operations forced him to 
develop an integrated view of managerial innovation and a broader 
conception of the manager's role. By 1901 Taylor had fashioned 
scientific management from systematic management.7 
As the events of Taylor's career make clear, the two approaches 
were intimately related. Systematic and scientific management 
had common roots, attracted the same kinds of people, and had the 
same business objectives. Yet in retrospect the differences stand 
out. Systematic management was diffuse and utilitarian, a series 
of isolated measures that did not add up to a larger whole or have 
recognizable implications beyond day-to-day industrial opera­
tions. Scientific management added significant detail and a larger 
view. In 1901, when he left Bethlehem, Taylor resolved to devote 
his time and ample fortune to promoting both. His first report on 
his work, "Shop Management" (1903), portrayed an integrated 
complex of systematic management methods, supplemented by 
refinements and additions like time study.8 
At first Taylor was disappointed with the response to his work. 
He could talk about a larger, integrated conception of manage­
ment but most manufacturers wanted solutions to specific prob­
lems. Furthermore, their preoccupation with the particulars, 
notably time study and incentive wage plans, threatened more 
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serious difficulties. Many machine shop owners, for example, 
introduced time study and an incentive wage to raise output and 
wean employees from the International Association of Machinists 
(IAM) and other trade unions. Taylor and his followers, who had 
little sympathy for unions, were slow to realize the dangers of this 
course. By 1910 the IAM and the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) had become implacable enemies of scientific management 
and Taylor was embroiled in a public controversy that would 
haunt him for the rest of his life.9 
Taylor responded to these problems with two tactical adjust­
ments. First, he began to rely more heavily on anecdotes from his 
career —"object lessons" —to convey his message to audiences that 
had little interest in technical detail. Taylor liberally interpreted 
his experiences to make his point. Thus the tale of "Schmidt," the 
oxlike Bethlehem laborer whose stupidity Taylor had supposedly 
overcome with an incentive wage, was largely apocryphal.10 
Second, apart from the object lessons, Taylor spoke less about 
factory operations and more about the significance and general 
applicability of his ideas. Between 1907 and 1909, with the aid of 
one of his shrewdest associates, Morris L. Cooke, he wrote a 
sequel to "Shop Management" that ultimately became The Princi­
ples of Scientific Management (1911). Rather than discuss the specific 
methods he introduced in factories and shops, Taylor used colorful 
stories and language to illuminate "principles" of management. 
To suggest the integrated character and broad applicability of 
scientific management, he equated it with a "complete mental 
revolution."11 
Taylor's reformulation of scientific management as a series of 
principles and as a mental revolution made him a celebrity. "Shop 
Management" had reached an audience of engineers and industri­
alists; the Principles potentially appealed to everyone. Building on 
the momentum of other efficiency movements devoted to natural 
resource conservation, improved government service, more effec­
tive education, and similar goals, Taylor invited readers to extrap­
olate.12 How did scientific management apply to their circum­
stances? Could they duplicate Taylor's successes? What were the 
possibilities of rational organization, time study, and material 
incentives? What costs could they anticipate? Taylor's book be­
came an inspiration to those on both sides of the Atlantic who 
equated industrial or social progress with increased efficiency. 
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As Taylor's name became a household word, his role in the 
management movement paradoxically declined. The popularity 
of the Principles created more demands for appearances and state­
ments than any individual could satisfy, and Taylor had little 
choice but to turn to others to assist him. Initially, he had no 
qualms about this step. For years he had attracted devoted fol­
lowers. At first they were employees like Thompson, who per­
formed specific tasks. After Taylor's retirement in 1901 they 
became more independent, introducing the techniques he had 
developed and refined at Bethlehem. In addition, Taylor attracted 
other individuals who were intrigued both by his methods and by 
the larger implications of his activities. They soon began to play 
creative roles in their own right. In 1910 Louis Brandeis, the 
distinguished lawyer and reformer, skillfully used their testimony 
in the celebrated Eastern Rate Case before the Interstate Com­
merce Commission to publicize scientific management. By the 
time the Principles appeared and Taylor testified before the Con­
gressional investigating committee, Taylor's followers were well 
prepared to apply scientific management in industry and to ex­
plain its significance to an eager public. Their competence and 
fidelity became a major concern of Taylor's later years; the ten­
sions that arose from his concerns have in turn been a feature of 
most histories of scientific management.13 
The most influential disciples were Henry L. Gantt and Morris 
L. Cooke, whom Taylor trusted and generally endorsed; Frank B. 
Gilbreth and Harrington Emerson, whom he grew to dislike and 
distrust; and Harlow S. Person, who became a major figure in the 
scientific management movement after his death. Gantt was 
Taylor's first important follower, the creator of valuable refine­
ments such as the task and bonus wage plan and the charts that 
became his trademark. He was also the first of the Taylor group to 
recognize the common ground between scientific management 
and personnel work.14 Cooke was the most political of Taylor's 
followers, the principal link between scientific management and 
progressive reform. He became known for his applications of 
scientific management to public administration and for his over­
tures to union leaders.15 Gilbreth's colorful activities often ob­
scured his substantive contributions to the analysis of work. 
Emerson was a creative publicist who grasped the potential of 
scientific management as a business, and Person was the foremost 
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theorist of scientific management after Taylor's death. As head of 
the Taylor Society, the association of Taylor's professional and 
intellectual disciples, in the 1920s and 1930s, he identified scien­
tific management with the liberal business community of that era. 
Among other important individuals with ties to the Taylor circle, 
Richard A. Feiss and Mary Van Kleeck symbolized the diverse 
potential of scientific management. 
Scientific Management in Industry 
During Taylor's lifetime, scientific management was first and 
foremost a plan for enhanced business performance that Taylor's 
followers and other consultants installed for fees. Taylor and his 
allies argued that their work increased profits, enhanced produc­
tivity, and eliminated class divisions and labor unrest. Critics 
charged that it encouraged excessive specialization, degraded 
work, and encouraged personal competition, hostility, and a sense 
of alienation. The conflicting charges were so sweeping that it was 
(and is) impossible to reconcile them.16 However, historical re­
search has addressed several pertinent issues, including the extent 
to which scientific management was adopted in industry, the 
character of the changes that occurred in those plants, and the 
impact of such activities on the work and well-being of employees. 
Between 1901 and 1915 Taylor's associates introduced scientific 
management in nearly 200 American businesses, 181 or eighty per­
cent of which were factories.17 Some of the plants were large and 
modern, like the Pullman and Remington Typewriter companies; 
others were small and technologically primitive. Approximately 
one-third of the total were large volume producers for mass mar­
kets, but scientific management initially had limited appeal among 
the managers of mass production plants.18 A majority of the 181 
firms fell into one of two broad categories. First were those whose 
activities required the movement of large quantities of materials 
between numerous work stations (such as textile mills, railroad 
repair shops, and automobile plants). Their managers sought to 
reduce delays and bottlenecks and increase throughput, the vol­
ume of production per unit of time. The second group consisted of 
innovative firms, mostly small, that were already committed to 
managerial reform. Their executives were attracted to Taylor's 
promise of social harmony and improved working conditions. A 
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significant minority of the total fell in both categories. Many of 
the textile mills, for example, were leaders in welfare work.19 
The history of scientific management in these plants provides 
little support for the contention, common to many later accounts, 
that Taylor's central concern was the work of the individual 
employee. Consultants devoted most of their time and energies to 
machine operations, tools and materials, production schedules, 
routing patterns, and cost and other record systems. In one-third 
of the factories these activities generated such controversy that 
time and motion studies were never undertaken. In others, such as 
the Franklin Automobile Co. and several textile mills, the installa­
tion consisted almost exclusively of improvements in schedules 
and routing. As a result at least one-half of the employees of the 181 
firms were essentially onlookers. They may have experienced 
fewer delays, used different tools, or found that their supervisor's 
authority had diminished, but their own activities were un­
affected.20 
What about the other employees? Taylor promised that they 
would receive higher wages and have more opportunities for 
promotion and less reason for conflict with their supervisors. 
Most assessments of these claims have concluded that Taylor 
promised more than his associates could or would deliver. By the 
same token, the union leaders and other critics exaggerated the 
dangers of scientific management. They argued that skilled work­
ers would forfeit their skills and creativity, that scientific manage­
ment would promote speedups, fatigue, and rate cuts, and that 
average workers would lose their jobs.21 Taylor's followers mocked 
the deskilling argument; Gilbreth compared it to the notion that 
surgeons or dentists were deskilled general practitioners.22 In 
recent years, however, it has reappeared in social science texts and 
in radical critiques of the economy, notably in the influential work 
of Harry Braverman. The modern critics extrapolated from the 
Principles rather than from the experiences of the 181 plants or other 
historical data.23 They reasoned that industrial jobs had become 
intellectually and psychologically unrewarding since Taylor's 
time; that Taylor was the architect of modern work (or so the text 
writers insisted); and therefore, that Taylor had tipped his hand 
when he referred, in the Principles to "gathering together all of the 
traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the 
workmen." 
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The most important effect of the deskilling argument may have 
been to obscure the more serious charges that scientific manage­
ment led to speedups, rate cuts, and the discharge of employees 
whose skills or motivation were no better than average. In ortho­
dox settings, where employers lived up to the letter of scientific 
management, only inferior performers had to worry. And in firms 
that were also committed to personnel management, even that 
threat was minimal. But many employers were less scrupulous or 
less patient. In their minds faster work meant faster, more diligent 
workers, not better planning and coordination, improved com­
munications, and systematic maintenance. They gave lip service 
to Taylor's idea of an interrelated whole, but they looked to the 
employees for immediate gains. Even among the 181 firms there 
was some tendency to use time study to cut rates. That was the 
prospect that sparked the famous Watertown Arsenal strike of 
1912. It was apparently also the cause of strikes at Joseph & Feiss 
and at three American Locomotive Company plants where Emer­
son worked.24 Outside the Taylor circle the tendency was far more 
pronounced. In early 1913, for example, Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Company managers assigned an employee named Robert Holmes 
to conduct time studies of tire workers to learn why earnings were 
so high. Holmes had had no contact with the Taylor group or 
experience in time study, but he spent a day timing the workers 
with a stopwatch and concluded, predictably, that piece rates were 
too high. The managers then cut the rates and the workers struck, 
precipitating the industry's most serious labor conflict before the 
1930s.25 
Considering the experiences of firms that have left records 
(including those like Firestone) several conclusions about the 
impact of scientific management on factory work seem war­
ranted: (1) First-line supervisors lost much of their authority to 
higher-level managers and their staffs. (2) The proportion of the 
work day devoted to production increased due to the elimination 
of delays. (3) Fewer decisions depended on personal judgments, 
biases, and subjective evaluations. (4) The individual worker 
exercised less discretion, particularly in plants where time studies 
were used to schedule production and/or set piece rates; in the 
small minority of plants where individual instruction cards were 
also used, the area of discretion was reduced even more. (5) In 
most cases earnings rose, but there were enough exceptions to 
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blur the effect. (6) The level of skill required in production did not 
change as a result of scientific management though the most 
highly skilled employees, like the foremen, lost some of their de 
facto managerial functions. (7) Some unskilled jobs disappeared 
as improved scheduling and routing reduced the need for gangs of 
laborers and encouraged the introduction of materials handling 
machinery. (8) The "great fear" of skill and job losses that David 
Montgomery has documented among craft workers in the early 
1910s quickly waned and scientific management ceased to be 
associated with labor turmoil until the spread of the Bedaux 
system in the 1920s.26 
Only in recent years has it become apparent that the traditional 
preoccupation of contemporary analysts with factory conditions 
was far too narrow. Scientific management was also applicable to 
the operations of stores and offices, as a handful of illuminating 
studies have emphasized.27 There were parallels with manufactur­
ing plants: large establishments were most likely to introduce 
scientific management techniques and the managers' overriding 
motivation was a desire to increase the speed of operations. But 
there were also differences. Because clerical work was labor 
intensive and dependent on small, hand-operated machines, reor­
ganization efforts focused on the individual employee to a greater 
degree and at an earlier stage than in most factories. Indeed, the 
approach that Taylor and his orthodox followers scorned became 
the standard in white-collar settings and evoked little controversy. 
Efforts to improve scheduling and routing, to employ time and 
motion study to reduce wasteful effort, and to introduce economic 
incentives were most effective where large volume, repetitive 
operations were the rule. In other settings, employers paid less 
attention to industrial engineering techniques reminiscent of fac­
tories, and concentrated on improving employees' skills and mo­
rale. In either case, scientific management was associated with the 
mechanization of clerical operations and the growth of a largely 
female labor force. The impact on the individual worker is harder 
to gauge. Judging from the experiences of factory workers, it 
varied considerably and defies easy summary.28 
In the meantime the "efficiency craze" that followed the pub­
lication of the Principles overshadowed everything Taylor's associ­
ates had accomplished or failed to accomplish in American facto­
ries. As a result, Taylor, Gilbreth, Emerson and other associates 
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became celebrities; organizations and publications devoted to 
efficiency proliferated; professional societies recognized the im­
portance of management as well as of technical knowledge; uni­
versities began to teach management, and virtually every organi­
zation gave lip service to the goal of enhanced efficiency. 
This activity, together with Taylor's death in 1915, marked the 
beginning of a new phase in the history of the management 
movement. Though the picture is far from complete, a series of 
dramatic changes in the character and imagery of scientific man­
agement between 1915 and 1920 suggest the outlines of this new 
era. The best known of these changes was the reconciliation of 
Taylor's followers and union leaders that followed the engineers' 
formal endorsement of collective bargaining.29 The practical im­
portance of this concession is unclear but it removed a major 
source of misunderstanding and demonstrated the appeal of scien­
tific management among union leaders once its anti-union impli­
cations were muted. Nearly as important was the gradual merger 
of the scientific management and personnel management move­
ments. Thanks to labor market conditions during the war period, 
scientific management by 1920 embraced the full panoply of person­
nel reforms, including personnel departments that performed the 
foreman's traditional functions of hiring, firing, and training as 
well as new activities associated with industrial psychology.30 
A third unanticipated development was the growing role of 
scientific management in the federal government. Taylor had had 
extremely poor relations with the Taft administration and his 
followers had little contact with Wilson and his advisors. Though 
virtually every member of the Taylor Society was a government 
employee during 1917-1918, they had no demonstrable effect on 
mobilization policy.31 The war experience nevertheless had im­
portant indirect effects, not the least of which was the rise of 
Herbert Hoover to the forefront of American politics. Hoover 
quickly developed close and cordial relations with the scientific 
management movement and superseded Taylor as the nation's 
foremost apostle of efficiency. His influence was apparent in Waste 
In Industry, a report that soon rivaled the Principles as the most 
widely read manifesto of the scientific management movement. 
In subsequent years Hoover would lead an American rationaliza­
tion effort that depended, even more than comparable efforts in 
Europe, on the ideas and techniques of scientific management.32 
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Scientific Management in Europe and Japan 
Before the 1970s most histories of scientific management gave 
the impression that it was an American phenomenon that had its 
greatest impact on American institutions. Authors either disre­
garded Paul Devinat's Scientific Management in Europe (1927) or 
relegated it to a footnote. In recent years, however, a new empha­
sis on scientific management has accompanied the study of twen­
tieth-century political and economic institutions in European 
history. Taylor's popularity, for example, was "one of the first 
tangible signs of the Americanization of French society."33 After 
World War I, scientific management became a potent force for 
economic and political renewal.34 Above all, perhaps, it was a 
gauge of the growth of large organizations and bureaucratic 
cultures, a development that transcended national boundaries. 
Before World War I, the diffusion of scientific management in 
most European countries and in Japan resembled the American 
experience. It depended on engineers and industrialists who had 
some exposure to systematic management and who were eager to 
realize the potential of the large and complex organizations they 
worked for or consulted. In most countries charismatic individu­
als within this group provided the intellectual and organizational 
impetus that converted the technicians' interest into a more broadly 
based movement. Initially, their focus was factory reform, which 
proved to be as difficult and contentious as it was in the United 
States. The most common conflicts pitted company executives, 
sensitive to costs and short-term results, like their American 
counterparts, against engineers and technicians who adopted the 
broader perspective of Taylor and his followers. Nearly as impor­
tant before the war was the division between these groups and the 
labor unions, which strongly opposed any change in the industrial 
status quo. 
Systematic management began to make inroads in Europe and 
Japan after 1900. As in the United States, the rise of the engineer­
ing profession and the enhanced role of the engineer in manufac­
turing were major underlying forces. The appearance of books 
and articles promoting coordination through management sys­
tems signaled a new sensitivity to the limits of empiricism and 
tradition. Yet change was gradual and uncoordinated. In Ger­
many, for example, systematic management seemed to grow 
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naturally out of "bureaucratic traditions."35 As a result, German 
industrialists introduced "various scientific management tech­
niques before they ever heard of the American movement. "36 On 
the other hand, Japanese railroad executives decided to introduce 
western managerial methods after they purchased American roll­
ing stock.37 The majority of European executives fell between 
these extremes. A crude measure of the spread of systematic 
management was the popularity of incentive wage plans. In 
Britain and France nearly half of all engineering employees 
worked under some form of incentive by 1914.38 In Russia, the 
largest employers followed the lead of their western counterparts. 
St. Petersburg, with many large metal working factories, became 
a hotbed of experimentation. In state plants and then in private 
operations, engineers and managers debated ways to increase 
throughput and productivity. They installed cost accounting and 
incentive wage plans and, in some cases, made time studies. By 
1908, at least sixteen of the largest plants in the St. Petersburg area 
had introduced "American" bonus plans.39 Union leaders viewed 
the wage plans as another effort to undercut the powers of skilled 
workers and reduce wages, but were unable to prevent their 
introduction or extension. 
Taylor first became known to European industrialists and engi­
neers for his invention of high-speed tool steel. At the Paris 
Exposition of 1900, where high-speed steel attracted much atten­
tion, he had contacts with leading German and French techni­
cians, including Henri Le Chatelier, who would soon emerge as 
his best-known European follower. Le Chatelier published Tay­
lor's "The Art of Cutting Metals" in his prestigious Revue de 
Metallurgie in 1907 and "Shop Management" a few months later. In 
the meantime, Zeitschrift des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, the jour­
nal of the Association of German Engineers, published a long 
report on Taylor's work in 1901, stimulating widespread experi­
mentation by German engineering firms. One of the participants 
in this activity, Professor Georg Schlesinger, of the Royal Institute 
of Physics at Charlottenburg, soon emerged as an expert on high-
speed steel and Taylor's managerial ideas. A German translation of 
"Shop Management" appeared in 1904.40 From this point, Tay­
lor's international contacts increased and his influence grew. After 
hearing Taylor's lecture on the potential of scientific management, 
Andre Michelin, the French tire manufacturer, supposedly rushed 
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out to buy a stopwatch. Japanese technicians were no less enthusi­
astic. Koichi Kanda, author of the first Japanese manual on factory 
management, published in 1911, included an extensive discussion 
of Taylor's work. Yoichi Ueno, a university professor and consul­
tant, translated Gilbreth's Motion Study in 1911 and the Principles in 
I9I3-41 
Still, there were limits to Taylor's personal influence. Despite 
considerable effort, only a handful of European and Japanese 
engineers and managers spent extended periods in Philadelphia, 
and his associates worked almost exclusively in the United States. 
The notable exception was Gilbreth, who spent much of 1913 and 
1914 at the Auergesellschaft company, which was allied with 
Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (AEG), the largest German 
engineering firm.42 The exact nature of Gilbreth's work and his 
relations with his client remain a mystery, but Walther Rathenau, 
the head of AEG, and Wichard von Moellendorff, one of its key 
manufacturing executives, were among the most influential pro­
moters of scientific management in Germany during the follow­
ing decade. 
Of the European pioneers, Le Chatelier was unquestionably the 
most important. After 1904 he became the "driving force" that 
insured the spread of Taylor's ideas "in France and over large parts 
of continental Europe. "43 As a distinguished chemist and pro­
fessor at the Ecole des mines and the College de France, his 
prestige insured that Taylor's ideas received a respectful hearing in 
the highest circles of French society. Together with Charles de 
Freminville, an engineer who held a succession of high positions 
in large industrial firms, Le Chatelier made France the center of 
the European scientific management movement. 
After Le Chatelier, de Freminville, and Schlesinger, no follower 
of Taylor had a greater impact than Alexsei Gastev, a Russian 
revolutionary who helped introduce scientific management to the 
new Soviet state. Trained as a teacher, Gastev became a metal 
worker in 1908 and began a lifelong fascination with western 
technology. Exiled in 1910 for political activity, he went to Paris, 
worked in several large plants, and became familiar with the 
contemporary debate over scientific management. He returned to 
St. Petersburg in 1913 and was employed at the large Aivaz plant 
when workers there struck against managerial innovations, in­
cluding an ill-conceived effort to introduce time studies. Gastev, 
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nevertheless, was intrigued with the potential of scientific man­
agement. Like Lenin, who began to write positively about Tay­
lor's ideas in 1914, he saw scientific management as a method 
for achieving a "cultural revolution" and "making every man a 
manager. "44 
Only in Great Britain, among the larger European countries, 
was there no influential advocate or group of advocates before 
World War I. The major engineering publications either disre­
garded Taylor's work or criticized it. Industrialists such as Edward 
Cadbury and B. Seebohm Rowntree, closely identified with 
managerial reform, wrote generally hostile analyses. Socialist 
critics of the status quo were also unfriendly. The consensus of 
economic historians is that Taylor's work had no immediate 
impact in Britain due to the hidebound conservatism of British 
executives.45 Their indictment may be overdrawn. As Judith 
Merkle has noted, the problem in British industry may have been 
the absence of a "self-propagating class of merchandisers," not 
lack of interest.46 Michael Rowlinson has recently shown that 
Cadbury introduced many of Taylor's methods despite his public 
disclaimers.47 Additional investigations would likely show that 
Cadbury and the few industrialists, such as Hans Renold, who 
publicly endorsed scientific management, were not alone. An 
American engineer who surveyed European industry in 1920 
found in England "the most complete installations of scientific 
management I have ever seen. "48 
Why were British executives so reticent? The answer may have 
been their preoccupation with industrial relations and labor un­
rest. In Britain, as in other countries, the years after 1900 saw a 
sharp increase in labor militancy and union activity. Among craft 
workers, particularly those in technologically backward trades, 
changes in manufacturing operations were at least as threatening 
as wage cuts or attacks on unions.49 Union leaders in Britain, 
France, and Germany carefully monitored the Watertown arsenal 
incident and the ensuing conflict between Taylor and the AFL, and 
were ready to react whenever a stopwatch appeared. 
If European workers had any doubts about the malign inten­
tions of Taylor and his European allies, Louis Renault soon 
eliminated them. A brilliant autocrat who created Europe's larg­
est automobile firm, Renault was typical of the French manufac­
turers who were attracted to scientific management. In 1907, one 
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of his subordinates, Georges de Ram, introduced a planning 
department, time study, instruction cards, and other measures in 
two shops. Production soon doubled. Renault was impressed but 
refused to extend de Ram's reforms because of their cost.50 Four 
years later, after visiting Taylor in Philadelphia, touring several 
plants and publicly announcing his "conversion," he decided to 
proceed with his own version of scientific management, and 
abruptly introduced time studies into his factory. His workers, 
fearful of what would follow, struck. Renault was conciliatory. He 
blamed de Ram for the trouble, agreed to the election of shop 
stewards, and promised to consult the workers before revising 
their rates. The strikers returned to their jobs but remained 
suspicious. After reading exaggerated accounts of conditions in 
American plants and failing to gain new concessions, they struck 
again in February 1913. The second strike lasted six weeks and 
initially commanded the support of most Renault workers. Like 
the Firestone strike in the United States, which occurred at the 
same time, and a strike at the Bosch Company in Germany several 
months later, it collapsed when the strikers exhausted their sav­
ings and became disenchanted with their leaders.51 
The Renault strike was a turning point in the diffusion of 
scientific management. From Britain to Russia, workers and 
unions became alert to the dangers of uncontrolled time study.52 
Yet they also became aware of the possibilities of scientific man­
agement. Le Chatelier argued that once workers learned about 
scientific management, they would distinguish between Taylor's 
promises of affluence and harmony and the foolish actions of a 
Renault. He considered the strike a public relations coup.53 In any 
event, Taylor's writings became more popular after 1913. If the 
new enthusiasm did not match the American "efficiency craze," it 
did mark the beginning of a proliferation of nonindustrial applica­
tions of Taylor's ideas. And, as in the United States, one measure 
of this broader conception of scientific management was the 
reconciliation of many unionists and working-class political lead­
ers who, like Gastev, were more impressed with the promise of 
order, planning, and security from capricious rule-of-thumb man­
agement than with the dangers of time study. 
Though there were important similarities between the Ameri­
can and European experiences in the mid 1910s, there was one 
crucial difference—the First World War. Beginning in the fall of 
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1914, European executives and government leaders had to cope 
with mounting pressures for industrial expansion, coordinated 
activity, class and interest group cooperation, and efficient use of 
scarce resources, pressures that American executives and employ­
ees would not experience until 1918. As government expanded it 
became more dependent on individuals with managerial and 
technical expertise. As factories grew, their managers became 
more dependent on management systems. After 1914 the exigen­
cies of war, more than the work of Taylor, Le Chatelier or others, 
shaped the scientific management movement. 
In three areas this effect was especially noticeable. First, the 
disruption of the economy and the labor force created powerful 
pressures for effective resource utilization. Unlike the American 
firms that produced arms and munitions for the Allies, European 
manufacturers had to increase production without commensurate 
increases in materials and labor. Their responses inevitably were to 
reduce waste, reorganize production for volume operations, and 
recruit women, handicapped workers, and other heretofore un­
conventional employees. Second, the labor shortage and the de­
mand for uninterrupted production forced manufacturers to in­
troduce labor reforms and to work more closely and cooperatively 
with unions.54 The result was an amalgamation of scientific and 
personnel management and a new emphasis on the compatibility 
of time study, incentive wage plans, and collective bargaining. 
Third, the substitution of political controls for market forces in 
many sectors required an unprecedented degree of production 
planning and coordination. 
While there was growing reliance on scientific management in 
all countries, the French experience is particularly well docu­
mented.55 Even before the war, French military officers had 
recognized the potential of scientific management for arsenal 
operations and had introduced Taylor's methods in at least one 
plant. After 1914, as they struggled to increase production, they 
increasingly relied on scientific management for the manufacture 
of shells, arms, explosives, motor vehicles, and airplanes.56 At the 
Penhoet navy yard at Saint-Nazaire, for example, they gave Leon 
Guillet, Le Chatelier's close friend and associate, a "free hand." 
Guillet organized a planning department, introduced time studies 
and a bonus wage, and installed other managerial innovations. 
When he left in late 1915, de Freminville succeeded him and 
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completed his work. Guillet and de Freminville treated the em­
ployees well and "won" their support.57 Most private employers 
were less enthusiastic and less scrupulous. Yet an American expert 
wrote in 1918 that he found in France "a better grasp of the 
essentials . . . than in the United States." Interest in scientific 
management was "more widespread. "58 Aimee Moutet concludes 
that scientific management made substantial inroads in French 
industry during the war, that engineers substituted a "scientific 
spirit" for the "ruling empiricism," and that the war experience 
"integrated the Taylor system in the general organization of the 
enterprise."59 
No less dramatic was the change in union attitudes. Organized 
labor's reaction to the Renault strike had suggested unyielding 
hostility. Yet the reformers who controlled the largest unions and 
the largest union federation were pragmatists who embraced the 
war effort and the campaign to increase production and produc­
tivity, provided they were accompanied by labor reforms. Under 
Alphonse Merrheim and Leon Jouhaux, the French labor move­
ment shifted from hostility to qualified support for scientific 
management. The attitudes of rank-and-file workers are more 
difficult to ascertain, though there were apparently no strikes 
against scientific management during the war period.60 
Most dramatic of all was the conversion of high government 
officials, notably the individuals responsible for directing the war 
economy and planning the postwar reconstruction. Neither Albert 
Thomas, the socialist who directed munitions production until 
late 1917, nor Etienne elemental, the Minister of Commerce, had 
had more than a superficial knowledge of Taylor's writings. Yet by 
1916 they were advocates of scientific management, promoters of 
industrial modernization, and champions of labor-management 
cooperation. Thomas, in particular, pushed scientific manage­
ment in conjunction with collective bargaining and labor reform. 
His outspoken advocacy of scientific management won him the 
enmity of conservative industrialists and far-left political col­
leagues, but he persisted. His rival and successor, Louis Locheur, 
was no less aggressive in promoting scientific management. Cle"­
mental, who became the central figure in the reconstruction 
effort, saw in wartime experiences the basis of a new postwar 
order, which would feature larger, more modern, and more so­
phisticated industrial operations, scientific management, labor­
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management cooperation, and government coordination of the 
61 economy.
The American role in the war, coupled with the collapse of 
living standards in the last months of the war and the first months 
of peace, created enormous interest in scientific management. In 
Germany more than one thousand books and articles on scientific 
management or "Taylorismus" appeared in the postwar period.62 
Waste in Industry had a galvanizing effect in Eastern Europe; it 
"contributed very largely to the promotion of scientific manage­
ment in Czechoslovakia."63 Karol Adamiecki, an engineering 
professor who had developed a series of charts and graphs similar 
to Gantt's, played a similar role in Poland.64 Professional groups 
devoted to aspects of scientific management emerged in Britain, 
though an effort to form an English branch of the Taylor Society 
did not fare as well.65 In industry, scientific management tech­
niques became widespread. Corporations with at least some mass 
production operations, such as Renault, Siemens, and Fiat, were 
leaders, but smaller firms in the textile, food processing, and 
mining industries were also active. By the mid 1920s, banks, 
insurance companies, department stores, and a variety of govern­
ment agencies were using scientific management to increase the 
quality and quantity of their services.66 
Three developments of the 1920s illustrated the appeal of scien­
tific management. First, the German Rationalization movement 
embraced a variety of objectives and causes. Yet the works of 
Schlesinger, Rathenau, Moellendorff, and other theorists, the 
operations of such firms as AEG and Siemens, and the activity of 
quasi-public agencies such as the Reichskuratorium fur Wirt­
schaftlichkeit did not compartmentalize factory operations, eco­
nomic planning, cartel negotiations, and corporatist political ar­
rangements. Rationalization was a seamless web, a measure of the 
larger implications of Taylor's ideas.67 Second, during the same 
period, enthusiasts in other nations formed a variety of promo­
tional associations analogous to the Taylor Society: the Masaryk 
Labor Academy in Czechoslovakia, E.N.I.O.S. in Italy, the Ox­
ford Management Conference in Britain, the French Conference 
on Scientific Management (which after its 1925 merger with 
Henry Fayol's Center for Administrative Studies became the 
French National Management Council). These groups organized 
international congresses in Prague (1924), Brussels (1925), Rome 
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(1927), and Paris (1929). They also persuaded the American phi­
lanthropist Edward A. Filene and the International Labor Organi­
zation to establish an International Management Institute in 
Geneva in 1927. Headed by Albert Thomas and later Lyndall 
Urwick, the Institute symbolized the acceptance of scientific 
management in postwar, pre-Depression Europe. Third, the rap­
id spread of scientific management was also related to a new 
tolerance among organized workers and union leaders similar to 
the position of the French labor movement after 1915. This change 
of attitude reflected greater care in the use of time study, but also 
the new link between scientific management and labor reform, the 
desire for American living standards, and the unions' declining 
fortunes.68 
The most striking example of the allure of scientific manage­
ment in the 1920s was its popularity in the Soviet Union. Lenin 
and Gastev found few allies until 1920. Then the desperate state of 
the Soviet economy, the Bolshevik commitment to industrializa­
tion, and the attractions of western technology led Soviet leaders 
to embrace scientific management in much the same way that their 
successors in the 1930s would embrace a similar panacea, the 
importation of American and German technology. At the height 
of his influence, Gastev preached a "Soviet Americanism" and a 
"new, flowering America" based on scientific management.69 
Gastev's first victory came in 1920 when he obtained official 
support for an Institute of Labor (TsIT) to conduct managerial 
research and promote scientific management. In the following 
months he outmaneuvered rivals and won additional patrons in 
the Soviet government. With the advent of the New Economic 
Policy, Gastev's cause flourished. In early 1921 there were twenty 
groups conducting research under his auspices; by mid 1923 there 
were fifty-eight. Most of them focused on raising industrial 
productivity but "rationalizing education, combating excessive 
lines at stores, improving the sorting of mail, reorganizing the 
harvesting of potatoes and even curing syphilis were all subjects of 
experimentation and research, . . . "70 Gastev soon attracted crit­
ics and rivals. His opponents attacked his preoccupation with time 
study and his technocratic approach, his slogan, for example, that 
"mankind learned how to process things; the time has come to 
thoroughly process man. "71 Gastev's most serious challenger was 
Pavel Kerzhentsev, a journalist who promoted a popular, non­
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technical approach to scientific management. Kerzhentsev's Time 
League, devoted to reducing waste in all areas of daily life, 
enjoyed a brief vogue in 1923-1924 and temporarily eclipsed 
Gastev's operations. Yet Kerzhentsev was no match for Gastev in 
the arena of bureaucratic combat. By 1925 he had lost official 
favor; together with the Time League he soon faded from view. 
Gastev, however, had little opportunity to savor his victory. The 
death of his chief patron, Felix Dzerzhinski, in 1926, made him 
vulnerable to attack and the triumph of Stalin in the late 1920s 
abruptly ended the Soviet commitment to scientific management. 
Some of Gastev's followers were purged as early as 1929; he 
persisted, with declining influence until his arrest and imprison­
ment in 1938. By that time nearly all his allies and associates had 
been killed or imprisoned.72 
What did Gastev accomplish, if anything? The reports of Amer­
ican engineers who visited the Soviet Union provide one measure 
of his impact. Royal R. Keely, a peripheral member of Taylor's 
coterie who made an extended survey in 1920, was contemptuous 
of Soviet industry.73 Walter Polakov, a prominent consultant of 
leftist sympathies who spent a year and half in the Soviet Union a 
decade later, reported only modest progress. "All of the vital 
details of scheduling, dispatching, production control, progress 
records, etc. are left mainly to chance." Time and motion study, 
he added, "is a thing little known in the U.S.S.R."74 While 
Polakov probably missed subtle changes of approach and attitude 
as well as applications outside manufacturing, his judgment was a 
commentary on the corrosive effects of political infighting and the 
intensity of grassroots opposition. Despite official support for 
nearly a decade, scientific management had few friends in mines 
or factories. The management expert was "the most hated man in 
industry." As Gastev himself acknowledged in 1927, "he is op­
posed by the director; he is opposed by the chief engineer; to a 
large degree he is opposed by the foreman; he clashes with the 
opposition of the workers. "75 Donald Filtzer's recent examination 
of Soviet time study data attests to the enormity of the challenge.76 
As Gastev and his allies fell out of favor, the resistance grew increas­
ingly violent. The Stakhanovite movement of the mid 1930s was a 
rebellion against time and motion study and the managerial 
authority that it enhanced.77 By the end of the decade few engi­
neers or managers were sufficiently bold or foolish to hold out. 
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The remarkable rise and fall of scientific management in the 
Soviet Union had no western parallel. The Depression of the 1930s 
diminished the attraction of American ideas and such European 
surrogates as rationalization, but apparently did not affect the 
progress of scientific management in industry. The best example 
was the success of the Bedaux firm in the 1930s. European 
affiliates of the American consulting company began to operate in 
Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and other countries in the late 
1920s. Hard times were good for business, despite renewed labor 
opposition. Bedaux's promise to save more than his fee, primarily 
through increased labor productivity, suited the thinking of in­
dustrialists in the 1930s.78 But Bedaux was not the only consulting 
firm that thrived. Urwick, Orr & Partners, and Wallace Clark & 
Co., for example, did well despite their fidelity to the Taylor 
approach. And though the international scientific management 
movement (including the International Management Institute) 
fell victim to hard times and rising political tensions, most of the 
institutions that impressed Paul Devinat in the 1920s continued to 
uphold the heritage of Taylor and his associates in the 1930s. 
The Japanese experience was similar. In the late 1920s and 1920s 
three groups promoted scientific management in Japanese indus­
try: consultants such as Yoichi Ueno and Araki Toichiro, who had 
personal contacts with Taylor, Gilbreth, and Emerson; mechanical 
engineers such as Takuo Godo of the naval arsenal at Kure and 
Shigeo Kato of Niigata Iron Works, who wanted to improve the 
operation of their plants; and engineering employees of Japanese 
firms allied with General Electric, Westinghouse, and other Ameri­
can multinationals, who borrowed technique as well as technology. 
Takeo Kato of Mitsubishi Electric, for example, brought back the 
Westinghouse factory manual and time study guide from a 1925 
visit and used them to modernize operating procedures in his 
firm. The Japanese government encouraged this activity, creating 
committees on rationalization that served as forums for propo­
nents of scientific management.79 
Though the history of scientific management in Europe and 
Japan in the 1930s and 1940s is hardly more complete than the 
history of scientific management in the United States, it is clear 
that the post-World War II leaders who argued that American 
management techniques would save wartorn countries from eco­
nomic backwardness greatly exaggerated the novelty of their 
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proposals. Like Americans •who saw in Stalin's Five Year plans the 
ultimate expression of scientific management planning, they con­
fused superficial appearances with reality. The mental revolution 
was not and had never been an American monopoly. 
Scientific Management in America, 1915 to the 1950s 
What happened to scientific management in the United States 
after 1915? The following essays examine the fates of the scientific 
management pioneers, the diffusion of scientific management in 
society and industry, and the criticisms of a later generation of 
analysts who had no firsthand knowledge of Taylor or his work. 
More important, they show that in the United States, as in 
Europe, scientific management continued to be a stimulus to 
thinking about the functions of organizations and a series of 
techniques for improving short-run economic performance. Be­
cause of this dual role, the study of scientific management pro­
vides an avenue for understanding the American interest in eco­
nomic and technical rationalization as well as the evolution of 
production management and the changing character of industrial 
work in the middle decades of the century. 
At the time of Taylor's death, none of the men close to him 
could match the fame or influence of two outsiders, Richard A. 
Feiss and Frank B. Gilbreth. Feiss was an innovative executive 
whose Joseph & Feiss Company had recently emerged as the most 
attractive and promising expression of the promise of scientific 
management. Feiss's operation was not only large and successful; 
it also was a compelling example of the logical links between 
Taylor-inspired industrial engineering and advanced personnel 
work. Feiss and his influential assistant, Mary Barnett Gilson, 
soon embraced a form of social engineering commensurate with 
the company's commitment to industrial efficiency but far ex­
ceeding anything Taylor or his immediate disciples ever imagined. 
Scientific management and a large female labor force proved to be 
a potent combination. David Goldberg's essay (chapter 2) is the 
most complete description to date of the Feiss operation and the 
ironic fate of Feiss and his colleagues in the 1920s. 
Gilbreth's career is better known. His ebullient personality, 
innovations in job analysis, conflicts with Taylor, and unconven­
tional family life made him a celebrity. Yet, as Brian Price explains 
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in chapter 3, public visibility did not translate into professional or 
material success. Despite his fame, Gilbreth made little progress 
in establishing the superiority of his innovations to conventional 
time study or in satisfying his clients. At the time of his death in 
1924, his career was at low ebb, his reputation sullied by repeated 
failures. He escaped the fate of Feiss, however, because of the 
potential of motion study and because of the efforts of his wife and 
partner, Lillian Gilbreth. During the 1930s, as motion study 
reemerged as an important feature of work analysis and Lillian 
became a celebrity in her own right, the Gilbreths of the early 
1920s gave way to the more enduring and attractive Gilbreths of 
Cheaper by the Dozen (1948)—happy, successful, and respected. 
In the meantime the ideas or principles of scientific manage­
ment had attracted wide interest in American intellectual circles. 
Some writers and scholars became critics; others saw potential 
benefits for themselves and society. The spectrum of possibilities 
is evident in chapters 4 and 5, which examine the reactions of 
several groups of academics and the prominent social investigator, 
Mary Van Kleeck. Professors saw scientific management primarily 
in terms of academic politics; yet their effort to exploit it for their 
benefit created a powerful and wholly unanticipated mechanism 
for the spread of Taylor's ideas. It was no coincidence that a large 
proportion of active participants in the management movement of 
the 1920s and 1930s were university faculty members or that 
Taylor's work became an important feature of the education of 
engineers and managers. Van Kleeck, on the other hand, began her 
career as a prominent social worker, not unlike Mary Barnett 
Gilson. She became interested in industrial issues, saw scientific 
management as an answer to the disorganization and anarchic 
individualism of laissez-faire capitalism, and viewed its success as 
proof of the efficacy of production planning in society as a whole. 
As Guy Alchon explains, these views also led her to admire the 
Soviet experiment and ultimately to become an apologist for the 
Soviet state. 
Although scientific management had implications for all insti­
tutions, it is most closely identified with industrial production. 
Supporters and critics alike assumed that its greatest impact was in 
the factory. But they have had more trouble specifying the nature 
of that impact. During Taylor's lifetime, when relatively small 
numbers of firms and workers were involved, it was possible to 
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physically inspect most of the important sites, as C. Bertrand 
Thompson and Robert Hoxie did. By the late 1910s that type of 
evaluation was impossible; a small group of practitioners no 
longer controlled access to Taylor's techniques, and the number of 
applications exceeded the investigative capabilities of any individ­
ual. Nevertheless, several indirect measures are possible.80 They 
suggest that by the 1930s scientific management in the workplace 
no longer implied revolutionary change or had special appeal for 
avant garde executives like Richard A. Feiss. In most cases manag­
ers viewed it in narrow, utilitarian terms and introduced or 
extended it to help achieve the potential of mass production 
technologies and to manage semiskilled workers. These trends 
probably accelerated in the 1930s, when economic decline spurred 
a renewed search for lower costs. 
Three papers examine the application of scientific management 
in industry. Kathy Burgess's subject in chapter 6 is the Link-Belt 
Company, which had been one of Taylor's original demonstration 
firms. She reports a pattern of activity that was consistent over a 
long period but which differed markedly from that of Joseph & 
Feiss and presumably the mass production and service firms that 
embraced scientific management in the 1920s. Link-Belt de­
pended on highly skilled workers. Scientific management im­
proved their work and generally won their applause, but it could 
not insure that they would not join unions or strike. To Link-Belt 
managers, this was a serious shortcoming, which they addressed 
through traditional union avoidance measures: labor spies, black 
lists, and arbitrary discharges. Thus the mental revolution at 
Link-Belt was never complete; despite the introduction of modern 
personnel work and other refinements of scientific management in 
the 1920s, Link-Belt managers continued to rely on draconian 
anti-union tactics as long as it was legally feasible to do so. 
During the same period, the enigmatic Charles Bedaux demon­
strated that the techniques of scientific management could be 
successfully applied without a broader commitment, or a liberal 
vision like that of the Taylor Society insiders. In the 1920s and 
1930s, Bedaux became the best-known industrial consultant, with 
a large clientele in the United States and Europe. A latecomer to 
scientific management, he prospered while Feiss, Gilbreth, and 
many of the pioneers stumbled. Yet the ingredients of his success 
are obscure because of his deliberately secretive approach. The 
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discovery of the records of his British operations has finally raised 
the veil on Bedaux's activities. In chapter 7, Steven Kreis discusses 
Bedaux's tactics and their effects. 
Most big businesses, however, did not employ outsiders or 
employed them only briefly and sporadically. John Rumm's study 
of Du Pont (chapter 8) is the first detailed account of an industrial 
engineering department over a long period. Like Kreis's study, it 
illustrates the narrow, practical focus of most scientific manage­
ment applications. Du Pont executives had created a sophisticated 
organization based on principles of scientific management long 
before they established an industrial engineering department. 
Only when the Depression required extensive cost cutting did 
they extend scientific management to the shop floor. Still, their 
effort provides a detailed view of Taylor's techniques in action and 
an illuminating contrast with the experiences of Joseph & Feiss, 
Link-Belt, and other pioneers. 
During Taylor's lifetime, the focus of most assessments of the 
impact of scientific management was its effect on work and 
workers. In the 1920s and 1930s this emphasis gradually faded, 
though Bedaux's work continued to elicit controversy. In part, 
this change was political; union policy changed and personalities 
like Taylor and Gilbreth no longer served as lightning rods for 
opposition to managerial change. In the 1930s, when labor mili­
tancy revived, organizing efforts and economic issues overshadowed 
the concerns of a more prosperous and confident era. Equally 
important, however, was the ambiguous effect of scientific man­
agement on industrial work. By the 1920s, it was clear that 
scientific management had not fulfilled its critics' apocalyptic 
forecasts. If Link-Belt and Du Pont were representative, most 
effects of scientific management were the results of changes in the 
operation of the firm as a whole, of changes in production 
processes, and of often diverse and inconsistent applications of 
time and motion study. The relationship between scientific man­
agement and work remained complex and variable. 
Nevertheless, in the 1940s scientific management attracted a 
new generation of critics who focused on the worker. Two stimuli 
probably accounted for this development: the wide acceptance of 
managerial principles that were directly or indirectly associated 
with Taylor and a growing tendency to use Taylor as a straw man 
in order to emphasize revisionist ideas.81 The result was a percep­
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tion of scientific management as both influential and defective. Of 
the postwar critics, the best known was Peter E Drucker, an 
Austrian-born scholar and management theorist whose works 
attracted a wide popular and academic audience. While professing 
admiration for Taylor's ideas, Drucker had reservations about 
their application in the large private bureaucracies that dominated 
the postwar economy. As an antidote to excessive specialization, 
organizational fragmentation, and professional isolation, Drucker 
proposed a procedure that he called Management By Objective 
(MBO). As Stephen Waring explains in chapter 9, MBO was a 
natural outgrowth of Drucker's earlier philosophical studies and 
ideological perspective. In practice it was highly controversial. 
Waring finds it flawed in conception and poorly or incompletely 
applied. Among other problems, Drucker, like Taylor, was af­
flicted by a legion of followers whose activities were halfhearted 
or uninspired and whose principal interest was immediate finan­
cial gain. 
Waring concludes that Taylor's ideas continued to influence 
managers in the 1950s and 1960s. To rephrase his point, Taylor's 
ideas, modified and expanded upon by Richard A. Feiss, Mary 
Gilson, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, Mary Van Kleeck, Charles 
Bedaux, a host of academic proponents and critics, executives at 
Link-Belt, Du Pont, and other firms, and many others influenced 
the operation of American institutions in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
after. The precise nature of that influence has not been adequately 
gauged or appreciated. This collection of essays is a step toward 
that end. 
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2 Richard A. Feiss, Mary Barnett Gilson, and 
Scientific Management at Joseph & Feiss, 
1 9 0 9 - 1 9 2 5 
From the early 1910s to the mid-i92os, the premier exam­
ple of the application of scientific management in industry was the 
factory of the Joseph & Feiss Company, a Cleveland, Ohio, 
manufacturer of men's suits. The architects of this remarkable 
effort were the company's vice president, Richard A. Feiss, and its 
pioneering personnel manager, Mary Barnett Gilson. Feiss and 
Gilson demonstrated that scientific management was as appropri­
ate to the comparatively labor-intensive production of suits as it 
was to the more capital- and energy-intensive operations that 
Taylor had reorganized. But they also grasped, better than Taylor, 
the larger implications of scientific management for the worker 
and society. Sensing the limitations of the engineers' approach, 
they combined Taylor's industrial engineering techniques with 
contemporary welfare practices to create a synthesis that antici­
pated the trend of the post-World War I years. In the process they 
challenged conventional ideas about the relations of employer and 
employee and the roles of women in industry. For a decade, Joseph 
& Feiss was as famous for its social engineering as it was for its 
suits. 
Founded by German-Jewish immigrants in the 1840s, Joseph & 
Feiss grew slowly until the 1890s when it became one of the first 
clothing manufacturers to dispense with outside contractors and 
to produce suits and clothing entirely within its own plant. This 
change meant that the small contractors, primarily Czech immi­
grants, who had been doing the skilled tailoring and pressing 
work for the firm could no longer maintain their own shops. 
40 
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Many of these displaced craftsmen found employment at Joseph & 
Feiss Company as inspectors and foremen. 
These changes occurred at a time when new technology and 
new managerial techniques were transforming the manufacture of 
men's clothing. Making use of semiautomatic machinery driven 
by electric power, employers thoroughly divided and subdivided 
operations so that the manufacture of a suit involved as many as 
189 separate steps. Female employees performed most of the 
repetitive tasks, such as sewing on pockets, collars, and sleeves, 
and men worked primarily as cutters and tailors. 
The men's clothing industry proved suitable for the use of high-
volume production techniques since it did not have the constant 
changes of style that characterized the women's clothing industry. 
In addition, since Joseph & Feiss concentrated on the production of 
medium-priced suits (sold mainly through outlets in small towns 
of the middle west), its product lines proved relatively easy to 
standardize. Indeed, the firm's staple, the blue serge suit, came to 
be known as the "Model T" of the men's clothing industry. In peak 
years the company sold over 200,000 garments of this type. 
Good salesmanship as well as mastery of mass-production 
techniques accounted for the firm's success. Capitalizing on the 
popularization of the craft ideal by the book publisher and editor 
Elbert Hubbard, the company in the 1890s began to market its 
goods under the "Clothcraft" label. Sales shot up immediately 
even though this bit of advertising gimmickry disguised the 
fact that changes initiated by Joseph & Feiss had eliminated the 
jobs of the custom tailors, which had been the basis of the 
craft.1 
A turning point in the firm's history came in 1905 when Richard 
A. Feiss, the son of one of the company's owners, became vice 
president in charge of organization and manufacturing. Feiss 
graduated from Harvard in 1901 and received a law degree from 
Harvard Law School, but found the practice of law too "routine." 
While living in Boston, Feiss became a devotee of Frederick W. 
Taylor's theories of scientific management. Feiss hung Taylor's 
portrait in his office, acquired an extensive collection of pamph­
lets and books on Taylorism, and eventually became president of 
the Taylor Society. A person so compulsive and methodical that he 
measured the exact distance between his dormitory and his class­
rooms and later numbered each paragraph of his articles, Feiss set 
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out to prove Taylor's theories could be applied to the notoriously 
seasonal and changeable clothing industry.2 
Supremely confident in his own abilities, Feiss wanted to make 
the Clothcraft Company the most efficient clothing firm in the 
country. In keeping with Taylor's recommendations, engineers 
and time and motion study technicians scrutinized each task 
performed by operatives and placed them in eight separate grades. 
Each task was subdivided to the "last possible degree" and piece 
rates were reviewed four times annually to see if any readjust­
ments were necessary. The greatest care was taken not to set the 
initial rate too high so that if reclassification proved necessary it 
would be in an "upward direction only." Operatives generally 
began at the lowest grade so they would have an opportunity to 
work their way up. Production clerks kept careful records and 
employees always had a slip informing them of their earnings.3 
The piece rate system was so detailed that John R. Commons 
considered it "as highly refined" as any in the country. Nowhere 
had he seen "such minute measurement."4 
To spur on its workers and to reduce turnover and absenteeism, 
the Clothcraft Company developed an interlocking system of six 
separate bonuses. A daily production bonus was paid to each 
operative who maintained his or her standard rate; a daily quality 
bonus was paid to operatives who avoided rejections for defective 
workmanship; a daily attendance bonus of 50 cents per day 
rewarded those who came to work on time; an excuse bonus 
(which reduced the penalty for not reporting to work) rewarded 
those who explained their absence; a service bonus of 5 cents per 
day for every year of service rewarded long-term employees; and 
an advance notice bonus encouraged employees to forewarn the 
company about their intention to leave.5 
No aspect of factory organization escaped scrutiny. The ar­
rangement and placement of machinery was "scientifically" worked 
out to minimize lost time. An orthopedic surgeon designed new 
chairs for employees, and special tables made it possible for 
garments to be "handled as quickly and with as few motions as 
possible." To reduce monotony and fatigue the company allowed 
female operatives to get new batches of garments rather than have 
them delivered to their work stations.6 
In keeping with Taylor's emphasis on the importance of the 
smooth flow of production, Feiss greatly enlarged the planning 
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department, which developed a system by which trousers, vests, 
and coats were sent through the plant simultaneously. Pressing 
operations were also integrated into each step of production. A 
centrally located tally board served as the plant's "pulse" and 
foremen knew "at a glance" where "pressure" needed to be 
applied. Operatives were usually trained to perform more than 
one task and moved from one work station to another to remove 
bottlenecks. Since practically all of the sewing operations were 
carried out in a mammoth, well-lit, well-ventilated workroom in 
a state-of-the-art factory building (located in a westside residen­
tial neighborhood), supervisors did not even have to go from 
room to room to check on the production process.7 
Speed became the firm's hallmark. A visitor to the plant in 1914 
noted: "At the Clothcraft shops all workers are at full speed within 
a minute after the first bell rings and they keep up the drive until 
the last bell." Another outside observer commented: "Speed­
lightning speed—is probably the first impression that forces itself 
upon the visitor in the factory. The operatives work with a 
smoothness, rapidity and precision that are astonishing."8 Ac­
cording to Feiss, these methods enabled the firm to produce 
medium-grade clothing at one-half the cost of its competitors. 
They also meant that the company needed 20 percent fewer 
workers to produce the same amount of clothing as previously, 
although the firm's workforce continued to grow between 1910 
and 1920 (when it reached a peak of 1,500) because of greatly 
expanded output.9 
The company's initial efforts to implement this system led to 
one of the earliest walkouts against scientific management. In 
January, 1909, skilled pressers struck to protest wage cuts that they 
said would reduce their earnings from 25 to 50 percent, work rules 
that they considered onerous, and fines that penalized workers for 
damages. Ethnic solidarity also played a role in the strike. The 
Czech pressers protested against Feiss's efforts to eliminate the 
independent tailors, who were also Czech immigrants.10 
One object of the workers' anger was a book of twenty-three 
rules that the firm issued in early 1909. The regulations mandated 
fines for tardiness and for failing to report a change of address and 
required all employees to obtain buttons when they arrived for 
work (instead of punching a clock) which meant that even those 
who were just a few minutes late had to go through the humiliat­
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ing procedure of reporting to the supervisor's office. The rules 
also prohibited anyone from leaving the plant at lunch time. 
It is hardly surprising that skilled, veteran, male workers led 
the protest against regulations that workers termed "penitentiary 
rules." Yet over 600 female workers joined the men on the picket 
lines, actively participated in the walkout, and insisted that they 
be included as officers in a branch of the AFL's United Garment 
Workers that was established during the month-long strike. 
Despite demonstrations, parades, and picket lines, the company 
retained the loyalty of enough workers and hired enough strike­
breakers to defeat the walkout. Those who were not fired returned 
to a factory that not only retained the twenty-three rules but that 
remained so regimented that male and female employees had to 
line up in "fire drill formation" before marching to separate 
lunchrooms at the noon hour.11 
Clearly, the strike failed to halt or even to slow down the 
implementation of scientific management at the Clothcraft Com­
pany. On the other hand, the firm soon adopted a wide variety of 
welfare programs, despite Taylor's strictures against welfare 
work. By 1916 the firm had gone further in combining Taylorism 
and welfarism than any other company in the country.12 Several 
factors in addition to the strike led Feiss to choose this course of 
action. Always concerned with improving productivity, he be­
lieved a more contented workforce would be more productive. He 
was also influenced by a wave of walkouts that hit the clothing 
industry between 1909 and 1911. In addition, Cleveland provided a 
sympathetic milieu, serving as home to a number of welfare-
minded firms.13 Lastly, Richard Feiss's personal motivations 
played a major role; in the manner of Henry Ford, he set out to 
uplift, Americanize, and remold his workforce. Feiss sincerely 
believed that industry had the responsibility for the "mental, 
moral and spiritual advancement" of its employees and desired 
that his factory perform functions that one normally associated 
with parenting or the public school.14 
To Feiss, these endeavors had to become an integral rather than 
a peripheral part of management. To insure that the firm recog­
nized their importance, he created a new department called Em­
ployment and Service (rejecting Welfare because it smacked too 
much of "philanthropy"). In 1913, he invited Mary Barnett Gil-
son, a Wellesley College graduate, to become its head.15 
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Gilson was an example of a Progressive era reformer who cast 
her lot with industry rather than with settlement houses or trade 
unions. Upon graduating from college she helped train depart­
ment store clerks but had come to dislike the "artificiality" of that 
environment. She subsequently worked as a vocational counselor 
at a trade school for girls, where she gained her experience making 
home visits. Sympathetic to the needs of working women, she had 
even walked a picket line in support of striking textile workers. In 
1912, she heard Taylor speak and became a convert to his theories, 
in particular because of the stress he put on the "responsibilities" 
of management. Thus when Feiss offered her a position with the 
Clothcraft Company, she jumped at the opportunity to integrate 
personnel work with factory management.16 
Assuming the position of superintendent of the Employment 
and Service Department in 1913, Gilson remained with the firm 
for twelve years and became the nation's best-known welfare 
secretary.17 Since Feiss and Gilson both shared a commitment to 
Taylorism and to service work (the term they preferred), they 
made an ideal team. 
Many of the programs that Feiss and Gilson introduced resem­
bled those in existence at other industrial plants. For example, 
they sponsored dances, picnics, choral societies, clubs, an orches­
tra, and an extensive athletic program.18 On the other hand, no 
employer made a more determined effort to alter the values and 
behavior of the Czech, Italian, Hungarian, Slovak, and Lithua­
nian women who comprised the bulk of its workforce. In the 
process of trying to create more productive workers and an 
achievement-oriented business culture, the firm left little to 
chance. As Gilson later admitted, "There was no facet of life we 
did not touch."19 
Gilson's role began when the prospective employee appeared at 
the plant. During the hiring process the Employment and Service 
Department administered a battery of psychological, intelligence, 
and dexterity tests. Upon being hired, a new employee had her 
"duties" explained to her by a company representative who em­
phasized "the unfairness of trying to work in the factory and at 
home."20 This issue particularly concerned Gilson, who believed 
that fatigue caused by overwork in the home reduced the produc­
tivity and increased the absenteeism of female workers. For this 
reason, she used systematic home visits and in-plant talks with 
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women workers and their mothers to convince them to be more 
assertive within their families. This could involve getting "for­
eign-born men" to share the cooking rather than treating their 
wives as "beasts of burden;" convincing parents to allow their 
daughters to attend wholesome evening entertainments in the 
plant rather than making them "practically" prisoners in their 
own homes; or suggesting to a "fat, comfortable and tradition-
worshiping woman" that her six sons could pack their own 
lunches and do their own mending rather than leaving such chores 
exclusively to the sole daughter who worked at the Clothcraft 
Company. But as a realist, Gilson knew that most men wished to 
avoid "effeminating themselves" and thus advocated the five-day 
workweek so that women would have Saturday to work in the 
home.21 Since Feiss also believed Saturday work to be inefficient, 
the plant in 1919 went on an eight-and-one-half hour day, five-day 
week, fulfilling Taylor's prediction that implementation of his 
system would lead to a reduction in hours.22 
Assaults on traditionalism concerned "even the most intimate 
matters." A well-equipped medical department offered birth 
control information, gave instruction on diet and hygiene, and 
discouraged employees from patronizing quacks. Other members 
of the Employment and Service Department visited "every ab­
sentee" in order to investigate home conditions. At such times, 
they might give advice on how to make more "practical" use of 
parlors and how to ventilate homes in order to prevent headaches. 
The firm also began a savings program since it believed young, 
female operatives lacked incentives when, as occurred in "an 
astonishing number of cases," they had to hand unopened pay 
envelopes over to "avaricious parents."23 
Feiss and Gilson, who both frowned upon any form of ostenta­
tion, also made a concerted effort to control the conduct and dress 
of their employees. On various occasions, Feiss berated workers 
for smoking, for wearing rolled-down stockings, makeup, or 
jewelry, and for chewing gum, which he considered "unhealthy" 
and "disgusting."24 Gilson later admitted that the company be­
came overly "authoritarian" and "obsessed" with personal habits, 
but in 1916 she claimed that "it is no longer a debatable question 
that elaborate clothes and jewelry and powder and paint have a 
demoralizing effect on the character and ability of a working 
girl."25 Articles in the Clothcraft magazine, such as "What Shall I 
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Wear to Work Today," aimed at instructing young women on the 
proper way to dress. Foremen (who frequently objected to being 
given such petty tasks) were responsible for enforcing the personal 
standards set by Feiss and Gilson.26 
Disturbed by their employees' patronage of "cheap amuse­
ments" and attendance at "cheap dance halls and movies," the 
company instituted a series of choral performances, entertain­
ments, and dances that aimed at providing a wholesome alterna­
tive to the coarser forms of amusement. Company programs 
ended promptly at 9 P.M., "thereby setting a standard of proper 
hours." Another opportunity to control behavior came at the noon 
hour when employees sat at tables with assigned "heads" who 
monitored conversations and forbade the use of foreign lan­
27 guages.
Gilson also sought to ensure that women had opportunities for 
promotion. Wishing to discourage hasty marriage, she urged 
female employees to think of their jobs as more than a way station 
to matrimony. In general, the firm preferred to promote from 
within and, far more than most firms, encouraged women to seek 
"positions of responsibility." By 1920, twenty-one of the firm's 
forty-six supervisors were female and a number of the women 
managed men—an uncommon occurrence in American industry.28 
Gilson also hoped to "bridge the gulf between office and factory" 
and tried to discourage clerical employees from regarding them­
selves as superior to factory hands. However, she had less success 
in this endeavor since the firm's executives refused to submit their 
"blond twinkle toes secretary(s)" to the same discipline as other 
employees.29 
In keeping with Taylor's recommendations, the firm also re­
duced the foremen's authority. This meant that foremen and 
forewomen no longer had the power to hire and fire and that all 
planning was now done by management. To avoid any possible 
favoritism on the part of supervisors, all batches were assigned to 
sewing room operatives in numerical sequence. And as a sign of 
the firm's solicitousness of employees, Employment and Service 
personnel elicited complaints about foremen and forewomen dur­
ing home visits.30 Indeed, the firm tried so hard to remove the 
"old style bosses with their petty tyrannies" that Richard Feiss 
claimed "one of the words we never permit used in our factory is 
'authority.' Foremen are employed for responsibility alone."31 
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By the early 1920s, Gilson and Feiss could claim considerable 
success in their efforts to join scientific management with welfare 
capitalism. As one of the many laudatory articles written about 
the company put it, this truly was "a shop where science and 
humanity combine[d]."32 Morris Cooke, Carl Barth, Lillian Gil­
breth, and many other luminaries of the management movement 
visited the plant and many journalists wrote favorable articles 
about working conditions, which the company reprinted in its 
advertising campaigns. Through the use of home visits, bonuses, 
the five-day week and other means, the turnover rate was reduced 
from 150.3 percent per year in 1910 to 41.3 percent in 1923. Feiss 
even claimed that his firm had "the steadiest payroll force in the 
. city of Cleveland." Despite all of his denials of philanthropic 
intent, Feiss believed that employers had a "duty" and a "moral 
responsibility" to provide steady employment under "all possible 
conditions." This goal was achieved through the firm's practice of 
producing its staple—blue serge suits —during slack seasons rather 
than laying off large numbers of employees.33 
It is difficult to assess the impact these programs had on the 
company's employees. By paying higher wages, reducing the 
hours of labor, promoting on the basis of performance, providing 
instruction on health and hygiene and encouraging women to 
think in terms of self-advancement, the Employment and Service 
Department contributed to the employees' well-being. On the 
other hand, the Clothcraft Company also demanded loyalty to the 
corporation. Whatever benefits workers realized from the compa­
ny's programs came at the expense of privacy. By requiring yearly 
physical exams, by forbidding workers from leaving the plant at 
lunchtime, by exercising the right to visit a worker's home after 
each and every absence, by inspecting lockers and by regulating 
employees' dress and conduct, the Clothcraft Company exercised 
authority over all aspects of workers' lives.34 Defending manage­
ment's right "to interest itself in the lives of workers outside 
as well as inside the factory," Gilson claimed it as not just a 
"right" but as a "duty" that was "a natural outgrowth of execu­
tive responsibility."35 Significantly, a report prepared for the 
firm suggested that "husky and oftentimes obstreperous men" 
might have raised more objections to these programs than young 
female operatives.36 More recently, historians have suggested 
that women might have proven more amenable to social control 
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than men because they had already been socialized to accept 
authority.37 
From the firm's perspective, one measure of the success of 
welfare capitalism was the fact that after 1909 the company 
remained free of labor unrest. Most notably, between 1922 and 
1925, Joseph & Feiss withstood a well-financed organizing drive 
conducted by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America 
(ACWA). The ACWA had been founded in 1914 when Sidney 
Hillman and other members of the AFL's United Garment Work­
ers decided to leave that organization. Immediately upon its 
formation, the ACWA successfully organized thousands of immi­
grant and female workers. It scored even greater gains between 
1916 and 1919 when it took advantage of war-induced prosperity 
and the immediate postwar boom to secure contracts from all of 
the large firms in such men's clothing centers as Baltimore, 
Rochester, and Chicago.38 
The ACWA's first victories in Cleveland came in March 1919 
when a concerted drive led to the unionization of a number of the 
city's smaller shops.39 At this time, the ACWA made little effort to 
organize Joseph & Feiss or Richman Brothers, the city's other 
large nonunion firm.40 Upon the onset of the 1920-1921 depres­
sion, the ACWA was forced to assume a defensive posture, but 
when prosperity returned in late 1922, the ACWA decided to take 
on the Clothcraft Company. 
Given Sidney Hillman's open support for scientific management, 
it may seem surprising that the Joseph & Feiss Company did not 
welcome the ACWA. However, Joseph & Feiss was not one of the 
"elite" firms that believed unions had a role to play in establishing 
standards and bringing stability to the industry.41 Feiss may have 
been an admirer of Hillman but he definitely believed the firm 
would be better off without the interference of local Cleveland 
ACWA leaders, whom he deemed less capable and more militant 
than Hillman. Though Gilson in her memoirs claimed the company 
did not interfere with the organizing drive, the firm fired one 
ACWA organizer, and management convened a special meeting of 
foremen and forewomen to discuss inroads made by the union.42 
The ACWA launched its campaign in October 1922. Led by a 
female organizer, Hortense Powdermaker, the union opened an 
office near the Joseph & Feiss plant and began to distribute leaflets 
to employees. By November 1922, the ACWA had enrolled 236 
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male and 122 female Clothcraft employees. Confident that it was 
on the road to victory, the ACWA formed a local for the plant's 
employees in February 1923, and began the second phase of its 
drive. During the next six months, the union sponsored a number 
of meetings for various ethnic groups and held numerous educa­
tional and social gatherings. During the entire period it said little 
about welfarism and focused its demands on wages, union recog­
nition, and abolition of the "hated blue marks," which reduced 
employees' bonus earnings.43 
In late 1923 the ACWA concluded that it lacked the support to 
carry out a successful organizing strike and dropped the entire 
effort. During the next year local leaders ceased open activity, but 
in December 1924 the ACWA launched a second campaign, led by 
a male organizer, Beryl Peppercorn. This time the ACWA chal­
lenged the company's welfare policies more directly, urging work­
ers, "Demand to be let alone." Challenging notions that the 
factory could be thought of as a "charitable institution," the 
ACWA mocked the "hypocritical smile of the uplifter who gets 
paid to smile" and ridiculed the handing out of gifts at Christ­
mastime. In questioning the level of regimentation inside the 
plant, the union asked workers: "Are you free men and women?" 
This drive proved even less successful than the first one. In early 
1925 the union began to issue sarcastic leaflets that asked: "How 
much longer are you going to sleep and have them keep a veil over 
your eyes"; "Don't stand still, you are blocking the traffic"; and 
most tellingly of all, "Play bridge girls, it is a very good game if 
you have no other troubles." The union ended its campaign in 
May 192 5.44 
A number of factors accounted for the failure of the two 
organizing drives. Undoubtedly, Feiss and Gilson had created a 
"family" atmosphere that the union threatened.45 The ACWA 
itself blamed "continuity of work," which had largely eliminated 
layoffs.46 The company also screened out potential organizers or 
militants during the hiring process, dismissed those whose views 
ran counter to the "spirit" of the organization and followed a 
policy of hiring friends and relatives of current employees.47 The 
smooth flow of work did much to remove bottlenecks that often 
irked pieceworkers; an employee representation plan established 
in 1919 provided a means of presenting grievances; and the curbs 
on foremen and forewomen removed other problems.48 
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Ironically, the ACWA's campaign collapsed at a time when 
tensions that had been brewing within the firm for a number of 
years finally came to a head. The company's problems began with 
a sales slump during the postwar depression. That decline coin­
cided with the opening of a new factory building that after 1921 
housed all of the company's operations and imposed a consider­
able burden on the firm. Even after the depression lifted, the 
company's position did not improve much. Its major difficulty 
was that "the farmer, the coal miner and the factory -worker," who 
were the company's best customers, now had automobiles and no 
longer had to shop in their own immediate localities. By 1925, 
many clothing stores in small midwestern towns that had previ­
ously served as outlets for the firm's goods had closed entirely. 
Compounding the difficulty, many of the company's old custom­
ers began to buy more stylish suits and overcoats. The firm was 
poorly situated to cope with changing fashions since it had only a 
small design department, and Feiss was indifferent to if not 
contemptuous of trends in clothing styles.49 
Given its large overhead costs, the firm could ill afford a slump 
in sales. By 1925, the new plant, with a capacity of 750,000 suits 
per year, was only producing 3 50,000 per year. The company's net 
earnings dropped from $375,006 in 1923 to $138,422 in 1924, and 
it failed to pay its preferred dividend for the first time.50 Not very 
surprisingly, given the dire economic situation, some of the firm's 
executives began to view the work of the Employment and 
Service Department as "frills." Facing deep cuts in the welfare 
program and the end of her influence, Gilson chose to resign at the 
end of 1924.51 
Feiss's troubles were far worse. His father and brother (both of 
whom held high executive positions in the firm) had come to 
believe that scientific management was too costly and no longer 
provided the "efficiencies or economies" it had in better times.52 
As part of their revaluation of the firm's commitment to Taylor-
ism, Feiss's relatives also began to question the "'big' salaries" 
paid to engineers and other scientific management experts in the 
manufacturing department. Feiss made every effort to defend the 
application of Taylor's principles and blamed the firm's difficulties 
on its failure to apply scientific management to the merchandising 
and selling departments. But his father and brother gained the 
support of all of the firm's other executives and he had little choice 
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but to resign in mid 1925. According to Kepple Hall, the firm's 
superintendent of planning and a nationally known management 
expert whose own "big" salary was being questioned, Feiss was 
"crushed" by this series of events.53 
From Hall's perspective, the "unenlightened members" of the 
firm had gained control and were about to dismantle key aspects 
of scientific management, including the bonus system, the rout­
ing plan, and the cost system.54 Nothing this drastic seems to have 
occurred, although in June 1926 Feiss complained about "changes" 
that had been made in "some of the control methods which mean a 
step away from the fundamental principles of coordination and 
control. "55 In reality, the firm appears to have maintained many of 
the essential features of Taylorism but "dropped many of the 
refinements" and simplified controls so as to require a smaller 
supervisory force.56 
Regardless of how many changes the firm actually made, the 
business difficulties encountered by the Joseph & Feiss Company 
and the subsequent revaluation of its commitment to Taylorism 
were a major embarrassment to the scientific management move­
ment. Richard A. Feiss had served as president of the Taylor 
Society, and as late as October 1924 had published an article on 
"Personal Relationship as a Basis of Scientific Management" in 
the Bulletin of the Taylor Society. Kepple Hall, who also lost his job, 
probably spoke for many in the Taylor Society when he insisted 
that the problem was not scientific management but a "tempera­
mental Jew losing his head because he does not see a profit. "57 
The reorganization of Joseph & Feiss was thus a blow to the 
progress of scientific management. After 1925 the company was 
no longer a showcase for industrial and social engineering; propo­
nents no longer could point to it as proof of the power of scientific 
management to overcome the vicissitudes of the marketplace; and 
Feiss and Gilson no longer played the practical and symbolic roles 
they had performed so convincingly in earlier years. Yet it would 
be wrong to exaggerate these changes. Joseph & Feiss recovered 
quickly and resumed its growth with most of its managerial 
infrastructure and many of its welfare programs intact.58 The 
management movement also became more, not less, prominent in 
the late 1920s. Gilson went on to a distinguished career in univer­
sity teaching and most Joseph & Feiss employees were reemployed 
by 1926. Only Richard A. Feiss did not fare well. His dismissal 
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marked the beginning of a personal and professional decline that 
effectively ended his career. His brother later wrote that he was 
poorly qualified for the clothing business, which depended on 
financial and merchandising expertise more than on production 
management.59 But it appears that his inflexibility and obsessive­
ness, which had helped make him and Joseph & Feiss stars in the 
scientific management firmament, also made it difficult for him 
to work for anyone in any industry. 
In the meantime Feiss, Gilson and their subordinates had dem­
onstrated what a commitment to scientific management could 
mean. Starting with Taylor's technical and organizational re­
forms, they pursued the logic of scientific management to the 
factory door and beyond, challenging convention at every step. 
Their initiatives obliterated the distinction between contempo­
rary Taylorism and welfare work; exposed the artificiality of 
customary notions of women's abilities and motivations; redefined 
the boundaries of employer-employee relations; and challenged a 
host of other orthodoxies, for example that supervisors were the 
best judges of current or potential employees, that turnover was 
inevitable, and that shorter hours increased production costs. 
Their approach was not the only way to interpret Taylor's message 
and it was not the choice of most executives. But for a decade it 
enabled them to explore, as well as anyone, the possibilities that 
Taylor had in mind when he spoke of "a mental revolution." 
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 Frank and Lillian Gilbreth and the Motion 
Study Controversy, 1907-1930 
.Prank and Lillian Gilbreth were promoters of Taylor and 
his circle and, at the same time, competitors with them, as Milton 
Nadworny has noted.1 The causes of the conflict between Taylor 
and the Gilbreths included professional jealousies, disputes over 
clients and fees, and the Gilbreths' remarkable facility as publi­
cists. The immediate results were personal hostility and the frag­
mentation of the Taylor circle. The longer term consequences, 
however, were more positive and important, and provide a useful 
guidepost to the evolution of scientific management technique 
and to the application of that technique on the shop floor. Compe­
tition in scientific management encouraged innovation as well as 
bickering and criticism. In the decade and a half after Taylor's 
death, competitive pressures forced the Gilbreths to strengthen 
the time and motion study methods that were their trademark. By 
1930, when their struggle with the more orthodox practitioners of 
scientific management ended, time and motion study had become 
a more formidable but no less controversial managerial resource. 
Unlike most of Taylor's followers, Frank Gilbreth did not learn 
his efficiency techniques at the master's feet. For twelve years 
prior to his first meeting with Taylor in 1907, he was an innovative 
building contractor, whose specialty was speed work achieved by 
mechanical innovations and systematic management. Gilbreth 
developed improved cement mixers, techniques for driving con-
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lindsey Wharton Bolger 
and Mrs. Patricia Price. 
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crete foundation piles swiftly, and an adjustable scaffold, which 
could be raised to keep the masons level with the wall they were 
building. His Field System, Concrete System, and "Office System" 
outlined standardized procedures for organizing building sites, 
facilitating the flow of work on the ground, and enabling manag­
ers to keep the company current on building progress and costs 
through a series of detailed forms. To increase the worker's 
efficiency, he organized runways for concrete and brick delivery, 
advocated competition between gangs of workers (often divided 
by ethnicity), and designed a "white list" to reward reliable 
workers with more regular work.2 
Gilbreth did not approach Taylor as a beginner, therefore, but 
rather as one who had as much to teach as to learn.3 He soon 
demonstrated his usefulness to the nascent scientific management 
movement. While employing Stanford Thompson, Taylor's time 
study expert, to introduce time study for piece rate setting on his 
building sites, Gilbreth undertook systematic motion study ex­
periments on bricklayers and soon claimed to have reduced their 
motions from as many as eighteen to as few as four.4 He impressed 
Taylor, who incorporated Gilbreth's work in The Principles of 
Scientific Management (1911), and used Gilbreth's bricklaying 
achievements to illustrate the efficacy of the stopwatch technique 
he called the "keystone" of scientific management.5 
Even at this time, however, occasional differences arose be­
tween the men. The most serious problem occurred when brick­
layers at Gardner, Massachusetts in May, 1908, and at Glen Falls, 
New York in March, 1911, successfully struck Gilbreth's sites.6 
Taylor, feeling that Gilbreth had provoked the Gardner strike by 
rushing the installation process, ordered Sanford Thompson not 
to undertake any other work for Gilbreth.7 
When Gilbreth faced bankruptcy during the 1911-1912 building 
industry depression and decided to dedicate himself full time to 
Taylorism and motion study, he regained some favor with Taylor. 
Louis Brandeis's promotion of scientific management in the 1910 
Eastern Rates Case, and the Watertown Arsenal strike of 1911, 
raised Taylorism's public profile and galvanized trade union an­
tagonism.8 In defense of his mentor Gilbreth participated in 
debates against union leaders and organized the Society for the 
Promotion of the Science of Management (SPSM).9 His wife 
Lillian, who was completing a Ph.D. in psychology, became his 
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active partner at that time. Lillian wrote the Primer of Scientific 
Management (printed under Frank's name), and Psychology of Man­
agement, both of which argued that Taylorism was the only man­
agement method consistent with the health and development of 
workers.10 
Gilbreth began his scientific management career in 1912 at the 
New England Butt Company, of Providence, Rhode Island, a firm 
of 300 employees that produced braiding machines used in the 
manufacture of shoe laces, dress trimmings, and electrical wire 
insulation. Gilbreth viewed New England Butt as his version of 
the Tabor Company of Philadelphia, where Taylor had demon­
strated and promoted scientific management. Indeed, he and 
Lillian went to Providence to out-Taylor Taylor.11 
The history of the Butt Company installation reveals the seri­
ousness with which the Gilbreths took their task. The foundation 
of the installation was orthodox scientific management: improve­
ments in the routing of work and the organization of tool and store 
rooms, introduction of a planning department and functional 
foremen, task setting, and cost accounting. Appropriately, Gil­
breth hired Taylor's disciple, Horace K. Hathaway, to plan and 
guide these changes.12 In addition, the Gilbreths added two kinds 
of innovations. First, they responded to the trade unionists' argu­
ment that scientific management was merely a dictatorial driving 
system by inaugurating industrial betterment programs. They 
organized a series of weekly meetings of managers, foremen, and 
workers, during which the progress of the installation was openly 
debated; a lecture series to allow employees to enhance their 
knowledge of scientific management and motion study; a sugges­
tion system offering monthly prizes for the best ideas for factory 
improvement; and a promotion plan that increased upward mo­
bility within the firm.13 
Second, Frank Gilbreth developed a new motion study tech­
nique, which he called micromotion study. It involved filming a 
worker's operations against a cross-sectioned background while a 
chronometer recorded the time. By examining the film through a 
magnifying glass, Gilbreth could determine the times of each of 
the worker's motions to one-thousandth of a second. He could 
then compare methods and working conditions and synthesize the 
best elements into a method that would become standard for that 
job. 
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Gilbreth saw micromotion study as a potent antidote to labor 
hostility, as well as a major advance over stopwatch time study. 
When the unions charged that time study was a management tool 
designed to speed up the pace of production, he would show that 
micromotion study, by replacing the human observer and the 
stopwatch with the camera and the chronometer, provided scien­
tific accuracy in timing work operations. Furthermore, his films 
would demonstrate that motion study increased output through 
more effective use of time rather than through faster speed.14 To 
forestall the type of problems he had experienced on his building 
sites at Gardner and Glen Falls, Gilbreth installed his micromotion 
equipment in a "betterment room" at a remove from the factory 
floor, paying workers bonuses for allowing him to study them in 
isolation from their peers.15 
Even as the Butt Company installation progressed, Gilbreth 
sought to publicize micromotion study as an advance over time 
study and as a benefit to workers. He first summarized his work at 
the December, 1912 meeting of the American Society of Mechani­
cal Engineers (ASME), claiming that his new technique revolu­
tionized braider machine assembly processes and increased output 
per assembler from 11-12 to 60 machines per day. The commenta­
tor, Robert T. Kent, called micromotion study "as revolutionary 
in the art of time study as was the invention of the power loom in 
the art of weaving."16 In the following months, Gilbreth pressed 
home his image as an innovator, popularizing his new technique 
by using it to time the speeds of baseball pitchers and inaugurating 
a series of Summer Schools of Scientific Management for college 
professors in Providence, beginning in 1913.17 
Taylor was impressed. In his own presentation to the ASME 
meeting he redefined time study to incorporate Gilbreth's motion 
study ideas, though not his specific techniques. Dividing time 
study into "analytical" and "constructive" categories, he argued 
that time study "analysis" involved dividing a worker's job into its 
"simple elementary movements," discarding the "useless" ones, 
timing the quickest and best motions, and making their times the 
standard for the job. "Constructive" time study involved group­
ing combinations of elementary movements commonly repeated 
in any trade, and recording and indexing them so that the records 
could be of use in determining appropriate times in other, parallel 
kinds of work. Though motion study remained subordinate to 
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time study, the attention Taylor paid to it demonstrated the 
seriousness with which he took the Gilbreths' versions of his 
"keystone."18 
Still, Taylor knew only part of the story. What he did not know, 
and what Gilbreth did not admit, was that Gilbreth had completed 
most of his work at the Butt Company by straightforward obser­
vation before the micromotion laboratory had been completed, 
that the greatly increased output per assembler had been achieved 
by assigning time-consuming elements of the process to other 
workers, and that Gilbreth continued to be almost totally reliant 
on stopwatch time study for piece rate setting because he could 
not arrange artificial lighting powerful enough to overcome the 
factory gloom. In short, at the time that Gilbreth announced its 
virtues, micromotion study had not yet lived up to a single one of 
them.19 Moreover industrial betterment had not cured the work­
ers of their misgivings about the Gilbreths. In the late summer of 
1912, at a time when trade union militancy against scientific 
management was at a peak, Frank Gilbreth had narrowly averted a 
strike at the Butt Company by workers influenced both by the 
Industrial Workers of the World and the AFL.20 Taylor, wary of 
Gilbreth's hubris in undertaking a major installation without prior 
experience, and alarmed by the possibility of another strike, grew 
increasingly anxious about his work.21 
Matters between the two came to a head in 1913-1914, when 
Gilbreth undertook a major reorganization of the Herrmann-
Aukam Company, a manufacturer of handkerchiefs. To aid him in 
studying the motions of handkerchief folders, Gilbreth invented 
additional motion study techniques, which he dubbed cycle-
graphs, chronocyclegraphs, and stereochronocyclegraphs. The 
cyclegraph method involved mounting a miniature electric light 
on a ring that could be slipped onto a worker's finger, showing on 
the back of his or her hand. The movement of the light created a 
bright line on a single time-exposed photograph. A line full of 
twists and turns bespoke inefficient movement. The worker's 
tools, equipment, and motions could then be altered until the 
shortest, smoothest line was developed. Gilbreth improved on the 
cyclegraph technique by interrupting the flow of current to the 
light in order to obtain, in the resulting sequence of flashes, a 
record of the time and direction of the motions. The resulting 
image was a chronocyclegraph. A stereochronocyclegraph ere­
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ated a three-dimensional image of motion by using time exposed 
photographs from two slightly offset cameras, the positives from 
which could be viewed through a stereopticon or stereoscope. 
With his customary eye for publicity, Gilbreth arranged for Fred 
Colvin of the American Machinist to break the news of his latest 
advances to the engineering world.22 
Despite his apparent progress, Gilbreth interrupted his work at 
Herrmann-Aukam to accept a contract to install scientific man­
agement at the giant Auergesellschaft electric light and gas mantel 
manufacturing company in Berlin, Germany. In Gilbreth's ab­
sence, the Herrmann-Aukam owners broached Taylor with com­
plaints about the pace and quality of Gilbreth's work. Convinced 
that Gilbreth was unreliable, Taylor arranged for his orthodox 
disciple, Hathaway, to finish Gilbreth's job.23 
An outraged Gilbreth viewed Taylor's action as a declaration of 
war. From Germany he wrote Lillian: "We must have our own 
organization and we must have our own writings so made that the worker 
thinks we are the good exception (emphasis Gilbreth's)."24 To deal 
with the negative comments of Taylor and his disciples, Gilbreth 
immediately decided to keep all information about his present and 
future installation work secret, sacrificing potential publicity for 
security against claims of incompetency.25 He also began to 
rewrite his autobiography. Having earlier emphasized his debt to 
Taylor, Gilbreth now sought to show that he had invented motion 
study, independent of, and prior to, his contact with Taylor.26 By 
the time Frank returned from Germany, Lillian had completed 
two booklength manuscripts that emphasized both Gilbreth's 
concern with the "human factor" and his scientific outlook. 
The first manuscript, published as a series of articles in Iron Age 
under both of their names, addressed the problem of the trouble­
some "human element." Its primary contention was that motion 
study was less a series of mechanical devices for improving output 
than a systematic program for the betterment of the worker. It 
argued that motion study would train workers and make them 
valuable aids to management, not mere specialists in a craft or 
humdrum machine tenders. Such workers could then be individu­
ally rewarded by higher wages and promotion.27 
In the second work, Fatigue Study, Lillian Gilbreth argued that 
the aim of motion study was to eliminate unnecessary fatigue by 
designing convenient workbenches and chairs, providing regular 
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rest periods, and introducing other salutary measures. This ap­
proach also had strategic and psychological value. By performing 
a fatigue survey on first entering a factory and providing immedi­
ate antidotes to obvious fatigue-producing activities, such as 
standing and stretching, the motion study engineer bettered his 
chances of acceptance by workers more than by announcing that 
his intention was to speed up production. Together with related 
activities such as weekly open meetings to discuss fatigue elim­
ination, a suggestion system, and a promotion plan, the motion 
study engineer added a new dimension to the industrial welfare 
movement.28 
To aid in their effort Gilbreth devised a final motion study 
innovation. By 1915 he had formulated a basic alphabet of work 
motions, naming them therbligs ("Gilbreth" reversed, with a small 
concession to euphony). All work motions, he contended, could 
be reduced to sixteen categories: search, find, select, grasp, posi­
tion, transport loaded, assemble, use, disassemble, inspect, pre­
position (for next operation), release load, transport empty, wait 
(unavoidable delay), wait (avoidable delay), and rest (for overcom­
ing fatigue). By analyzing micromotion film or chronocycle­
graphs, the therbligs could be identified and plotted on "simultan­
eous cycle motion" or "simo" charts. The simo chart listed 
horizontally the parts of the body— arms, legs, trunk, and head— 
with subdivisions (for example, the upper and lower arm, wrist, 
thumb, fingers, and palm). The vertical axis displayed elapsed 
time. By assigning each therblig a color and symbol, Gilbreth 
could chart each body part's motion over time, producing a clear 
visualization of the relationships between the therbligs. Simo 
charts enabled Gilbreth to discern whether, for instance, one arm 
was actively working while the other was merely passively hold­
ing an object during the motion cycle. If so, he could redesign the 
operation to employ each arm simultaneously, while shortening 
the times for movements made by placing tools and parts closer to 
the worker's grasp. Therbligs provided Gilbreth with a new 
analytical tool and bolstered his confidence in the validity of his 
pursuit of a science of motions. Gilbreth nevertheless took the 
precaution of making his discovery public in a 1915 paper entitled 
"Motion Study for the Crippled Soldier," whose ostensible sub­
ject, the treatment of handicapped war veterans, reduced the 
likelihood of a substantial critique.29 
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To complete their work, the Gilbreths devised a slogan that 
underlined their concern with the human element and the scien­
tific analysis of work processes. They were, they intoned, devoted 
to " The quest of the one best way to do work (emphasis Gilbreths'). "3  0 
The Gilbreths' efforts to distinguish themselves from Taylor 
and his immediate circle had mixed results. Frank organized a 
Committee for the Elimination of Unnecessary Fatigue within the 
new Society of Industrial Engineers, hosted regular fatigue lun­
cheons at the Society's quarterly meetings, and worked with the 
National Safety Council, the American Posture League, and the 
Eyesight Conservation Committee, stressing motion study's health 
benefits.31 These activities promoted the Gilbreth name and sug­
gested the breadth of their interests. But their assertion that they 
were the humane alternative to orthodox scientific management 
was less persuasive. In the aftermath of World War I, the AFL and 
the Taylor Society (as the SPSM was renamed) reached a new 
understanding that ended organized opposition to scientific man­
agement and paved the way for the identification of the Taylor 
Society with the liberal wing of the business community. Thus, in 
regard to the "human factor," the perceived distance between the 
Gilbreths and their opponents rapidly shrank.32 
Similarly, their attempt to portray motion study as the central 
element in a broader management system was unrewarding. 
While motion study in isolation attracted wide interest, few 
executives were willing to authorize the more sweeping changes 
the Gilbreths advocated. This problem elicited two very different 
responses from the Gilbreths. First, Frank tried to employ motion 
study as a Trojan horse to gain both entrance to a company and an 
opportunity to win incremental extensions of his work until he 
had implementated his entire revisionist system. Second, because 
the Gilbreths were forced to rely primarily on motion study for 
income, they felt compelled to defend the scientific efficacy of 
motion study against the more conservative defenders of stop­
watch time study. Accordingly, they pushed for a decisive show­
down with their critics in an attempt to establish, once and for all, 
motion study's scientific superiority. 
A single example of Frank Gilbreth's Trojan horse strategy will 
suffice. In January, 1919, the Pierce-Arrow automobile company 
of Buffalo, New York, hired Gilbreth to use motion study to 
improve assembly procedures for its five-ton truck. Given offices, 
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laboratory space for micromotion experiments, and the right to 
bring in four assistants, Gilbreth initiated changes, not in truck 
assembly, but in the office system that monitored and directed the 
assembly procedures. Only later did his assistants begin the 
systematic examination of carburetor subassembly methods. When 
they had reduced assembly times from seven and two-tenths 
hours to one hour under experimental conditions, Gilbreth felt 
confident in pushing for the extension of his contract to enable 
him to modernize the company's toolroom, tool sharpening meth­
ods, and storeroom procedures. The company rejected all of these 
requests except his proposal to revamp its storeroom, and then 
allowed him to make changes only on a limited, experimental 
basis. Somewhat disheartened, Gilbreth nevertheless urged the 
establishment of a messenger service in the drill department, a 
salvage department to clean up the company yards, and a planning 
department to coordinate work in the rooms where workers were 
trained in new assembly methods. The Pierce-Arrow managers 
turn him down flatly, advising him to keep his nose to the motion 
study grindstone, eschewing interest in all else. Though this 
forced concentration soon produced more promising results, the 
election of a new company president resulted in the revocation of 
Gilbreth's contract just when he began demonstrations of revised 
methods for the final assembly of trucks.33 
The Gilbreths' push for a final confrontation with the orthodox 
scientific managers also produced unexpected results. The Gil­
breths' position on motion study had been clear since 1912: time 
study was unscientific, fraught with human error, and dependent 
on obsolete equipment that had been superseded by cinemato­
graphic micromotion study apparatus. Now, thanks to therbligs, 
the Gilbreths argued additionally that micromotion study could 
measure objectively the correct elements of worker motions. They 
elaborated on this position at length in their 1917 book of essays, 
Applied Motion Study.34 In December 1920, the Gilbreths arranged 
for a decisive confrontation with their opposition before the 
Taylor Society. 
In their presentation, the Gilbreths assailed the validity of 
stopwatch data, arguing that "the inevitable interference of the 
human element, when the stop-watch is read while it is running or 
pressed to stop or start, prevents accurate observations and rec­
ords."35 Because micromotion study recorded the surrounding 
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conditions and behavior of the workers, measured motions in 
therblig units, and provided absolutely accurate times, it consti­
tutes a "science" that enabled work to be developed, taught, and 
perpetuated at the highest standard —the "one best way."36 
The Taylorites' response was surprisingly restrained. Dwight 
Merrick admitted that for detailed operations he had often wished 
for something more accurate than a stopwatch.37 Robert Kent 
observed that micromotion study devices were less significant 
than the methods on which they were based.38 Carl Barth con­
tended that micromotion study was good for detailed work, but 
that, after all, if the magnifying glass was still useful after the 
invention of microscopes and telescopes, the stopwatch still had a 
place in scientific management.39 
If the Taylorites' response was mild, it was in part because they 
increasingly endorsed the Gilbreths' approach while ignoring 
their precise techniques and language.40 Sanford Thompson sum­
marized their position in a preface to a book on time study by his 
partner, William Lichtner: 
Our modern engineers, like Mr. Lichtner, realize that the men 
who work in the mills are not machines, . . . and that the 
increase in production that we need is one that will benefit, not 
exploit the workers. Time and job analysis achieves that increased 
production through saving waste in time and material, by 
determining the simplest and easiest way. . . .41 
Lichtner's technique consisted of comparing various methods to 
find the best way of performing the operation under the best 
conditions, eliminating waste and making allowances for neces­
sary delays and fatigue, and then setting standards and instructing 
employees in these methods. "The exact and systematic character 
of time and job analysis," he claimed, "merits for it the term 'sci­
ence.' The 'laws' which it formulates take into consideration the 
necessary energy . .  . to produce with the minimum of machine 
time and the minimum of human labor the maximum of quantity 
that is at the same time of the maximum quality. "42 Substitute 
"motion study" for "job analysis" and the Gilbreths could not have 
said it better. Lichtner went on to revise Taylor's statement on the 
importance of time study to read "job standardization is sometimes 
called the cornerstone of scientific management."43 
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The Gilbreths' attempt to position themselves as the humane and 
scientific alternative to orthodox scientific management was no 
more successful abroad than at home. In England, where a 
government-created Health of Munition Workers Committee (later 
renamed the Industrial Fatigue Research Board) and a private 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology used motion study to 
investigate fatigue and develop improved work methods, the 
Gilbreths fared badly.44 The prominent psychologist Charles S. 
Myers, who headed the Institute, and several colleagues published 
articles arguing that incentives for increased output were irrele­
vant to motion and fatigue study.45 Myers was more explicit and 
personal in attacking a paper the Gilbreths had prepared for the 
First International Conference on Applied Psychology and Voca­
tional Guidance in 1921.46 To their assertions that "the Quest of 
the One Best Way is the crux of the present-day industrial prob­
lem," and that psychologists must "cooperate" with engineers 
"so that the latter could discover the One Best Way,"47 Myers 
responded bluntly: 
To this the adequately trained psychologist retorts — "there is no 
One Best Way." On the contrary, physiological and psychologi­
cal differences between individual workers prevented them 
from adhering to one method. 
By nature, the efficiency engineer is prone to regard human 
workers as machines. Rather than understand them, he would 
mold them to a common type. Instead of trying to appreciate 
the various emotional influences and incentives which affect the 
worker's efficiency, the efficiency engineer is led by his mecha­
nistic interests . . . [to] devise some elaborate scheme of pay­
ment.48 
The Gilbreths' response, published in January 1924, attempted 
to defend the One Best Way and the supremacy of the efficiency 
engineer. Though they conceded that they had never seen any two 
workers with exactly the same motions, they insisted that this "in 
no wise belittles the fundamental importance of'the One Best Way 
to Do Work,' as an ideal, or makes it less necessary." They insisted 
that all workers be taught the One Best Way first and allowed to de­
viate from the standard method only with the approval of the effi­
ciency engineer. To Myers's concern that the task system could 
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produce unwarranted stress, they argued that the worker received 
from thirty to one hundred percent more wages and worked under 
conditions that were highly educational. Finally, they insisted 
"that psychology will progress faster in industry through the coop­
eration of, and usually under the direction of the INDUSTRIAL 
ENGINEER."49 
Frank Gilbreth's installation work was another source of frus­
tration. At the Auergesellschaft company, for example, workers at 
first watched Gilbreth's activities suspiciously as he renovated the 
company's office system, then demanded that he be prevented 
from extending his work to the shop floor. They were so success­
ful that only after many of them had been drafted into the armed 
forces did Gilbreth make any progress in their domain.50 In 1919, 
messenger boys at the Pierce-Arrow company threatened to strike 
unless Gilbreth fulfilled his promises of promotion, a problem he 
solved by disbanding the messenger system.51 In 1924, workers at 
the American Radiator Company in Buffalo refused to be time 
studied by Gilbreth's assistants, provoking the management to 
revoke Gilbreth's contract and remove him from the plant.52 
If anything, Gilbreth found foremen, superintendents, and 
managers even more recalcitrant than workers. At Auergesell­
schaft ^1914-1915, Cluett-Peabody in 1916, U.S. Rubber in 1917, 
Pierce-Arrow in 1919, and American Radiator in 1923-1924, they 
stalled, failed to respond to his directives, and questioned the 
quality of his work.53 
Owners could be equally recalcitrant, as Gilbreth discovered at 
Herrmann-Aukam and American Radiator. In addition, the own­
ers of the Erie Forge Steel Company, financially straightened by 
the postwar depression, sued Gilbreth to revoke his expensive 
contract and locked him out of the plant.54 Of the seventeen 
contracts Gilbreth signed between 1918 and 1924, he completed 
five requiring limited work and three more that required only 
written recommendations. Five of his six most important con­
tracts were cancelled prematurely. Gilbreth was working on three 
contracts when he died in June, 1924.55 
Thus, the Gilbreths' record in the decade after their break with 
Taylor fell far short of their goal. They had failed to distance 
themselves from their former colleagues, had invited ridicule with 
such slogans as the One Best Way, and had little success in 
persuading clients of the primacy of motion study or the necessity 
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of their services. Frank had influenced technicians such as Thomp­
son and Lichtner but had received little recognition for his contri­
butions. Contemporaries could justifiably dismiss the Gilbreths 
as colorful but inconsequential imitators of Taylor, not unlike 
other self-proclaimed management experts of that era. 
In fact, however, Frank's death marked the nadir of the Gil­
breths' troubles; in the following years their reputations grew 
steadily. Two factors accounted for this change. One was the 
inherent value of motion study, as even the critics had acknowl­
edged by 1920. The potential of motion study for extending 
scientific management, for combining the "science" and the "sci­
entifically trained worker," as Taylor had proclaimed in the Princi­
ples, increased as the technical obstacles that made it expensive and 
unweildy declined. In 1923, Eastman Kodak introduced new 
spring-driven cameras, 16-millimeter safety film, and simple 500­
watt lights. Simpler, easier to set up, and practical to use without a 
chronometer (spring-driven cameras ran steadily at one thousand 
frames per minute, making the timing of motions simple), the 
new cameras greatly increased the flexibility and quality of micro­
motion study while reducing its cost.56 
The second factor was Lillian Gilbreth, who not only continued 
her husband's practice, but gave it the distinctive character that it 
lacked during Frank's lifetime. Technically, she relied on the 
methods that he had devised in the 1910s. She also sought indus­
trial clients, though she was far more diligent and systematic in 
cultivating them than Frank had been. From 1925 to 1927 she ran a 
series of motion study courses from her house, training motion 
study engineers, among them her husband's last installation assis­
tant, Joseph Piacitelli, and participants from Johnson & Johnson, 
R. H. Macy, General Electric, and Cadbury, the British chocolate 
manufacturer. She retained close relations with these students 
after the courses ended.57 Beginning in 1927, she also aggressively 
sought work with such major companies as R. H. Macy, Johnson 
& Johnson, Sears Roebuck, and Green Line Cafeteria. Her own 
work, and that of her students, insured the continued identifica­
tion of the Gilbreth name with motion study.58 
But Lillian also recognized her unique position in an all-male 
profession and used it effectively. Her apparent success in raising a 
large family and competing with the country's top engineers 
made it easy for her to publicize her work. As a consultant she 
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shrewdly exploited the fact that many businesses were run exclu­
sively by men but sold almost exclusively to women. While she 
continued to offer the kinds of services that her male counterparts 
provided, she specialized in advice on women's work in the home, 
office, or store, and on methods for reaching a female clientele. 
Her efforts to streamline kitchens for the Brooklyn Gas Company 
and to evaluate feminine hygiene products for Johnson & Johnson 
were indicative of this approach.59 Like Frank, she understood the 
possibilities of motion study outside the factory. Unlike him, she 
managed to convert that insight into a distinctive business. 
Finally, Lillian made peace with the Taylor Society. In a brief 
paper for the American Machinist's 1927 tribute to "Fifty Years of 
Mechanical Achievement," she announced that stopwatch time 
study, like motion study, had its place in scientific management. 
She noted the passing of the pioneers of both methods and the 
rapid diffusion of new manufacturing techniques, which had 
helped blur distinctions between the two.60 The following year, 
before the Taylor Society, she declared that time and motion study 
were "fundamentally complementary. "61 
Her message was well received. In a swelling chorus, time 
study men insisted that their activities embraced not only accurate 
piece rate setting, but improvements in methods, and conditions 
of work, and labor processes. As Earl E. Watson declared, "Man­
agement must be made to see clearly that today reduced costs are 
to be expected, not so much as the result of any particular wage 
incentive plan, but rather, as a result of better methods. . . . "62 
Ironically, it was Horace K. Hathaway who in 1930 rehabilitated 
the Gilbreths to a central place in the pantheon of scientific 
management giants. In an extraordinary paper, "Methods Study: 
The Principles and Technique of Analyzing Work Methods," 
Hathaway told the Taylor Society that the Gilbreths had done the 
most vital work in forwarding methods study. 
The scientific management movement is indebted to the Gilbreths 
not only for focusing attention on this feature of Taylor's philos­
ophy and setting it forth in the light of its true importance but 
for refining and developing its technique along truly scientific 
lines, for reducing and codifying its fundamentals and setting, 
by years of persevering effort, a new standard which industry is 
just beginning to understand and make an effort to attain.63 
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He advocated further research into the determination and uses of 
therbligs, and quoted from the Gilbreths' writings to emphasize 
the need for cooperation among methods study investigators.64 
The new consensus was apparent in the texts that appeared in 
the following years, such as Allan Mogensen's Common Sense 
Applied to Motion and Time Study (1932), and Ralph Barnes's Indus­
trial Engineering and Management: Problems and Policies (1931).65 
However, Steward M. Lowry, Harold B. Maynard, and G. J. 
Stegmerten's widely used Time and Motion Study and Formulas for 
Wage Incentives best illustrated the trend. The 1927 edition treated 
motion study only briefly and insubstantially, while devoting 
many chapters to stopwatch methods and rate setting formulas. In 
1932, the authors approached Lillian Gilbreth and her research 
group for more detailed information on their methods. By 1940 
Lowry, Maynard, and Stegmerten had reduced their treatment of 
wage incentive formulas from nine chapters to three, and in­
creased the number of chapters devoted to motion study to 
seven.66 By that time motion study was no longer an incidental 
refinement of Taylor's time study techniques and the Gilbreths 
were no longer peripheral figures in the development and diffu­
sion of scientific management. 
While it is easy to portray midcentury scientific management 
practices as logical, even inevitable, outgrowths of earlier work, 
such a perspective distorts the Gilbreths' abrasive but constructive 
role and the impact of competition on the maturation of scientific 
management. The Gilbreths attacked the Taylor system at a 
vulnerable point and directly and indirectly accelerated the pro­
cess of innovation. Both the timing and the character of the 
changes they influenced meant that a new, more attractive version 
of scientific management would be available to hard-pressed 
manufacturers during the troubled years of the 1930s. 
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D A N I E L N E L S O N 
Scientific Management and the 
Transformation of University 
Business Education 
J_he public furor that followed the publication of The 
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911 underlined the appeal of 
Taylor's ideas and their applicability to nonindustrial settings, 
from social welfare agencies to public school systems. Among the 
educators who reacted positively to Taylor's message were faculty 
members at the burgeoning American universities of the second 
and third decades of the century. University professors, partic­
ularly those who prepared students for business careers, were 
attracted to scientific management because of its implications for 
the practical curriculum and for their relations with colleagues in 
more academically respectable and theoretically rigorous disci­
plines. Intrigued by time study, wage incentives, cost accounting, 
and other features of Taylor's work, but especially by the idea that 
management techniques were the building blocks of a larger 
edifice, a body of theory applicable to any institution, professors 
of business and engineering found scientific management highly 
useful.1 In the decade after Taylor's death, they made it a notable 
feature of the practical curriculum. By 1930 they rivaled the 
consultants as promoters of scientific management. As the role of 
the university in business and society continued to grow, they 
became the leading interpreters of Taylor's legacy. 
The author is indebted to Steven A. Sass and Guy Alchon for their comments and 
suggestions, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for financial 
assistance. 
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The background to this development is one of the most dramatic 
chapters in the history of the multiversity.2 College enrollments 
grew during the early decades of the century, spurred by the rise 
of technical and professional occupations and the spread of sec­
ondary education. During the most critical growth period, 1915 to 
the mid 1920s, the proportion of eighteen- to twenty-one-year­
olds attending colleges rose from 8 to 12 percent.3 An additional 
potent factor was the "entrepreneurial zeal" of administrators and 
professors, particularly at the less prestigious urban and state 
universities. Perceiving that middle-class parents would only pay 
college tuitions if they were confident that their sons (and some 
daughters) would qualify for well-paying jobs, they aggressively 
developed new curricula that satisfied the needs of employers and 
the demands of parents and students. As David O. Levine ex­
plains, the university curriculum "became inextricably tied to the 
nation's economic structure, particularly its white-collar, middle-
class sector. "4 
The best example of this development was the growth of 
collegiate business education. The Wharton School of the Univer­
sity of Pennsylvania, founded in 1881, was the only university 
college of commerce for more than a decade. Six institutions 
added business programs between 1898 and 1900; thirty-three 
universities introduced business majors between 1900 and World 
War I; and thirty-seven others added business studies during the 
war period, expressions of the wartime emphasis on discipline and 
practicality. The postwar years saw a "veritable craze for business 
education," with 117 new programs by 1924, despite a decided 
reaction against the asceticism of the war era.5 Many other schools 
also introduced business courses on a piecemeal basis. One ob­
server estimated that at least 400 colleges offered some form of 
business training by 1924.6 In 1915 there were 9000 business 
majors; by 1918,17,000; by 1920, 37,000; and by 1926, 58,000. The 
number of degrees awarded rose from less than 1000 in 1918 to 
more than 6000 per year in the late 1920s.7 Rapid expansion 
created tensions as well as opportunities. Administrators and 
professors discovered to their chagrin that many students were 
career-oriented and anti-intellectual. At such fast-growing urban 
universities as Northwestern and New York University, which 
had extensive night school programs and many parttime students, 
professors struggled against a pervasive trade school outlook. The 
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Northwestern faculty, for example, had to emphasize job training 
to maintain enrollments.8 More surprising was the prevalence of 
narrowly utilitarian attitudes among fulltime residential students. 
Administrators found that many students stayed only for a year or 
two while they took technical courses that qualified them for 
entry-level jobs. The dean of the Wharton School confessed in 
1913 that a two-year liberal arts requirement for admission to the 
professional program would decimate the school. As it was, 
Wharton's junior class was only one-third the size of its freshman 
class.9 
The expansion of business studies also exacerbated tensions 
between the arts and sciences and business faculties. To the former, 
business education smacked of the clerical and secretarial courses 
offered by proprietary "business colleges." After thirty years, 
Wharton professors still suffered from the "sneers and suspicions" 
of their colleagues.10 At many other universities, business pro­
fessors were isolated and intimidated. A recent study of higher 
education concludes that business studies "had low prestige, a 
practical orientation and small scope for knowledge enhance­
ment."11 Even before the boom some administrators and pro­
fessors had tried to raise the quality and reputation of their work. 
After 1915, as the pressures of the enrollment surge threatened 
career aspirations, professional recognition, and potentially the 
quality of the nation's business leadership, they redoubled their 
efforts. Their reactions gradually gave business education the aura 
of serious inquiry and professional respectability that had seemed 
so notably lacking. 
One response grew out of the rise of accounting as a professional 
specialty and an area of academic concentration. In an era of 
industrial expansion and big business, the demand for accountants 
and accounting education seemed inexhaustible. In many univer­
sities the growth in accounting enrollments and course offerings 
was the immediate reason for separating business from economics 
departments. By all quantitative measures, accounting overshad­
owed other business disciplines before 1930. It was the raison d'etre 
of university business education.12 Because of close association 
with scientific management, it also had the potential to redefine 
the character and image of business education. Costs systems had 
been a staple of early systematic management and Taylor had been 
a prominent accountant before he achieved fame as an expert on 
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production and labor issues. He and his followers, notably Har­
rington Emerson, pioneered in the extension of standards to cost 
data and in the analysis of variances between standard and real 
performance.13 By the mid 1920s they had made accounting a 
powerful management tool, not just a technique for recording and 
presenting financial data. The link between accounting, the most 
popular business specialty, and scientific management, the most 
notable effort to integrate business operations, had potentially 
fruitful implications for the business curriculum and the role of 
business education within the university. 
But these possibilities never materialized because of two con­
trary developments. First, the management accounting methods 
that Taylor, Emerson, and their allies developed were exceedingly 
cumbersome and costly in the era before the electronic computer. 
Executives concluded that costs outweighed potential benefits 
and abandoned them.14 Second, the growth of external corporate 
financing and intrusive government, in the form of the income tax 
amendment, the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Trade Commis­
sion Act, and other measures, overshadowed the link with scien­
tific management.15 The "demand for financial reports audited by 
independent public accountants" had a "profound and lasting 
influence."16 In the universities, this pressure insured that finan­
cial accounting retained its central role in the accounting curricu­
lum and that accounting education continued to focus on techni­
cal detail. Though critics within the profession often complained 
that universities offered "narrow technical training," neglected 
"basic principles of accounting," and only prepared students for 
the CPA exam, the move toward narrowly defined specialties, 
mastery of technical detail, and job training was irresistible.17 
Following the example of engineers in the late nineteenth century, 
accounting professors created a network of specialized professional 
groups and formulated canons of professional behavior that em­
phasized technical virtuosity and peer approval. A larger vision 
was not necessary. 
Wharton was the acknowledged leader of this development. As 
it evolved from an elite institution into an urban university (night 
classes were introduced in 1904 and an extension night school that 
operated in other Pennsylvania cities was added in 1913) the 
accounting program flourished. Enrollments grew, the account­
ing faculty became large and distinguished, and course offerings 
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became increasingly specialized. Moreover, under dean Emory R. 
Johnson (1919-1930) accounting became a model for the rest of the 
school. In the 1920s Wharton's specialized offerings proliferated. 
It became the "best place" to learn the "practical intricacies" of 
business.18 The Wharton approach was a stimulus to other urban 
universities. In part this was due to Wharton's commanding size 
and influence. Its large graduate programs were a major source of 
faculty and precedents for other universities. Wharton graduates 
made the University of Pittsburgh business school a virtual clone 
of the Wharton operation.19 In the 1930s a dean recruited from the 
Wharton faculty had a similar effect at Columbia.20 But the 
Wharton influence transcended such associations. As one of the 
largest and most prestigious business schools, Wharton offered 
administrators at other urban universities a convenient rationale 
for doing what logic and the economics of a parttime student body 
dictated anyway. Northwestern, with no direct ties and a substan­
tial reputation in its own right, embraced the Wharton approach 
in the late 1910s and 1920s. Courses proliferated and "the spe­
cialized, technical fields expanded enormously. "21 New York 
University, which had the largest business program of any univer­
sity by the 1920s, exceeded even Wharton in its varied course 
offerings.22 
The problem with the Wharton approach was that it looked 
suspiciously like a rationalization for inaction. The financial ac­
counting model, which had many critics, often broke down when 
it was applied in fields with less explicit vocational connotations. 
Even the Wharton faculty had trouble creating professional special­
ties in transportation and marketing.23 The other urban univer­
sities failed to escape the shadows of improvisation and opportun­
ism. Their continued reliance on parttime faculty was a powerful 
indictment. Even more serious, was the narrow, technical charac­
ter of many of their Wharton-type specialties. When the Massa­
chusetts Institute of Technology considered the introduction of a 
business major in 1913, an alumni committee dismissed the urban 
universities as models because their programs were "largely de­
voted to accounting, and as such are little better than those given 
at the so-called 'commercial colleges,' whose principal province is 
to train clerks and amaneunses."24 Clearly, the accountants' ap­
proach provided only a partial answer to the challenges of intellec­
tual and academic legitimacy. 
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Other academics embraced scientific management with fewer 
inhibitions. During Taylor's lifetime several professors had be­
come scientific management practitioners and others eagerly sought 
his advice. In the late 1910s, they and their colleagues joined the 
Taylor Society en masse, converting a narrowly conceived sanctu­
ary for technicians into a center of the liberal avant garde. In the 
late 1910s and 1920s they became the most vigorous promoters of 
scientific management. Like many industrialists, they were inter­
ested in time study and other managerial techniques that en­
hanced day-to-day operations. But their principal concern was the 
broader principles, especially the notion of management as a 
feature of all business endeavor. Taylor's writings suggested to 
even the most naive reader that industrial management required 
some sense of the larger character of the enterprise. To the better 
informed, they underlined the essential principles of the manage­
ment movement: the necessity of systematic organization and 
communications, the value of organized planning and research, 
and the importance of performance standards and managerial 
controls.25 To the professors, they made sense of the experiences 
of successful big businesses and the disjointed prescriptions of 
management reformers and publicists. Above all, Taylor's mes­
sage had the potential to bring coherence to the practical curricu­
lum and greater professional standing to those who prepared 
students for business careers. It was a powerful and satisfying 
alternative to the accounting model. 
Between 1910 and the 1920s these individuals introduced scien­
tific management to most large American universities.26 The 
process was irregular and haphazard, particularly in the early 
years, and had many dimensions. One indicator of it was the 
introduction of courses on management subjects in the curricula 
of engineering and business departments. The appearance of 
management courses was rarely an isolated occurence. In the vast 
majority of cases it was a proxy for the growth of professional 
consciousness among faculty members and contacts with Taylor 
and his followers, the Taylor Society, or other organizations 
devoted to the study and dissemination of scientific management. 
Table 4.1 includes information on twenty-one universities, chosen 
for their size, prestige, and regional importance.27 The first two 
columns indicate when courses specifically devoted to manage­
ment subjects appeared in engineering and business departments. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Management Courses in American Universities 
Scientific Personnel 
Institution Engineering Business Management Management 
Technical 
Penn State 1906 1908 1915 
Cornell 1905 * 1914 1920 
Purdue 1908 * 1919 1932 
Carnegie 1908 • 1910 1919 
MIT 1899 •k 1915 1920 
Drexel 1919 * 1919 1926 
Elite 
Harvard 1914** 1908 1908 1919 
Dartmouth 1918 1904 1911 1915 
Chicago * 1913 1915 1916 
State 
Ohio State 1911 1913 1923 
Wisconsin 1909 1915 1910 1918 
Michigan 1914 1914 1916 1918 
Iowa 1905 1915 1915 1921 
Urban 
Penn *** 1901 1914 1919 
NYU 1914 1903 1915 1916 
Northwestern * 1908 1913 1912 
Pitt 1920 1911 1911 1920 
West/South 
California * 1913 1918 1921 
Washington 1924 1917 1917 1917 
North Car. 1921 1919 1919 1921 
Vanderbilt 1921 1919 1920 * 
inappropriate or unavailable 
**cooperative program with MIT 
***cross-listed courses 
The third column adds the date when references to "scientific 
management" or specific activities associated with Taylor first 
appeared in course descriptions. The table also dates the introduc­
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tion of courses in employment and personnel management, which 
after Taylor's death became a hallmark of the new, broader ap­
proach of the second generation of theorists and practitioners.28 
A significant effort to utilize scientific management in business 
education occurred in engineering schools, where a small number 
of influential professors responded to mounting evidence that 
engineering graduates became industrial managers as often as 
they became inventors and designers. Their efforts had an imme­
diate impact on engineering education that persists to the present. 
Beyond that restricted area, however, their work had compara­
tively little effect. Engineering was based on esoteric skills that 
most students who aspired to business careers did not have and 
probably could not hope to attain. The professors' primary objec­
tive was to broaden the outlook of students who had chosen 
engineering as a course of study, not to recruit additional students 
whose principal interest was business. Within engineering depart­
ments there were other obstacles. By the early twentieth century, 
engineers had a clear conception of who they were and what they 
did. They conceded that management was becoming a common 
and appropriate activity for engineers, but they insisted that it was 
different from and probably subordinate to the technical activities 
that defined their profession. They were willing to add manage­
ment to the engineer's function, but not to make it a central feature 
of that function.29 
The experiences of the Pennsylvania State College engineering 
college made that institution a prototype for other engineering 
schools. In 1907 Hugo Diemer, an Ohio State graduate who had 
taught at the University of Kansas, became the head of the Penn 
State Mechanical Engineering department. While a faculty mem­
ber at Kansas, Diemer had become a devotee of scientific manage­
ment and a close acquaintance of Taylor's; his appointment at Penn 
State may have been due to Taylor's influence.30 His goal was to 
make management studies an integral feature of the mechanical 
engineering program. Penn State already had a course, "Shop 
Economics," which covered many of the specific features of 
scientific management. In 1907 Diemer added "Factory Plan­
ning," and in 1908 introduced a concentration in "Industrial 
Engineering" within the mechanical engineering curriculum. In 
1909 he won approval for an industrial engineering department, 
the first in any American university. Students took conventional 
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engineering courses for their first two years. They studied "Shop 
Time Study" and "Manufacturing Accounts" as juniors, and 
"Shop Economics," "Labor Problems," and "Factory Planning" 
as seniors.31 In 1913 Diemer added "Industrial Management," 
devoted to "departments and departmental reports, planning, 
scheduling, time study, labor and efficiency, wage system and 
welfare methods."32 The following year he added an advanced 
course on "Scientific Management," which used Taylor's writ­
ings as texts.33 Diemer left Penn State during World War I but his 
successors, E. G. Kunze and J. O. Keller, were sympathetic to his 
approach. By 1921 the industrial engineering department had 12 
faculty members, six of professorial rank. 
Diemer succeeded in creating a professional specialty, but not in 
making scientific management an integral feature of the engineer­
ing curriculum or the basis for a broader business curriculum. 
Though he wrote a popular, nontechnical management text, his 
preoccupation with machine shop activities strongly suggested 
that industrial engineering was factory management. To most 
engineers it was a peripheral vocational specialty; to most business 
students, an inaccessible and undesirably narrow option. 
The experiences of Cornell and Purdue, two other leaders in 
industrial engineering, were similar. Dexter S. Kimball, a me­
chanical engineer who, like Taylor, had served a traditional ap­
prenticeship and worked as a machinist before attending college, 
introduced a required junior-level course on the principles of 
manufacturing and an elective in works administration at Cornell 
in 1905.34 The former covered manufacturing methods, cost 
accounting, and plant management; the latter, retitled "Industrial 
Organization" in 1910, focused on welfare work, wage systems, 
and labor legislation.35 In 1914, when Kimball was appointed to 
head a new Department of Industrial Engineering, he revised 
"Industrial Organization" to include "modern industrial tenden­
cies and the principles that underlie modern methods of produc­
tion."36 Kimball also introduced a senior course, "Industrial 
Administration," that covered "modern time-keeping and cost-
finding systems, methods of planning work and of insuring 
production, administrative reports, time and motion study, pur­
chasing, etc."37 He thus insured that Cornell students became 
familiar with contemporary scientific management. Yet, even as 
dean of the College of Engineering (after 1921), he made no effort 
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to make scientific management more than a specialty for students 
who anticipated careers as industrial managers. Industrial Engi­
neering remained an unimportant major in a small and declining 
engineering program.38 
Purdue introduced "Industrial Engineering" in 1908 as a senior 
requirement for mechanical engineering students. The two-
semester course covered factory construction and power genera­
tion as well as "organization and management of shops; methods 
of paying wages; systems of cost accounting and shop bookkeep­
ing. . . . "39 Charles Henry Benjamin, the dean of the engineering 
school, taught the course until 1910, when L. W Wallace joined 
the faculty. Under Wallace, who would later become a leader of the 
management movement, the introductory course increasingly 
reflected the popularity of scientific management. By 1919 it 
focused on the "fundamental principles of Management."40 Wal­
lace also added advanced courses on scientific management meth­
ods and, like many of his colleagues, embraced personnel man­
agement as a feature of industrial engineering. Wallace left during 
World War I, but the Purdue program continued to be closely 
connected to the scientific management movement. In the 1920s 
the faculty added courses on time study technique and in the early 
1930s lured Lillian M. Gilbreth to help teach them. 
Other universities followed the examples of Penn State, Cor­
nell, and Purdue and created majors for students who had a strong 
interest in management or a weak interest in "pure" engineering. 
Several took an additional step and broke the implicit link be­
tween engineering and industrial management. In 1910 the Car­
negie Institute of Technology responded to employer requests for 
technically educated sales representatives with a major in "Com­
mercial Engineering."41 A "special feature" of the program was 
"the attention given to the scientific methods of management and 
production. . . . "42 Students took two years of conventional en­
gineering courses, together with "Works Management," which 
the Mechanical Engineering department had introduced in 1908. 
During the next two years they studied various business subjects, 
taught by a small Commercial Engineering faculty and the univer­
sity's social science departments.43 
The Carnegie Tech program was the prototype for MIT's 
Course XV the best known of the engineering and business 
curricula. By the turn of the century Davis R. Dewey, MIT's 
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distinguished economist, and several colleagues offered courses in 
economics, law, and history, •which Dewey wanted to expand into 
a social science major. He was unable to win the support of the 
university administration, in part because of an anticipated merger 
with Harvard.44 When the merger failed, Dewey succeeded in 
introducing Course XV which combined existing courses in 
engineering and social science with several new courses in busi­
ness management. Dewey ran the program until 1930.45 Although 
his interests in banking and corporate organization were reflected 
in the course requirements, he also insisted that management was 
an important feature of the curriculum. An unhappy alumnus 
recalled that Course XV was "really a course in 'scientific man­
agement' and Frederick Taylorism."46 
Among business schools, scientific management first influ­
enced the elite universities and then spread to the business depart­
ments of the midwestern and western state universities during the 
boom years of the late 1910s. At Harvard, Dartmouth, and a 
growing number of private and public business schools, scientific 
management became the basis of the practical curriculum. Each 
university introduced courses in factory operations, like the engi­
neering schools, but also promoted a conception of executive 
activity based on the principles of scientific management that 
transcended production. Two factors were essential to this devel­
opment. First, the elite universities were under no pressure to 
provide narrow vocational training; indeed, as the urban univer­
sities and their accounting-based curricula became more promi­
nent, the selective schools had a powerful incentive to adopt a 
broader and more theoretical approach. Second, scientific man­
agement emerged as an appealing option during the formative 
period of university business education, before disciplinary lines 
had hardened and the majority of business professors identified 
with a professional specialty. As a result administrators and faculty 
had more flexibility than the engineers of that period or their 
successors of the 1920s and later. 
The individual who had the greatest influence on this process 
was Edwin F. Gay, the distinguished economist who became the 
first dean of the Graduate School of Business at Harvard in 1908. 
Gay had no intention of presiding over a trade school or an urban 
university and was determined to make manufacturing and mar­
keting, not accounting, the basis of his curriculum. Most impor­
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tant, he was "convinced there is a scientific method involved and 
underlying the art of business. . . . "47 Initially, he had no idea 
how to proceed. At the suggestion of Dean Wallace C. Sabine of 
Harvard's engineering school he visited Taylor in May, 1908, 
listened to a lecture on scientific management, and toured the 
Tabor Company to see Taylor's approach in operation. Taylor 
encouraged him to incorporate scientific management in the 
business school curriculum.48 Gay was receptive. That fall he 
introduced "Industrial Organization," a course designed to pro­
vide the kind of integrative experience, based on the study of 
modern manufacturing, that he wanted to make the core of the 
Harvard program. "The principles of organization, carefully elu­
cidated in connection with the factory," he wrote, "will then be 
traced in their wide application to other forms of enterprise."49 
"Industrial Organization" brought together the leading figures 
of the contemporary management movement. Though Gay him­
self was the nominal instructor, J. Newton Gunn, the prominent 
industrial consultant, did most of the work. The course began 
with a series of lectures by Charles B. Going, editor ofEngineering 
Magazine, on management as an executive function. Other ex­
perts on factory operations followed. The course concluded with 
Taylor, who gave three lectures, and Carl G. Barth, who discussed 
scientific management techniques. Taylor gave his standard intro­
ductory speech, a talk on industrial discipline, and a lecture 
entitled "The Organization of a Manufacturing Establishment 
Under Modern Scientific or Task Management," his last original 
paper and his only effort to describe the responsibilities of top 
managers.50 "Industrial Organization," and Taylor in particular, 
were extremely popular. Melvin T. Copeland, a Harvard faculty 
member, recalled that the course "was new and . . . newsworthy. 
It was concrete, dealing with specific factory problems. And to 
many it seemed to provide something of a formula for manage­
ment. "5i 
Scientific management became increasingly important in the 
Harvard curriculum in the following years. Taylor repeated his 
lectures every year until his death, and the roster of lecturers in 
"Industrial Organization" become virtually a list of his closest 
followers. Sanford E. Thompson, Taylor's time study expert, also 
gave lectures on time study methods in an advanced course.52 In 
1911, C. Bertrand Thompson, one of Gay's former economics 
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students, took over his classroom duties. With Gay's support, 
Thompson also conducted extensive research on the application of 
scientific management and wrote the first scholarly analyses of 
Taylor's work.53 By 1914 he was a successful practitioner and F. L. 
Coburn, a naval officer who had been involved in scientific 
management installations in government shipyards, took over his 
courses. In the meantime, Gay had approved an advanced course 
on "The Practice of Scientific Management," which featured both 
lectures by Barth, Sanford E. Thompson, Morris L. Cooke, and 
H. K. Hathaway and the installation of scientific management 
techniques, first at the Rindge Manual Training School and the 
Harvard University Press and later at other Boston-area plants.54 
H. L. Farquhar, a business school graduate who assisted and then 
succeeded Coburn, acknowledged that this approach "did not 
really teach the Taylor System as it should be taught. "55 Even this 
modest effort, however, exceeded the resources and patience of 
local manufacturers. In 1920, Wallace Donham, Gay's successor, 
complained that with fifty students in the advanced course, "we 
can no longer find sufficient factories on the Taylor System to give 
the instruction which we wish to offer. . . ,"56 Despite such 
obstacles, "The Taylor System" continued to be a notable feature 
of the Harvard curriculum until 1926, when it was absorbed into 
the burgeoning course offerings of a Department of Industrial 
Management. 
Equally important were the indirect effects of scientific man­
agement on the Harvard program. Taylor's lectures and his fol­
lowers' work provided a "formula for management" that fulfilled 
Gay's promise of a "scientific method . . . underlying the art of 
business." Their success spurred related efforts, particularly in 
marketing. Under Donham, Harvard turned decisively against 
the Wharton approach and emphasized broad executive functions 
and responsibilities. The Harvard program became a model for 
others who sensed the potential of Taylor's writings. 
Harlow S. Person, who had received a Ph.D. in economics at 
the University of Michigan in 1902 and joined the faculty of 
Dartmouth College's Amos Tuck School of Business, introduced 
a course entitled "Business Management" in 1904.57 Like many of 
his colleagues he was attracted to Taylor's work and became active 
in the scientific management movement. When Morris L. Cooke 
lectured at Dartmouth in early 1911, Person persuaded him to 
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return in the fall to convene a national conference on scientific 
management. The Tuck School Conference, in October, attracted 
more than 300 executives, educators, and consultants and was an 
important stimulus to the diffusion of scientific management.58 It 
was also a turning point in the evolution of the Tuck School. 
Person revised his introductory course to make scientific manage­
ment its focus, added "Problems of Management," a course that 
emphasized the application of scientific management techniques 
and, in 1913, introduced a related course, "Principles and Mecha­
nism of Scientific Management."59 By that time he had also 
become the school's first professor of management.60 His col­
league Harry W. Shelton, who worked closely with him, intro­
duced "Scientific Management in Distribution" and "Scientific 
Management in Manufacturing" in the mid 1910s. When Person 
left Dartmouth in 1919 to become the permanent secretary of the 
Taylor Society, Nathanial G. Burleigh and Harry Wellman, spe­
cialists in production and marketing respectively, took over his 
management courses. For many years they sustained the approach 
to business education that Person had pioneered.61 
Despite their interest in scientific management, academics such 
as C. B. Thompson and Harlow Person objected to Taylor's 
derogatory references to workers like "Schmidt" and his conten­
tious relations with trade union leaders. On such issues they were 
closer to the contemporary proponents of systematic welfare 
work than they were to Taylor and his closest disciples. As their 
presence in the movement grew, they helped erase the last vestiges 
of the conflict between the engineers and organized labor. In the 
1920s they made the Taylor Society the most liberal business 
organization of the time.62 On campus they promoted the discus­
sion of labor issues and personnel management. From the begin­
ning, Gay's "Industrial Organization" included lectures on labor 
problems. Person introduced a course, "The Employment Func­
tion in Management" in 1915, and his successors continued to 
teach it as a feature of their series of courses on scientific manage­
ment.63 By the early 1920s Harvard's introductory course, "In­
dustrial Management" devoted almost as much attention to labor 
and personnel topics as it did to more conventional scientific 
management subjects. It is unlikely, however that the students 
noticed a marked change in perspective between the Taylor disci­
ples and Ordway Tead, Ralph G. Wells, and Earl D. Howard, 
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leaders of the nascent personnel management movement, or even 
Sidney Hillman, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, who discussed his efforts to use scientific management 
to stabilize employment and improve working conditions.64 
The broader conception of scientific management was also 
apparent in the evolution of the business curriculum at another 
elite school, the University of Chicago. Despite earlier efforts, 
Chicago did not have a business program of any consequence until 
1912, when new funds became available.65 L. C. Marshall, a 
student of Gay's who had been dean at Chicago since 1909, then 
turned to his mentor for advice. In 1913 he introduced a course in 
industrial organization, emphasizing manufacturing problems 
and scientific management.66 In 1916 he added a course in person­
nel management, which became another staple of the Chicago 
curriculum.67 The Chicago program soon became almost indis­
tinguishable from the Harvard and Tuck School curricula and 
Marshall, like Gay and Person, was satisfied that he had resolved 
the issue of the legitimacy of university business education. The 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, which he and Gay 
founded in 1916 to promote the professionalization of their enter­
prise, was a tangible expression of that confidence.68 
The examples of the elite schools, coupled with the contempo­
rary furor over Taylorism, had a profound impact on the hundreds 
of other schools that were introducing or expanding their business 
programs. Like Gay and Person, the academics of the 1910s and 
1920s found in Taylor's writings a way to make sense of the vast 
organizational changes of the preceding decades and to pass on the 
essence of that experience to students who would work in the new 
hierarchies. As a result they introduced a series of courses on the 
techniques and details of scientific management, often in compe­
tition with their industrial engineering departments. They also 
created courses on management principles and the application of 
those principles to nonfactory activities, especially marketing, the 
fastest-growing specialty of the postwar era. By the time that the 
enrollment boom slowed in the late 1920s, they were committed 
to teaching management as well as technical detail. 
The large midwestern universities provide the clearest exam­
ples of this process. In 1911 Mathew Hammond, a prominent 
figure in The Ohio State University economics department, 
introduced a course in industrial organization that emphasized 
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factory operations and welfare work. In 1913 he added a section on 
scientific management. When business became a separate college 
in 1916, "Industrial Organization" became a senior requirement 
for students of manufacturing. In the following years Hammond 
and his colleagues introduced related courses in factory organiza­
tion and management, office management, and time and motion 
studies, and an ever-growing host of specialized offerings. By the 
mid 1920s, parallel series of courses, emphasizing "principles" and 
"management," had evolved in marketing and finance.69 The 
pattern at Illinois was similar.70 At Michigan and Iowa the engi­
neering departments first introduced courses in factory opera­
tions and scientific management, which were open to advanced 
business students. Beginning in the mid 1910s, however, the 
business colleges at both universities introduced courses in office, 
sales, store and employment management, and then, having pre­
empted the field, added factory and production management. By 
the late 1920s they had comprehensive management programs, 
not unlike those at Ohio State and Illinois.71 
The development of the business curriculum at Wisconsin 
differed slightly because of faculty opposition to rigid disciplin­
ary barriers. In 1909, business professor Stephen W Gilman 
introduced "Business Organization and Management," which 
examined "the fundamental principles and methods of modern 
business procedures." The following year the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering introduced a major in commercial me­
chanical engineering, which included lectures by business pro­
fessors on "shop management, methods of remuneration of labor 
and the effects upon the cost of production. "72 Their collaboration 
continued in the following years. Gilman's course evolved into a 
series of courses on industrial and marketing management ("Fac­
tory and Office Administration" became "Fundamentals of Man­
agement" in 1919) and commercial mechanical engineering be­
came an industrial engineering major. In 1918 the Economics 
Department added a program in employment management, which 
became the basis for a related series of courses. Students were 
encouraged and in some cases required to cross disciplinary boun­
daries.73 With this exception, Wisconsin's business program was 
essentially indistinguishable from Ohio State's by the mid 1920s. 
Universities in the West and the South soon caught up with the 
other schools. At California, Washington, North Carolina, and 
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Vanderbilt, the business faculty and curricula were extremely 
modest until the late 1910s, when the enrollment surge created 
pressures for more elaborate programs. By that time there was no 
need to improvise. Many of the newer faculty were graduates of 
the eastern and midwestern universities and introduced similar 
courses. By the mid 1920s, the business curricula of the western 
and southern universities, while still modest by the standards of 
other areas, bore many resemblances to the curricula of the 
midwestern universities, including courses in industrial, sales, 
and personnel management.74 
The urban universities were equally vigorous in grafting the 
approach of the elite institutions onto their accounting-based 
programs. Wharton had offered courses in industrial manage­
ment since 1900, but there is no evidence that they included 
instruction in scientific management or that it played more than 
a tangential role in the curriculum.75 A major obstacle was 
J. Russell Smith, who headed the department of geography and 
industry for nearly a decade. A geographer, Smith made no effort 
to keep abreast of developments at Harvard or Dartmouth. Since 
several of his courses required field trips to Philadelphia factories, 
his students may have been exposed to the practice of scientific 
management but he, and the Wharton program, were wholly 
unaffected. In the late 1910s, Smith was succeeded by Richard 
Lansburgh and Joseph Willits, who were conversant with scien­
tific management, active in the Taylor Society, and aware of the 
new emphasis in business education. Like their colleagues at the 
elite universities, they "saw themselves as involved in a much 
more grandiose enterprise" than teaching factory management.76 
Still, their influence was not substantially greater than Smith's. 
Lansburgh's courses on industrial management emphasized the 
techniques of scientific management and Willits's specialty, per­
sonnel management, flourished because it, like other popular 
fields at Wharton, prepared students for a specific vocation.77 
Lansburgh and Willits filled embarrassing gaps in the Wharton 
curriculum, but their "more grandiose enterprise" had to await 
another generation of administrators and professors. 
New York University was characteristically bold and adapt­
able. It offered no courses in industrial management until 1914, 
when it introduced "Factory Organization" (in a new Industrial 
Engineering program) and "System and Organization in Com­
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mercial Business," which examined the implications of scientific 
management for office and service activities. In 1916, it created a 
Management department, headed by Lee Galloway, that taught a 
variety of management courses and a management seminar de­
voted to controversies over the application of scientific manage­
ment.78 No university responded more quickly to the oppor­
tunities of the moment. In the following years NYU introduced 
more specialized courses on industrial and labor management in 
response to the demands of the swelling student population. Yet 
courses disappeared as fast as they appeared, faculty turnover was 
high, and there was no evidence that the swollen curriculum was 
more than a reaction to the uproar over scientific management and 
the labor problems of the war period.79 Accounting and finance 
remained the core of the ever-burgeoning business curriculum. 
Northwestern and Pittsburgh were more typical of the urban 
universities. The former introduced a course in industrial organi­
zation in 1908 and a course on labor problems in 1912. In 1913 
Professor Arthur E. Swanson introduced "Business Organiza­
tion, " which included a section on scientific management, and an 
advanced course on factory organization. Henry R Dutton took 
over "Factory Organization" the following year and continued to 
teach it and related courses on personnel management for many 
years.80 Swanson, Dutton, and the other instructors had distin­
guished careers but, like Lansburgh and Willits, only a slight 
effect on the college's curriculum. In 1920, only three of forty-two 
faculty taught courses on management; in 1923, only six of fifty-
four.81 The Pittsburgh faculty introduced a course, "Industrial 
Management," which emphasized scientific management, in 1911 
and taught it every year for the rest of the decade.82 Yet despite this 
early start, and the presence of several specialists in production 
and labor problems, there were few course offerings in manage­
ment and factory operations, general or specialized, until 1922, 
when the Evening College introduced an Industrial Engineering 
major, and 1924, when the business college expanded its Industry 
department.83 High faculty turnover and a large parttime student 
body probably insured that even these developments had little 
impact on the Pittsburgh program. 
By the mid 1930s the first phase of the twentiety-century 
evolution of business education was largely complete. University 
business education was no longer a novelty to employers or the 
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university community. University graduates occupied a growing 
percentage of entry-level jobs in large corporations, and business 
professors occupied more secure and prestigious niches in their 
institutions. But the quantitative changes —in enrollment, faculty 
positions, curricula, and professional activities —were only part of 
the story. University business education was also qualitatively 
different and this difference was an important measure of the 
diffusion of scientific management. More specifically, five impor­
tant changes in university business education were apparent by 1930. 
First, scientific management had become a central feature of the 
practical curriculum. Most obviously, it was the foundation for 
programs in industrial engineering and production management. 
It was also a decisive influence in the growth of other management 
specialties, notably employment and marketing management. 
Above all, it had become an important integrative factor in 
business education, an antidote to the centrifugal forces that 
undermined the integrity of university business studies. As a 
consequence, business education matured and business professors 
rapidly superseded the consultants and manufacturers as the 
disseminators of scientific management. Henceforth, the spread 
of the principles and techniques depended more on the develop­
ments within the universities than on "object lessons," the per­
sonalities of individuals, or contacts with the public. 
Second, by the 1920s business professors enjoyed a more secure 
professional role in the university and the business community. By 
establishing their claims as heirs to the intellectual legacy of Taylor 
and his followers, they were able to answer the "sneers" of colleagues 
and the complaints of executives that they were preoccupied with 
technical detail. By the end of the decade they could confidently 
argue that their work was no less informed by theoretical insights 
than that of their counterparts in other utilitarian disciplines. 
Third, professors became increasingly important as innovators 
of management theory and technique. Nearly all of the individu­
als mentioned above wrote texts that became authoritative works 
in their specialties. In the process they and their students refined 
and extended what they had learned, just as Taylor had revised and 
extended the ideas of an earlier group of theorists. None of their 
innovations rivaled Taylor's in influence but collectively their 
work had at least two major effects. It helped recast the image of 
scientific management as a progressive force, compatible with 
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trade unionism, advanced personnel management, and an activist 
state, and it blurred the distinctions between orthodox and unor­
thodox ideas and methods that had been so important to Taylor's 
generation. 
Fourth, training in factory management, including personnel 
work, became as widely available as training in accounting had 
been in 1910. Between industrial engineering and management 
programs, nearly every university that offered any type of busi­
ness education provided some instruction in production manage­
ment. Though the total number of students in accounting and in 
marketing continued to be substantially higher, the university 
graduate was no more an oddity in the factory of 1930 than in the 
sales or accounting office.84 
Last, from the 1910s to at least the 1940s a large percentage of 
business students and a smaller but not inconsiderable proportion 
of engineering students were exposed to the tenets of scientific 
management, whether they realized it or not. At Harvard in the 
early 1910s and at other institutions at various times, they listened 
to Taylor, Taylor's closest followers, or professors who identified 
their information with the Taylor System. In many other cases, 
they listened to professors and read texts that encouraged them to 
think about management as Taylor had thought about it, as a 
rational, systematic endeavor based on attention to detail, and on 
the application of the scientist's perspective to economic activity. 
By the eve of the Depression, then, collegiate business educa­
tion was securely established, intellectually and institutionally. A 
blend of the accounting model and scientific management had 
become the basis of the practical curriculum in virtually all 
universities and professors enjoyed a more satisfying professional 
role. Anti-intellectual students and courses that emphasized tech­
nical minutiae had not disappeared, but they were no longer the 
threats they had been in the early 1910s, or so it seemed. The 
collapse of the economy in the early 1930s created compelling 
pressures for job-oriented training and effectively ended oppor­
tunities for curricular innovation.85 The result was a new round of 
specialized course offerings that eventually provoked criticism 
reminiscent of the 1910s and demands for broader, more explicitly 
theoretical approaches.86 The critics' ahistorical analyses captured 
only a part of the reality of business education and missed entirely 
the transforming effects of the scientific management movement. 
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 Mary Van Kleeck and Scientific Management 
Xhe diffusion and political content of scientific manage­
ment during the first half of the twentieth century has long 
interested scholars. Originally preoccupied •with work processes 
and labor discipline, scientific management ultimately informed 
the international development of several fields. Education, public 
administration, industrial psychology, and personnel manage­
ment, among others, absorbed in different ways the Taylorist 
ethos of organizational efficiency through expert research and 
functional prescription. As for its political thrust, most scholars 
have viewed Taylorism, for good or ill, as an important part of 
modern capitalist ideology, or as a vehicle for the promotion of 
new classes standing above or between capital and labor. More 
recently, the gender politics of Taylorism's spread have come 
under review, if often only implicitly, in studies of women's work 
and the home.1 
Critical to both the appeal and the development of Taylorism 
were the "scientizing" and Utopian impulses at its core. The "mental 
revolution" Taylor demanded of labor and management was to pro­
duce both a more rational and productive workplace and, by 
extension, a more abundant and harmonious society. This sensibility 
only increased after Taylor's death in 1915; his notoriety, the 
proselytizing of his associates, and wartime lessons in cooperative 
planning, would liberate scientific management from the shop floor. 
And during the postwar years, an international search for new 
mechanisms of social integration increasingly turned scientific 
management into an ideology of broad social transformation.2 
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Visions of a world made rational and abundant through the 
planning of technical elites now animated the thinking of novelists 
and revolutionaries, as well as engineers and businessmen. H. G. 
Wells, V I. Lenin, and Herbert Hoover, in different ways, sub­
scribed to the new faith, made plain its political ambitions, and 
thus helped to advance its pretensions and values. From approx­
imately 1915 through the 1930s, then, serious people believed and 
promoted the view that scientific management's proven ability to 
raise productivity within the firm could become the basis for a 
new Utopia. One of these was the Russell Sage Foundation execu­
tive, social worker, and industrial sociologist, Mary Abby Van 
Kleeck.3 
"The archetypal social feminist," Van Kleeck (1883-1972) was 
one of the network of women reformers and social investigators 
active in New York's labor and social justice causes early in the 
century. Her studies ofwomen workers led to her appointment as 
director of the Sage Foundation's Department of Industrial Stud­
ies, a post she would hold from 1916 to her retirement in 1948. In 
that capacity, she led the development of a program of labor and 
economic planning research, and almost singlehandedly turned 
the foundation into an institute for advanced social study. During 
the interwar period she emerged as the leader of the left wing of 
American social work, a radical defender of labor and civil rights. 
And there, too, she joined the worldwide planning debate through 
her leading role in Herbert Hoover's macroeconomic planning 
initiatives, in the International Industrial Relations Institute (IRI), 
and in the Taylor Society, the chief American organization for the 
promotion of scientific management.4 
Van Kleeck was not the only Taylorite concerned with scientific 
management's wider social applications. Morris Cooke and Har­
low Person, among others, shared this interest. Nor was she the 
only woman. Lillian Gilbreth and Ida Tarbell, like Van Kleeck, 
were members of the Taylor Society, and worked to apply the 
movement's principles to the home. But perhaps more than any 
Taylorite, Mary Van Kleeck worked to bring scientific manage­
ment to bear on social welfare. She saw scientific management's 
emphasis on research into the factors of production as the key to 
achieving social work's goal of raised living standards. Scientific 
management, Van Kleeck believed, its standard of rationality 
informed by social work's concern for the common weal, could 
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determine the proper coordination of all aspects of modern econ­
omies, from industrial relations within firms to the balancing of 
national production and consumption. And she pursued this belief 
over a career that traversed the difficult terrain from liberal reform 
through Hooverian corporatism to Soviet fellow traveling.5 Largely 
ignored by scholars, Van Kleeck's activities illuminate the appeal 
of Taylorism to professions and professionals seeking wider pub­
lic influence, the meaning and place of scientific management in 
the interwar movement toward macroeconomic planning, and the 
ironies of one woman's very large role in these matters.6 
Mary Van Kleeck's commitment to social work antedated her 
discovery of scientific management. Her vocation took shape 
while she was a student at Smith College from 1900 to 1904. 
There, her leading role in the Smith College Association for 
Christian Work and exposure to the early industrial work of the 
YWCA drew her into a wider world of woman-led reform. Upon 
graduation, and with a postgraduate fellowship in hand, she 
joined the College Settlement on New York's lower east side and 
began graduate work in social economy with Edward T. Devine 
and Henry R. Seager at Columbia University. The College Settle­
ment had already served as a training ground for such other 
women reformers as Mary Simkhovitch, Frances Kellor, and 
Eleanor Roosevelt. And there, Lilian Brandt, Florence Kelley, and 
the Women's Trade Union League of New York introduced the 
young social worker to a women's network of industrial investiga­
tion and reform. From 1905 through 1907, she studied child labor 
and overtime in women's work in New York City and soon came 
to the attention of the then-new Russell Sage Foundation.7 
Inaugurated in 1907, the Sage Foundation reflected the scientiz­
ing currents then running strongly through philanthropic circles, 
and the determination to move beyond charity and relief into the 
systematic study of poverty's causes. To this end the foundation 
sponsored, among other things, the Pittsburgh Survey, the first 
social survey of an American city, dedicated itself to profession­
alizing social work, and would function for the next forty years as 
Mary Van Kleeck's institutional base.8 
Initially, the new foundation sponsored the continuation of Van 
Kleeck's early researches, operating now under the auspices of an 
independent Committee on Women's Work chaired by Henry 
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Seager, and in 1910 brought this committee formally into the 
foundation. Between 1910 and 1917, Van Kleeck's department 
launched investigations of the poor conditions, night work, and 
unemployment suffered by New York City's women workers in 
the artificial flowers, millinery, and bookbinding trades. "Inten­
sive in method, dealing with a concrete, limited subject of inquiry," 
these studies, she explained, produced "not theories but evidence 
gathered slowly from those who know the facts through experi­
ence—the workers and the employers."9 
Van Kleeck's investigations emphasized the disorganization and 
irregularity of business operations. She called, among other 
things, for worker-management wage boards and employment 
exchanges to address these problems. In 1910 and again in 1915, she 
was instrumental in the establishment of state prohibitions against 
night work for women workers. Reflecting later upon the value of 
her early projects, she remarked that for "a view of the industrial 
system which comprehends not only the factory but the homes of 
the people . . . , the best subject of study is the status of women 
in industry." By 1914, however, convinced by her work "that 
distress and poverty among women workers are but phases of" 
larger "industrial and social conditions," Van Kleeck welcomed 
the foundation's decision to enlarge her department's scope to 
include study of men's as well as women's work. This broadened 
mandate was made formal in 1916 with the creation of a new 
Division of Industrial Studies under her leadership.10 
These projects revealed a stubborn faith in the potential of 
social science to provide both the vision and the means necessary 
for social transformation. They were, Van Kleeck noted in 1915, 
"carried on in the faith that a well-informed community will 
develop, step by step, a new order, the outgrowth of a new 
philosophy pressing toward the control of the industrial causes of 
poverty and misery. . . . "Management and labor, in other words, 
would be brought to a more balanced and just accommodation 
through a public opinion informed by social research. And be­
cause her studies also indicated that poor business management lay 
behind unemployment, Van Kleeck soon would be among those 
encouraging the fusion of scientific management and social work 
in the assault on economic instability.11 
By 1915 and Taylor's death, scientific management had been 
moving for some time toward just such a wider application of its 
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principles. Taylor's later writings and pronouncements, together 
with the popularization of his ideas by Louis Brandeis, Ida Tar-
bell, and others, strongly suggested the movement's applicability 
to the cause of national reform and renewal. Under Harlow 
Person's presidency, the Taylor Society from 1914 through 1919 
was increasingly receptive to the consideration of social ideals and 
to the participation of social scientists and reformers.12 
Van Kleeck surely was aware of this ferment; while the origins 
of her association with the Taylor Society remain unclear, her first 
reference to Taylorism, so the available evidence indicates, came in 
a syllabus for a course on industrial problems at the New York 
School of Philanthropy, where she taught from 1914 to 1917. 
There, in 1915, she introduced students of social work to the 
proposition that scientific management's "big contribution" to 
their field lay in its "expert study of working conditions." Such 
study, she argued early in 1917, had already led some management 
engineers to recognize the inefficiencies of unemployment and 
haphazard personnel policies. Here she pointed approvingly to the 
ideas of Richard Feiss and Ordway Tead, and to the efforts of 
Robert Valentine to promote an "Industrial Audit," in which the 
management of human relations within firms would be subject to 
the scrutiny accorded the management of production. Taylorites, 
it seemed to Van Kleeck, were beginning to share social work's 
preoccupation with the "human element"; in order to further 
these merging tendencies, she urged the adoption of the industrial 
audit as the first step in training social workers to assume person­
nel management positions in industry.13 
As they developed from 1915 to 1924, Van Kleeck's views on the 
relations between social work and scientific management were 
complex and contradictory. Convinced that both social workers 
and scientific managers had much to teach each other, she encour­
aged their merger and welcomed their contributions to the new 
field of personnel management. At the same time, she resisted the 
tendency of Taylorites and others to view the growing emphasis 
on human relations in industry as an improvement upon and 
departure from the ideas of Frederick W Taylor. Occasionally, she 
seemed to suggest that scientific management needed no lessons 
in wider social vision from anyone. Because an unreconstructed 
Taylorism's scientific, and thus disinterested, approach to indus­
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trial management could help to rationalize the firm, she reasoned, 
it could not help but rationalize and make just the firm's relation­
ship with its workers and community. Scientific management, for 
Van Kleeck, was thus a social science of Utopian potential. With its 
pretensions to transcendent authority, moreover, such a funda­
mentalist scientism likely held an additional appeal: it could 
enable insecure professionals, social workers as well as manage­
ment engineers, to cast themselves as social arbiters with impor­
tant and independent roles to play in stabilizing the industrial 
system. 
Van Kleeck was acutely conscious of social work's uncertain 
professional status. With its attention split between the results and 
the causes of human suffering, between casework and social 
reform, and lacking an esoteric technique and independent source 
of income, social work's identity was unclear, its disinterestedness 
in question. Since it functioned best as a "mediating" contact 
among various groups, Van Kleeck argued, it should view its 
professional mission as one of encouraging other groups and 
professions to think in terms of the community, the social ideal. 
"Only as social workers are prepared consciously to formulate 
their experience as a guide for the practice of others . . . can they 
lay claim to the possession of technique." Recent "experience 
seems also to show," she noted, "that the more socialized the other 
professions become, the more they turn to social workers for 
light." The best evidence for this proposition, Van Kleeck felt, lay 
in the warming relations between social workers and management 
engineers.14 
The first world war's demand for labor management intensified 
the linkages between these groups, encouraging both the devel­
opment of the personnel management movement and fresh oppor­
tunities to illustrate scientific management's importance to wo­
men workers. Together with Morris Cooke, for example, Van 
Kleeck sought to advance the interests of wartime women work­
ers by establishing labor standards through the Storage Commit­
tee and Industrial Service Section of the Ordnance Department. 
With the trade unionist, Mary Anderson, she expanded upon this 
work in the Woman in Industry Service of the Labor Department, 
forerunner of the U.S. Women's Bureau. Despite employer resis­
tance, exploitation, and discrimination, women workers, she 
found, often succeeded in men's work. "Hundreds of jobs," Van 
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Kleeck noted proudly, "became sexless." Such success, however, 
depended mostly upon intelligent and efficient business manage­
ment. "The war record," she wrote in The Atlantic Monthly, 
". . . is clear. Management in industry, and not feminism, opened 
the way to novel work for women." Nonetheless, Van Kleeck 
suggested, feminism and scientific management shared ultimate 
goals. "Efficiency," she averred elsewhere, "is not the ultimate 
aim. . . . The goal is the establishment of just relationships."15 
It is the method of industry to attach the individual to his 
limited, specified place in the whole scheme of production; 
while the aim of feminism is to make the whole recognize a 
hitherto unrealized obligation to the individual . .  . it busies 
itself with the issues that the times create. 
The economic issues of the time, as they are reflected in 
women's industrial status, were never more baffling. She must 
win a more secure place in the shop as a skilled worker. She has 
as yet only a limited . . . recognition in the labor movement. . . . 
She is accused of aiming to undermine the home, just when she 
may be working hardest at uncongenial tasks to support it. So 
discouraging is the outlook . . . that one is almost inclined to 
agree with certain anti-feminists about the effects of industrial­
ism on all our social institutions, including the family as a whole 
and women individually. Not feminism, however, but indus­
trial organization, uncontrolled in the common service, has 
done the damage.16 
Scientific management, Van Kleeck was certain, could help 
undo the damage. And while in the immediate postwar years, she 
would continue to work on behalf of women workers through her 
association with the U.S. Women's Bureau, by far the bulk of her 
energies would be devoted to furthering the merger of social work 
and Taylorite perspectives. Here, her own ties to scientific man­
agement would intensify, as she would be elected to the Nominat­
ing Committee and the Board of Directors of the Taylor Society.17 
"The management engineer and the social worker," she con­
cluded in 1922, "have found cooperation necessary." "The man­
agement engineer has discovered . . . that the efficiency and co­
operative attitude of a labor force is directly affected by the 
organization of life in the community." The social worker, "ap­
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proaching from a different direction has also arrived at the place 
where recognition of the relations of these two groups . . . become 
highly desirable for the success of each . . .  " Van Kleeck was 
probably right, although in more ways than she admitted. During 
the years just before and after the world war, elements within each 
group were interested in securing greater influence and autonomy, 
both within and without the corporation: engineers by claiming 
possession of a scientifically informed social vision, social work­
ers by establishing a new professional authority resting on the 
research and skills they could bring to bear on the economic 
sources of social distress. "Industry," she proclaimed, "is being 
invaded by social workers, who are bringing their experience to 
bear upon problems of personnel and research as they affect 
human relations." For a social worker like Van Kleeck, eager to see 
her profession take up an important role in social reconstruction, 
the assault was providential.18 
Closer ties to scientific management, Van Kleeck seemed to 
think, would help to "scientize," and thus make more effective, 
social work's claim to a place in the larger postwar debate over 
capitalist instability and unemployment. Personnel management 
already had emerged, in part, from this linkage, and Van Kleeck 
looked forward to further developments along these lines, toward 
an entirely new profession for industrial sociologists like herself. 
For a time in 1921 and 1922, she •worked with Lucy Carner, Frances 
Perkins, Molly Dewson, Louise Odencrantz, and George Soule 
attempting to organize a field of "industrial social work," but 
nothing came of this effort. Still, as she reminded her friend, 
Morris Cooke, "the analogy is close between social work and 
engineering." "We wish," she continued, "that we could find a 
more inclusive title than social work which has been so strongly 
associated with case workers." Briefly, she considered the term 
"social engineering," but regarded it as inaccurate and confusing. 
Still, "a term of that kind which denotes our interest in construc­
tive social problems and in research would give us the broader 
basis necessary for . . . professional organization. "19 
While Van Kleeck welcomed the development of mutually 
informing links between social work and scientific management, 
ties that would alter each profession, she resisted any suggestion 
that Taylor's thought had ignored the "human element." "My 
own experience," she would tell the Taylor Society in 1924, 
110 • GUY ALCHON 
"began with what is called the human element in industry, and I 
saw it first outside the shop in the community." There, her search 
for solutions to the long hours and repetitive unemployment 
characteristic of women's work "led back into the causes of these 
conditions in the shop itself, and nowhere did I find so many 
questions in process of being answered as in the Taylor Society. "20 
Those answers did not relate merely to what is called the human 
element in industry, conceived as a separate problem in a 
different compartment of the manager's desk. My interest in the 
contribution of scientific management . . . was not solely in its 
emphasis upon personnel relations, but in the technical organi­
zation of industry as it affects wage-earners. The constructive 
imagination which can spend seventeen years studying the art 
of cutting metals is the imagination which can make industry 
and all its results in human lives harmonize with our ideals for 
the community. That kind of constructive imagination, though 
it may deal with one technical problem, will not fail to envisage 
the whole significance of industrial management. Nor will it be 
content merely to increase profits. The philosophy and the 
procedure which it represents will ultimately build a shop 
whose influence in the community will be social in the best 
sense, because the shop and all its human relations are built on 
sound principles. 
Therefore, my interest in the Taylor Society is not directed 
toward challenging the technical engineer to give attention to 
problems of human relations. I am not worried about that, 
because if he is a good engineer he cannot fail to contribute to 
human relations. I am concerned rather with the other end of the 
story. I am eager to have those people who see the present 
disastrous results of industrial organization in the community 
realize how the art of management in the shop can fundamen­
tally change those social conditions in the community.21 
By the early 1920s, Van Kleeck's efforts to merge social work 
and scientific management had led her irretrievably from the 
world of women's reform to the heart of the management reform 
movement. While she would maintain some contacts among the 
women's network of social reformers, she would not be central to 
their progress through the interwar years. Instead, her commit­
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ment to scientific management as social science would lead her 
into a range of new activities, international associations, and 
political commitments. Postwar economic turmoil and industrial 
conflict already had prompted her to reorient her Department of 
Industrial Studies toward systematic analysis of employee-man­
agement plans within several industries. More importantly, in 
terms of our story, her efforts would take her now into the 
developing arenas of national and international planning.22 
These, in the most immediate sense, were the product of the 
first world war's various national planning experiments. Against 
the backdrop of postwar dislocations, some of those who had 
played the largest roles in the wartime mobilization of the econ­
omy—management engineers, social scientists, a few business­
men, and labor leaders —struggled to build new national manag­
erial capabilities. The chief figure in this story was the new 
Commerce Secretary, Herbert Hoover. But around him, from 
1921 through the early 1930s, would gather an array of planners, 
and among these was Mary Van Kleeck.23 
Van Kleeck saw Hooverian planning, at least at its outset, as an 
opportunity to further the rationalization of business and its 
relation to the community, and to do so now on a national scale. 
Early in 1921, Hoover sponsored the Federated American Engi­
neering Societies' study, Waste in Industry. While criticizing the 
report as vague, Van Kleeck nonetheless found valuable its empha­
sis on managerial responsibility for social as well as industrial 
welfare. Still, she was skeptical when in the fall of 1921, amidst a 
severe depression, Hoover presided over the President's Confer­
ence on Unemployment. Van Kleeck doubted Hoover's grasp of 
labor issues and unemployment. And with both the Labor Depart­
ment and its Women's Bureau excluded, she feared the Conference 
would promote the Commerce Department at their expense. Still, 
she retained some hope. "Perhaps," she wrote to her Sage Founda­
tion associate, Shelby Harrison, "this means that the main objec­
tive will be to emphasize the responsibility of employers for 
avoiding unemployment, and, if so, the results may be worth­
while.'^ 
This was precisely Hoover's emphasis in the conference. To 
institutionalize it, he invited Mary Van Kleeck and others to join a 
continuing committee to supervise an unprecedented investiga­
tion into the nature of business cycles and the utility of scientific 
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management in their prevention. A key vehicle of Hooverian 
planning, the committee reflected Hoover's desire to construct a 
better ordered and balanced society through the application of 
technical expertise to economic problems. It reflected, too, Hoov­
er's antistatism, and his determination to achieve these goals 
through a corporatist arrangement in which private bodies were 
encouraged by the Commerce Department to assume larger pub­
lic responsibilities.25 
Such planning, while sponsored by the Commerce Depart­
ment, would be funded by the major foundations and built upon 
the investigations of social scientists affiliated with them, univer­
sities, and public policy research organizations such as the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. The idea was that the new knowl­
edge developed about the business cycle and the countercyclical 
benefits of scientific management would be broadcast to the 
nation's businessmen by a Commerce Department eager to see 
them stabilize their operations and tailor their investment deci­
sions to the cycle's swings. And to the extent that they did so, the 
argument ran, then the sum of their individual actions would add 
up to a national economy of greater stability and less unemploy­
ment.26 
Still skeptical, Van Kleeck was willing to give Hooverian 
macroeconomic planning a chance. With the economist, Wesley 
C. Mitchell, and the chairman of General Electric, Owen D. 
Young, she played a leading role in the Cycle Committee's deliber­
ations, and authored one chapter of the committee's final report, 
Business Cycles and Unemployment. Published amidst wide publicity 
in 1923, the report seemed at the time to have helped to moderate 
both the upward swing and subsequent decline in business activ­
ity at mid-decade, thus vindicating, apparently, Hoover's approach 
to the economy. But the story of Hooverian planning would not 
end well, and turned out to be more a story of tentative efforts 
soon to be overwhelmed by the economy's deeper structural 
dilemmas and the coming of the Great Depression.27 
By the late 1920s, in any case, Van Kleeck had become increas­
ingly impatient with Hoover's approach. Her impatience prompted 
a reassessment. The evidence of rising unemployment amidst 
general prosperity had mounted; neither social work's "invasion" 
of industry nor scientific management, it seemed, were strong 
enough to compel capitalism's reorganization of work and wel­
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fare. Thus the time had come, she now argued, to ask whether the 
problem of stabilizing employment and raising living standards 
could any longer be left to business management alone.28 
Scientific management was as important as ever to addressing 
these problems, she maintained, but without greater public and 
worker control of the economy it would never fulfill its promise of 
rational production and social abundance. "It is not enough," she 
insisted as early as 1927, "to leave the problem of employment and 
unemployment to leaders of business." The "scientific method of 
approach to social and economic problems needs to be utilized by 
unions." This was a theme she carried even into the Taylor Society, 
where she urged consideration of the "claim of the public upon the 
social uses of the science of management." It was a theme, too, 
that would only intensify, as the coming of the Great Depression 
accelerated her commitment to socialism.29 
Insisting that Van Kleeck was "one of the best-fitted women in 
the country for a Cabinet position," Alice Hamilton spoke for 
those early in the 1930s who regarded Mary Van Kleeck, in Lillian 
Gilbreth's words, "as the best research woman I know." Van 
Kleeck's militant and newfound socialism, however, made a New 
Deal cabinet appointment unlikely. She was offered a post on the 
Federal Advisory Council of the U.S. Employment Service, but 
resigned it abruptly to dramatize her opposition to the NRA's 
insufficient support for collective bargaining and the labor move­
ment. "I find myself forced to stand outside and criticize," she 
told her good friend Morris Cooke. "I have to work out in my 
own mind the right direction for my present activities." Her 
activities since the late 1920s increasingly had involved her in the 
worldwide search for a new international economic order, a search 
that had originated more than a decade before in her first efforts to 
"internationalize" the merger of social reform and scientific man­
agement in the work of the International Industrial Relations 
Institute (IRI).30 
The IRI arose early in the 1920s as the result of international 
efforts by a group of mostly women personnel specialists to 
address the postwar debate over scientific management's place in 
industrial relations. While corporate welfare and personnel work 
had been developing both in Europe and the United States since 
early in the century, the war's labor demands created openings in 
many firms for women interested in managing the "human 
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factor." And, in a chateau in Normandy in July, 1922, a small 
group of such women, representing eleven countries, came to­
gether in the First International Welfare Conference.31 
Louise Odencrantz, the wartime personnel manager for the 
New York ribbon-making firm, Smith & Kaufmann, and Van 
Kleeck's former associate at the Sage Foundation, was the Ameri­
can representative to the conference. Mary Fledderus, the person­
nel manager of the Leerdam Glassworks, just outside Rotterdam, 
Holland, and soon to become, together with Van Kleeck, the 
motive force behind the IRI, also attended.32 
Appointed by the conference to organize a larger and more 
permanent organization, Fledderus was responsible in June 1925 
for convening in Holland the new International Association for 
the Study and Improvement of Human Relations in Industry. 
More than fifty delegates, most of them women, representing 
twenty-one countries, attended the conference. Among them 
were sympathetic employers, such as Dorothy Cadbury, a manag­
ing director of England's Cadbury chocolate empire, and Cees van 
der Leeuw, a partner in Rotterdam's Van Nelle coffee operation 
and longtime friend of Fledderus. Sweden's chief Inspector of 
Factories, Kersten Hesselgren, was elected president, and three 
American members, Odencrantz, Lillian Gilbreth, and Van Kleeck, 
were elected to the organization's permanent Council.33 
"Though the principles of Scientific Management and Efficiency 
are in themselves to be hailed with enthusiasm," Fledderus wrote 
in the introduction to the congress's report, "unless they are 
applied with a corresponding study of their effect upon humanity 
serving in Industry, they hide within their depths the possibility 
of a great and subtle cruelty." Here, in another form and place, was 
Van Kleeck's linkage of industrial social work and scientific man­
agement. The new congress envisioned its role as one of collabora­
tion with such established bodies as the International Manage­
ment Institute (IMI) and the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). As such it could be a forum for the frank discussion of 
contending schemes for the "promotion of satisfactory human 
relations and conditions in industry. "34 
The Association met regularly in summer sessions during 1926 
and 1927 in order to prepare for its first triennial conference, one 
that was to test this self-appointed function. The "Fundamental 
Relationships Between All Sectors of the Industrial Community" 
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was the theme, then, in June 1928, when more than one hundred 
delegates from twenty countries met for a week at Girton College, 
the women's college of Cambridge University. There, Paul Devinat 
of the ILO, the British scientific management enthusiast, Lyndall 
Urwick, former Principal Woman Inspector of Factories, Dame 
Adelaide Anderson, and Paul Kellogg, editor of the Survey maga­
zine, were in attendance. Both Holland's and Britain's progressive 
employers were represented by Cees van der Leeuw and by the 
Rowntrees and Cadburys.35 
Their discussions, Van Kleeck noted in her remarks to the 
congress's closing session, had ranged over the philosophies of 
individualism and collectivism, differences in national experi­
ences, workers' education, and the contributions of scientific 
management to improved human relations. "Now if anyone com­
plains that there are not enough 'brass tacks' . .  . in our discus­
sions," she admonished, "I think we have to ask, is there anything 
more tangible or more concrete . . . ," than "bringing together 
the points of view of labour, of employers, of managers, and of 
those who are students of industry?"36 
This seemed to be the view of many, both in the conference and 
among the attentive public, who in the late 1920s looked upon the 
IRI as an interesting, if modest, "factory of ideas." The organiza­
tion was all the more remarkable, Van Kleeck was to note later, 
because it did not have a formal staff, instead relying upon 
carefully developed triennial conferences, themselves arising out 
of previous summer meetings and reports. These materials and 
conference proceedings, then, would be published, usually in 
book form, as the favored method of bringing the organization's 
work to a wider and international public.37 
In truth, the IRI by the late 1920s relied almost exclusively upon 
Fledderus and Van Kleeck. As director and associate director, 
respectively, they ran the organization from its office in The 
Hague and from Van Kleeck's offices in the Sage Foundation, 
relying for funds on membership dues, a few guardian angels, and 
the Sage Foundation. And when early in the 1930s the coming of 
the Depression, the emergence of fascist parties in Europe, and the 
Soviet Union's turn toward central planning brought a new ur­
gency to world affairs, they turned the IRI's next triennial confer­
ence into an opportunity to investigate the implications of these 
new developments. The result was the Amsterdam World Social 
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Economic Congress of 1931, the high water mark of the IRI's 
influence.38 
"The situation in Europe is indescribably serious," Van Kleeck 
warned Morris Cooke in the fall of 1930. And "modest as is the 
I.R.I., it seems to find itself in the position of being the only 
organization able to offer a platform at this moment to labor, 
employers, scientific managers, and economists. . . ."The plat­
form's strength, Van Kleeck felt, would depend upon turning the 
Amsterdam Congress into an international version of the Presi­
dent's Unemployment Conference of 1921. Then, "Mr. Hoover . . 
was trying to lift the subject of unemployment to a higher plane of 
industrial statesmanship, getting leaders of business to use the 
results of economic research to enlarge thejudgment of business­
men. " With unemployment now worsening, she argued, "interna­
tional economic co-operation . . . toward a planned development 
of productive capacity and standards of living," was necessary. 
Van Kleeck envisioned nothing less than the fusion of scientific 
management and social welfare in an international "Social-Eco­
nomic Planning."39 
Returning to a favorite theme, Van Kleeck insisted that social 
economic planning "traces directly back to the scientific manage­
ment movement," and asks "whether the mastery of knowledge 
which is slowly being accepted in the workshops can be trans­
ferred to the community as a whole. . . .  " Planning, she later 
wrote, "will soon be another commonplace expression," meaning 
everything and nothing. "But rarely is the expression 'economic 
planning' used in combination with the word 'social' as denoting 
the common welfare — the one word from which it should never be 
severed." Social-economic planning, she asserted in Amsterdam, 
"is the name for a definite procedure." It had yet to be fairly 
tested, "but its underlying principles have been developed in the 
scientific management movement . . . ," and its central task is to 
utilize the world's productive capacities "to raise the standards of 
living."40 
This was the theme that appealed to the Taylorites, scholars, 
socialists, and trade unionists who assembled in Amsterdam's 
Koloniaal Institute in late August of that year. Delegates from the 
United States included Harlow Person, Edward A. Filene of the 
Boston department store and 20th Century Fund, and Lewis 
Lorwin of the Brookings Institution. But drawing the most 
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attention was a delegation of the State Planning Commission of 
the Soviet Union (Gosplan). 
The Soviet delegation's presence alone was news, as they were 
among the first Soviet officials to travel to the west to discuss the 
Five Year plans. More than this, they were representatives of the 
world's first society attempting comprehensive and socialized 
planning, and thus "their coming did not merely add one nation to 
the list," Van Kleeck noted, "but brought to the discussion the 
record of experience with social economic planning under com­
munism, as it is actually in effect." Led by the Gosplan economist, 
Valery V Obolensky-Ossinsky, the Soviet delegation even pre­
sented their chief discussion of Russia under the plans as "The 
Nature and Forms of Social Economic Planning." Their presenta­
tions were eagerly attended by a congress and international press 
curious to learn more about the details of central administration, 
goal setting, the role of scientific management in labor relations, 
and the allegedly democratic and collaborative ethos underlying 
the Soviet administration of industry, agriculture, and trade. But 
of these matters, the Soviets really had little new to say, preferring 
instead to emphasize, sometimes angrily, the contrast between a 
Soviet Union enjoying planned and democratic full employment 
and a prostrate western capitalism.41 
Following the Amsterdam Congress, Van Kleeck and her allies 
in the IRI worked to establish a World Commission for the Study 
of Social Economic Planning, one capable of developing statistics 
and other materials necessary for the construction of world plans. 
"But is not this world task too big for us?" she asked rhetorically. 
It was, of course. The IRI never attained direct and continuous 
influence in the planning debates of the 1930s. Unable to generate 
additional funds for their ambitious plans amidst the Depression, 
Van Kleeck, Fledderus, and a few associates continued their work, 
coming together in IRI conferences every year until war in Europe 
effectively brought their enterprise to an end.42 
While the Amsterdam Congress marked the height of the IRI's 
career, it marked only the beginning of the final stage of Mary Van 
Kleeck's efforts to merge social work and scientific management 
for the planned raising of living standards. During the Great 
Depression, she advocated a greater role for both in the construc­
tion of social economic planning. "The Amsterdam Congress 
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convinced me," she said in a speech early in 1932, "that the place to 
begin planning is to study the production and distribution of raw 
materials" as the first step toward a "better social plan for economic 
life." To this end, she turned the Department of Industrial Studies 
and the IRI to new studies of natural resource industries, techno­
logical change, and living standards, and urged the creation of a 
National Economic Council to promote such planning.43 
Increasingly, too, she pointed to the Soviet Union as a source 
for comparative study in these matters. "If we can be objective 
and scientific in our attitude, what an opportunity this is for our 
generation to observe two systems —capitalist and communist— 
and to compare their results." And by 1933, she had little doubt 
where such comparison would lead.44 
It is impossible to discuss a planned economy without calling 
attention to the actual example of it in the Soviet Union. There 
all of the branches of economic life are planned as an integrated 
whole. It would be worthwhile for us to study its actual 
technique . .  . as examples of the way in which the whole range 
of managerial problems is studied in their interrelationships. I 
am frank to say that I believe that the planned economy of the 
Soviet Union brings us face to face with the real issue . . . [of] 
whether capitalism as we know it now . . . must claim our 
permanent allegiance, or whether we are ready with entirely 
open minds to consider the fundamental questions of economic 
organization which the present crisis of unemployment presents 
4us.45 
Van Kleeck, like other curious engineers and observers, had 
visited the Soviet Union in 1932, studying its efforts toward social 
economic planning under the Five Year Plans. And upon her 
return she presented her findings to the Taylor Society. 
The universality of the principles of scientific management 
emerges as one observes their applicability in the new economic 
system of the Soviet Union. The outstanding difference is that 
in the United States limits are set to the application of knowl­
edge because the area of control through ownership is not 
comprehensive enough to plan and control the relationship of 
factors which are essentially interrelated. . . . [T]he Soviet 
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Union has given to scientific management in that country a 
scope which is new in the history of modern industry. It will 
take time to perfect its application. . . . But meanwhile . . . 
this large-scale integration of industries reaches far beyond the 
widest stretch of the management engineer in America. Here 
scientific management is tied to a hitchingpost, when it should 
be free to follow as far as electricity can carry it.46 
To untie scientific management so that it could assume its 
rightful social role, Van Kleeck advocated public trusteeship over 
corporate use of national resources. For a time during the mid 
1930s she attained national prominence promoting this vision, 
especially among social workers, leading them and other profes­
sionals as national chairman of the Inter-Professional Association 
for Social Insurance, an organization designed to forge cross-class 
alliances between workers and professionals. But it would be her 
growing identification with the Soviet Union that most marked 
these latter years of her career.47 
An advocate of closer U.S.-Soviet trade and diplomatic recog­
nition, she soon became a staunch advocate of the Soviet state, 
linking the prospects for social economic planning to the fate of 
the Soviet Union. She defended its persecution of Trotsky, its 
purge trials, its invasion of Finland, and its short-lived pact with 
Hitler. She became, in other words, a fellow traveler, apparently 
never joining the Communist Party, but lending the Soviet Union 
and American Communists her energies and the support of her 
intellectual authority. Having dedicated her life to the scientific 
construction of social welfare, she was tired of capitalism's con­
tinuing imbalances. And like many reformers of her generation, 
she looked upon the Soviet Union as the single, courageous 
alternative, trying to build the planned society but beset on all 
sides by enemies, thus requiring her help and defense. For these 
reasons, she joined or worked with various pro-Soviet organiza­
tions during the 1930s and 1940s, leading to her surveillance by the 
FBI, and to an appearance before Senator Joseph McCarthy's 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1953, at the age of 
sixty-nine.48 
Mary Van Kleeck's Taylorism reveals much, but at the same 
time poses questions beyond the immediate scope of this essay. 
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Her career emphasizes the point that Taylorism, whatever else it 
may have been, was a Utopian project, one that sought through 
technocratic direction to produce a rational industrial order and a 
liberating abundance. Its attractions to reformers thus are not hard 
to understand. But until now there has been little interest in the 
question of women reformers' relation to Taylorism. Nor has 
there been sufficient recognition that one such woman played an 
unusually large role in the story of scientific management after 
Taylor. 
There has been little recognition, in other words, of Mary Van 
Kleeck's efforts to merge Taylorism and social work following 
World War I, to bring to scientific management the social feminist 
concern for living standards while bringing to the professionaliza­
tion of social work Taylorism's scientism. But why did so few 
women join her in this quest? Why was Mary Van Kleeck, 
virtually alone among the women's reform network of her day, so 
powerfully attracted to Taylorism and its utopianism? What part 
did the Russell Sage Foundation play in encouraging or enabling 
her to set out on this independent path? And on what terms, at 
what cost, did she leave the worlds of woman-led reform to enter 
the male-dominated worlds of Taylorism and planning? 
Van Kleeck would play a large part in Taylorism's contribution 
to the interwar debate over national and international planning. 
Here, especially, few pursued scientific management's Utopian 
implications as far as she did and at such cost. Together with 
Morris Cooke, Harlow Person, and Henry Dennison, Van Kleeck 
in the 1920s helped to make the Taylor Society an imaginative 
forum for the discussion of scientific management's relation to 
problems of macroeconomic coordination. But why did few if 
any Taylorites in the 1930s follow Van Kleeck into an uncritical 
admiration of Stalinist central planning! How, in the absence of 
personal papers and autobiographical statements, can we account 
for her increasingly inflexible fellow traveling? 
Blinded as well as guided by faith and conviction, Van Kleeck 
seemed unable to grasp the political implications of her Taylor-
ism. Generous and sincerely committed to advancing human 
welfare, she nonetheless promoted the antidemocratic tendencies 
of technocratic direction and centralized control, never appreciat­
ing the paradox at the heart of her ambitions. Simultaneously 
unusual and representative, finally, Mary Van Kleeck still informs 
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us about the fate of scientific management and the history of a 
generation and its hard-edged confrontation with capitalism, 
expertise, and Utopian hope. 
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Organized Production and Unorganized 
Labor: Management Strategy and Labor 
Activism at the Link-Belt Company, 
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 4 0 
J_he Link-Belt Company occupies an important place in 
the history of scientific management. After 1907, as one of Fre­
derick W. Taylor's famous showcase firms, it epitomized the 
"mental revolution" in cooperative and efficient production. The 
company's top executives, James Mapes Dodge and Charles Piez, 
ranked among Taylor's most ardent supporters, and Link-Belt 
employees often expressed their satisfaction with Taylor's system. 
However, there was another side to the Link-Belt experience. An 
examination of the firm's industrial relations from 1900 to 1940 
underscores the limited impact of scientific management in an 
important area of industrial management: contrary to their state­
ments, Link-Belt executives never relied on scientific manage­
ment to promote industrial peace. The company's labor manage­
ment strategy had combined trade association and corporate 
welfare activities with Taylorism from the beginning, and after 
World War I, scientific management became even less important in 
defining the relations between employer and employees. 
Similarly, a reluctance to join in organized labor's attack on 
scientific management did not signify that Link-Belt workers 
were indifferent to trade union promises of higher wages and 
better working conditions. On three occasions labor activists 
threatened to organize the company's Chicago plant. With each 
The author thanks Daniel Nelson, Walter Licht, and James A. Sauls for their 
valuable comments on the manuscript, and PT Components, Inc. for providing 
access to the Link-Belt records. 
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challenge, Link-Belt executives used every available means to 
oppose unionization and collective bargaining. Far from a celebra­
tion of Taylor's methods and the "mental revolution," the Link-
Belt experience exposes the limits of scientific management in 
satisfying workers' aspirations. 
The Link-Belt Company grew out of a small Chicago enter­
prise that began manufacturing a new detachable-link chain for 
agricultural equipment in 1875. Link-Belt chain quickly tran­
scended its original use in farm equipment and became an impor­
tant component in elevating and conveying machinery. Over the 
next five decades, the company expanded its facilities and diver­
sified its product line, initially to meet customer demand and later 
to maintain its position in a competitive market. By 1930, Link-
Belt was a well-established engineering firm specializing in mate­
rials handling equipment, with corporate headquarters in Chicago 
and primary manufacturing facilities in Chicago, Philadelphia, 
and Indianapolis. Although some work at the three manufacturing 
sites overlapped, each plant specialized in particular activities, 
serving complementary purposes in the company's overall manu­
facturing business. The Indianapolis plant made a wide variety of 
chain products sold to basic industries and used in Chicago and 
Philadelphia as components of other Link-Belt goods. The Chi­
cago facilities did contract engineering and produced cranes, 
steam shovels, electric hoists, and other heavy earth moving 
equipment. Link-Belt's Philadelphia shops specialized in design­
ing and installing the customized transmission and conveying 
systems that fueled the growing mass-production industries.1 
At first, Link-Belt's expansion and diversification had little 
effect on the company's social structure or management practices. 
Before 1906, several levels of authority existed in the Chicago 
shops. Each department foreman set wages and controlled hiring, 
firing, and shop discipline in his own area. The foremen coordi­
nated the efforts of a highly skilled, technically knowledgeable, 
and versatile work force, but the workers themselves determined 
production methods. Company executives and engineers, includ­
ing Charles Piez, Link-Belt president and head of the Chicago 
operation, maintained offices right in the shops, where they did 
estimating, engineering, designing, drafting, and experimental 
work in conjunction with foremen and craftsmen. Everyone from 
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the greenest hand to the company president intermingled on the 
shop floor.2 
While foremen and individual workers ironed out most labor 
grievances at the point of conflict, sometimes workers resorted to 
other means. Occasionally, they appealed to the plant superinten­
dent or higher company officials to resolve disputes. In other 
cases, they looked to unions for support. Link-Belt carpenters, 
millwrights, machinists, and molders successfully organized the 
Chicago plant at the turn of the century. As part of a citywide 
drive to gain union recognition, the nine-hour day, and better 
working conditions, machinists and molders waged at least four 
strikes at Link-Belt between 1900 and 1906. In conjunction with 
other Chicago metal trades employers, Link-Belt signed agree­
ments with the International Association of Machinists (IAM) 
between 1900 and 1903, and during these years the union's busi­
ness agent and shop stewards had considerable voice in settling 
grievances, setting wage rates, and defining production norms.3 
Responsibilities for meeting production schedules fell on fore­
men's shoulders. In fulfilling these duties, they exerted far less 
control than in dictating the terms of employment. In addition to a 
work pace determined by the craftsmen's notion of a fair day's 
work, foremen had to cope with periodic shortages of material, 
machinery breakdowns, production bottlenecks that disrupted 
work flow between departments, and the continual need to set 
aside partially completed work to produce rush orders. Often the 
obstacles delayed shipments until well after the delivery dates 
promised to customers.4 
The nature of Link-Belt products limited the use of rigid 
production techniques and schedule. Except for the company's 
wide variety of standard chain products, business was done by 
special order. Marketing heavy machinery and conveying systems 
designed to meet the specific needs of each client called for 
customized chain, special devices, and new forms of conveyors. 
Producing an order for a production-line conveyor system used to 
refine Cuban sugar might be followed by another for a coal 
storage system capable of handling two hundred tons per hour and 
involving feeders, crushers, bucket carriers, storage bins, a cable 
car system, and a locomotive crane.5 The shops required a wide 
variety of skills and enough flexibility to accommodate such 
dramatic switches in production. 
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The foundation for scientific management at Link-Belt was laid 
in Philadelphia. To eliminate some bottlenecks and systematize 
the shops, James Mapes Dodge, who headed Philadelphia's opera­
tion, hired Louis Wright, a former apprentice under Frederick W. 
Taylor, as plant superintendent in 1889. Dodge credited Wright 
with giving Link-Belt its "first jolt in [the] direction" of scientific 
management, stating that "as soon as he became our superinten­
dent he put in all the new wrinkles he brought with him from the 
Midvale Steel Co." Wright's efforts included the introduction of a 
bulletin board, shop notices spelling out job instructions and 
rules, and new routing procedures, involving "circulating bills-
of-material" that documented worker accountability for specific 
tasks.6 
Louis Wright left Link-Belt after two years, but systematiza­
tion continued throughout the decade. Company executives depart­
mentalized production and implemented new accounting methods, 
work rules, and bureaucratic labor control mechanisms, including 
a "Time Recorder." Between 1890 and 1903, the supervisory staff 
doubled and the nonproduction managerial staff nearly tripled. 
Higher management chipped away at the foremen's empire by 
delegating some supervisory tasks to "assistant foremen," and by 
restricting the foremen's ability to hire, fire, and set wages at 
will.7 By the turn of the century, Link-Belt management had 
paved the way for a smooth transition to scientific management. 
Link-Belt was among the first companies to install Taylor's 
system. Taylor's most orthodox student, Carl Barth, oversaw the 
installations. Barth's work coincided with retooling the plants to 
utilize high-speed steel cutting tools, converting from partial to 
full electrification, and installing individual motor drives on all 
machinery. In 1904, Barth began his preliminary work in Phila­
delphia by standardizing and upgrading machinery, tools, and 
other equipment, redesigning the shop floor layout, and experi­
menting to determine the proper speeds and feeds for machining 
different types of metal with high-speed steel. Gradually, skilled 
workers were promoted and trained as functional foremen. Some 
former foremen and skilled workers joined draftsmen and engi­
neers in setting up the planning room and designing instruction 
cards and other recordkeeping forms.8 
More than a year passed before Dwight Merrick, a former 
Link-Belt draftsman promoted to assist Barth, began time stud­
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ies. Merrick proceeded cautiously after Philadelphia's machine 
shop workers objected to the stopwatch. Barth and Link-Belt 
Superintendent Willis Adams took two of the younger machinists 
aside to explain how they could earn 3 5 percent over their day rate 
by "working under instructions and direct supervision." The 
young machinists agreed to try it and their wages immediately 
averaged 40 percent more than those of veteran coworkers. The 
two machinists worked under functional foremen, but their work 
involved no time study, no slide rule calculations, no detailed 
instruction cards, or any discernable new work methods. Other 
Link-Belt machinists stood on the sidelines for some time, com­
paring their relatively thinner pay envelopes to those of the two 
young men. Eventually, a worker with fifteen years' seniority 
succumbed, deciding he wanted a chance to earn the higher wage. 
Thereafter, others approached Adams asking "to be put on that 
kind of work." As resistance eroded, Barth and Adams introduced 
new elements of the system "little by little," including "time 
study and task work with bonus, for which, later on, Mr. Taylor's 
differential rate was substituted. "9 
To maintain the employees' confidence throughout this pro­
cess, Link-Belt managers assured workers that once time studies 
were taken and fair piece rates established, there would be no 
tampering with the rates. It was management's duty to eliminate 
disruptions and provide workers with the best equipment and 
materials. No matter how much money a worker might make, rate 
changes were not allowed unless new machinery or technology 
rendered old production methods obsolete. In Dodge's words: 
"We would not dare to cut the rate. Scientific management would 
evaporate like snow in sunshine if we did not keep our word with 
our men."10 
With reorganization and time study work well under way in 
Philadelphia, Barth departed for Chicago to introduce the system 
in June 1906. Conditions there differed substantially from those in 
Philadelphia. First, there is no evidence that Louis Wright's work 
was duplicated in Chicago. Second, while Philadelphia's labor 
relations were generally friendly, in Chicago they were strained. 
Barth entered the Chicago shops in the aftermath of a six-year 
unionization drive involving citywide labor unrest and consider­
able violence at the Link-Belt plant. For example, during the IAM 
strike of 1900, fights between strikers and nonunion employees led 
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to some serious injuries. "[M]en were knocked out in the shop, 
windows . . . and machinery were broken, . . . and mobs [went] 
through the Chicago shops three times" during subsequent ma­
chinists and molders strikes. Furthermore, the molders' shop 
steward ordered what Charles Piez considered "a steady and 
insidious reduction in output," cutting production on some oper­
ations by 30 percent. A management study estimated that Link-
Belt's Chicago machine shop workers had reduced their output by 
35 percent. Such challenges led to stormy labor relations at the 
firm. Consequently, following a city wide strike beginning in May 
1904 and lasting into 1905, Link-Belt refused to renew its contract 
with the IAM. The company also rejected the molders' contract 
demands after a general strike in 1906. Thereafter, Link-Belt 
management vowed to operate as an open shop in Chicago.11 
Chicago's branch of the National Metal Trades Association 
(NMTA), an organization spawned and nurtured by the strikes, 
aided Link-Belt in this endeavor. Initially, when member firms 
realized they could not keep unions out of their plants, the NMTA 
served as bargaining agent for all its members, bringing metal 
manufacturers and unions together under citywide contracts be­
tween 1900 and 1903. When contract negotiations broke down in 
1904, the NMTA developed new tactics aimed at breaking the 
unions. Two weeks after the IAM called its members out on strike, 
NMTA recruiters began scouring midwestern and northeastern 
cities for replacement workers. In the midst of a depression, 
recruiters found "an unusual number of unemployed mechanics" 
who willingly travelled to Chicago.12 The NMTA's national 
secretary opened a temporary office in Chicago to coordinate 
recruitment, interview incoming workers, match up their quali­
fications with the needs of member firms, and dispatch them 
under guard to their new employers.13 
Link-Belt and other NMTA members intended to teach the 
strikers "that they cannot leave their positions and still have 
them." Recruiters had instructions to engage only permanent 
replacements, not temporary strikebreakers, and member firms 
pledged to protect the nonunion machinists throughout the strike 
and offer them preferential employment afterwards. Travel ad­
vances, deducted from the strikebreakers' wages in the first two 
weeks of employment, were refunded to those who "rendered 
faithful service" for sixty to ninety days. Apparently, many 
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received their refunds. Five months after the strike broke out, the 
NMTA declared a "crushing defeat" of the IAM, reporting that 75 
percent of the NMTA "certified mechanics" remained on the job 
along with about 20 percent of the strikers who defected from the 
union and returned to work. In a move to further cripple the IAM, 
the NMTA worked with the Chicago Employers' Association to 
prosecute sixty machinists on criminal charges.14 
Heralding its new focus, the NMTA changed the name of its 
monthly publication from the Bulletin to The Open Shop. To 
further its objectives after defeating the machinists, the Associa­
tion converted its emergency organization into a permanent labor 
bureau to screen prospective employees for member firms. Asso­
ciation members refused to hire workers without cards on file 
with the NMTA. Besides recording the employment histories, 
qualifications, and union activities of workers who consented to 
the process, clerks kept similar records on many unsuspecting 
Chicago metal workers through a network of secret informants in 
the plants. The NMTA's extensive card index served as a powerful 
blacklist in the following years, and Link-Belt's Charles Piez felt it 
was "perfectly proper" to use it for that purpose.15 
James Dodge offered ambiguously worded denials when asked 
if Link-Belt had "discharge[d] the entire force in Chicago" before 
introducing scientific management. He denied that any "whole­
sale exodus of men" had taken place, and he refused to connect 
individual dismissals with the success of scientific management. 
Undoubtedly, few, if any, IAM activists were reinstated. Link-
Belt officials demanded undivided loyalty from their workers 
after the strike. Anyone expressing discontent or having union 
connections was fired on some other pretext. Describing the 
situation at Link-Belt a decade after the strike, Chicago's IAM 
business agent complained: "I do not believe you can find a union 
man with a fine-tooth comb."16 
Reshaping Link-Belt's labor force did not completely satisfy the 
company's needs. Like other firms, it soon detected "wide-spread 
disloyalty" among foremen and superintendents. The NMTA's 
"special agents" reported that supervisors had shown "a strange 
antipathy toward the newcomers," by using everything from 
subtle discouragement to discharge without cause to rid their 
departments of strikebreakers. Most of the wayward supervisors 
held withdrawal cards from the union. Early in the 1904 strike, the 
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NMTA convinced its members that such attitudes compromised 
their efforts, and the employers began hosting dinner meetings 
with their production supervisors and NMTA officials to discuss 
"the question of a superintendent or foreman's true position" in 
the firm. In December, the Chicago Metal Trades Association 
Superintendents' and Foremen's Club was officially organized. 
Among those elected to office at this meeting were Link-Belt 
Assistant Superintendent L. I. Yeomans and Foreman}. D. Wig­
gins.17 No doubt others participated as well. 
Consequently, Barth arrived in Chicago to deal with a restruc­
tured Link-Belt production force consisting of longtime employ­
ees who sided with management during the strikes, newcomers 
who replaced striking machinists, and a supervisory staff purged 
of incorrigible union sympathizers and instilled with a new sense 
of responsibility toward the company. The economic downturn 
beginning in October 1907 further reinforced the new order. In 
November, Link-Belt laid off its entire night shift and many 
workers on the day shift; the remaining employees worked short 
hours. The depressed market extended well into 1909. Under such 
circumstances, Barth met little resistance. While he had required 
over four years to develop and install scientific management in 
Philadelphia, he took only eighteen months to transplant it to 
Chicago. By relying on prior experience and data from Phila­
delphia, Barth and his assistants dispensed with much time-
consuming experimentation and preliminary work.18 Barth quickly 
installed what he considered to be an operational system, and then 
he left it to the superintendent and newly trained functional 
foremen to keep things running. 
After the installations, Link-Belt became a prominent stop on 
the tours Frederick W. Taylor arranged for potential clients who 
wished to see a working model of scientific management. Dodge 
and Piez welcomed both admirers and critics to tour the Link-Belt 
plants. Even skeptical visitors were impressed by the orderly, 
efficient plants they saw and the promotional pitch they heard. 
With the introduction of scientific management, Link-Belt offi­
cials explained, worker productivity had more than doubled and 
wages ran 25 to 35 percent above the straight day rate, prices of 
Link-Belt products had decreased by 10 to 20 percent, and yet the 
corporation's profit margin had increased 15 to 20 percent. After 
stressing that all this was accomplished without a hint of labor 
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trouble —sometimes even crediting the system with solving Chi­
cago's labor problems —they invited members of the audience to 
get the workers' firsthand reactions. Most visitors left the prem­
ises convinced of scientific management's unqualified success in 
the Link-Belt shops.19 
The promotional rhetoric fell short of fully disclosing the 
complex series of changes influencing the statistics. State-of-the­
art machinery, high-speed steel cutting tools, and more extensive 
and effective use of electricity in the shops also help to explain 
increased output. Link-Belt officials who described the plants 
frequently used wage data from 1904 to emphasize the workers' 
higher earnings in the 1910s. However, they failed to acknowledge 
that 1904 was a depression year, disregarded inflation, and over­
looked the portion of workers' higher earnings attributable to 
their increased skill or length of service. Nor can scientific man­
agement alone explain growing corporate profits. For example, 
the Indianapolis plant was profitable although it operated under 
traditional management methods until 1916.20 Many interrelated 
factors account for increased profits between 1904 and 1915, 
including product development and more sophisticated market­
ing techniques. Finally, Link-Belt officials told half-truths in 
describing the labor situation, obfuscating the strikebreaking and 
blacklisting that suppressed labor activity in Chicago, and disre­
garding factors other than scientific management that encouraged 
worker cooperation. 
Despite outward appearances, the uneven application and ad­
ministration of the "system" at these showcase plants cannot be 
emphasized too strongly. Some work was readily adapted to the 
system, other applications took years to implement, and in other 
cases, scientific management proved entirely impractical. Link-
Belt continued using several payment methods, including straight 
day work, piece work, and bonus rates in the shops, long after it 
installed scientific management. Fully 50 percent of the work 
done in Chicago was paid on a straight day work basis. Regardless 
of the payment methods, workers' rates were not uniform and 
earnings did not depend solely on output, since management 
made individual adjustments based on seniority and the foreman's 
assessment of ability.21 
Since the planning department routed work to minimize mate­
rial handling and to avoid foreseeable delays, the system affected 
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all production workers to some degree. However, Link-Belt's 
most highly skilled workers, such as the pattern makers, tool 
makers, electricians, maintenance workers, and structural steel 
workers, maintained their autonomy under scientific manage­
ment. For less skilled workers, the system's effect varied from day 
to day, depending on the feasibility of conducting time studies of 
work moving through the shops at any given time. Scientific 
management's impact also changed from one shift to the next. 
During the day, labor crews moved raw materials and work in 
progress from one machinist to the next while tool boys ran 
errands, gathered tools, stood on line to collect and return time 
cards, and even fetched water for the machinists. Machinist 
Michael Donnelly, who eventually refused to work under the 
system at Link-Belt, complained of losing his bonus "quite fre­
quently" because this advantageous support network did not exist 
for him on the night shift, and time studies made no compensating 
allowances.22 
Although management methods and the physical arrangement 
within the plants changed, Link-Belt's special-order, custom-
designed products remained the same, requiring small batch 
production, flexibility, and highly skilled labor. Dodge described 
Link-Belt workers as "ambidextrous," capable of moving easily 
from one machine and operation to another. He insisted that "spe­
cialists" would be detrimental in shops like his, where most 
productionjobs involved a complicated series of operations rather 
than a few repetitive tasks. Although workers might repeat the 
same work process several times, the typical machine shop job re­
quired one and a quarter hours to complete. On average, workers 
changedjobs seven times a day. This work pace was faster under sci­
entific management, but it did not involve deskilling. In most 
cases, well-paid versatile machinists concentrated their efforts 
where skill was essential, while low-paid common laborers took 
over menial tasks and routing of material. Link-Belt machinists 
apparently paid more attention to their wages than to "any particu­
lar system of management in the shop." Of the few Link-Belt 
workers' voices appearing in the scientific management sources, 
Michael Donnelly alone complained, while the others reported 
satisfaction with the system based on their high earnings.23 
Upon Barth's departure, local managers began simplifying, 
adapting, and improving the system to meet each plant's specific 
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needs. In December 1907, Link-Belt eliminated the speed-bosses; 
in early 1908 it altered some forms to reduce some paper work; and 
by 1913 it had abandoned functional foremen in favor of conven­
tional general foremen and subforemen.24 
After being lured into working under the differential piece rate, 
machinists turned it to their advantage. In many cases, the work­
ers knew more than Dwight Merrick and the other time study 
experts and protested to the rate setter, the foreman, and even 
higher management if they considered a rate too low. By estab­
lishing informal limits on production among themselves, workers 
influenced the process of determining methods, defining opera­
tion times, and setting rates. Moreover, Chicago's management 
encouraged employee initiative in improving methods by award­
ing three monthly prizes for the best suggestions. To their credit, 
Link-Belt managers took the workers' complaints and sugges­
tions seriously and kept their promise to uphold established piece 
rates.25 
From their first experience with Taylor's methods, Link-Belt 
managers recognized the system's deficiencies in maintaining the 
worker's cooperation. At a conference on scientific management, 
Dodge argued: 
Certainly, where human elements are introduced into a prob­
lem, scientific methods alone will hardly achieve a complete 
solution. It must be a combination of scientific analysis and 
methods plus consideration for the interest and well-being of 
the workers, and tact in meeting their inherent resistance to 
change. . . . Truly Scientific Management takes account of both 
sides of the problem, and the method of approach should lie 
along both these lines [emphasis Dodge's].26 
As early as the 1890s, Link-Belt introduced an impressive and 
growing array of employee benefits, incentives, and welfare mea­
sures, designed to personalize the relationship between manage­
ment and labor. These activities lacked the elaboration and sophis­
tication of programs developed by companies such as Joseph & 
Feiss. Link-Belt had no welfare department or special staff. Some 
Link-Belt welfare efforts developed piecemeal to address specific 
needs, while others grew out of close contact and genuinely 
friendly relations between management and workers during the 
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late nineteenth century. Dodge and Piez believed in maintaining 
personal contacts and in giving workers a "square deal," but they 
disapproved of "soup-house philanthropy." Consequently, most 
Link-Belt initiatives required matching employee contributions 
in effort, talent, or funding. From the Beneficial Society's support 
for ill or disabled workers to company events providing family 
entertainment, managers and workers collaborated in organizing 
and operating the company's welfare programs. One observer aptly 
termed such Link-Belt activities the "philanthropy of self-help. "27 
In January 1915, James Dodge wrote to his friend Frederick W. 
Taylor: "I believe that it would be perfectly possible to harmonize 
Scientific Management with Trade Unionism if an earnest effort 
were made by both parties." In a subsequent letter, Dodge in­
formed Taylor that at Link-Belt's annual meeting the executives 
discussed introducing worker-elected shop committees to permit 
employee participation in "the determination of base rates and 
piece rates so as to . . . disarm organized labor in their claim that 
we are all arbitrary and heartless in our determination of these 
figures. . . .  " Taylor minced no words in his reply: "I think you 
are making a great mistake in doing this. I do not believe there is 
the silightest [sic] dissatisfaction among your men and having 
these Shop Committees would only have the effect of stimulating 
you[r] men in the direction of trades unionism."28 
Dodge's views in this exchange expose his ambivalence toward 
labor unions. While "gradually coming to the opinion that . . . 
intelligent labor leaders might overcome their opposition . . . [to] 
scientifically-managed shops," Dodge stopped short of sanction­
ing unions at Link-Belt. His practical alternative was to enlist 
workers into a Link-Belt association. However, other Link-Belt 
executives were less enthusiastic. Taylor's firm opposition to the 
shop committees gained a sympathetic response from Charles 
Piez, who feared that any form of organization might revive the 
IAM in Chicago. He wrote to Dodge: "I want to move very 
cautiously before taking a step that may haunt us later on. . . . 
There is . . . no great haste about the appointment of these com­
mittees, so that we will have ample time for further reflection." 
Link-Belt never established shop committees, and management 
dropped the debate after Dodge's death in December 1915.29 
Link-Belt managers clung to familiar methods to discourage 
union inroads. They expanded their traditional social and welfare 
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measures and continued to play active roles in the NMTA.30 These 
additional methods complemented scientific management at Link-
Belt in a three-pronged strategy designed to enhance management 
authority: scientific management controlled the labor process and 
individualized bargaining between labor and management; cor­
porate welfare encouraged workers to identify with management; 
and trade association activities shaped the labor market. In trying 
to block later unionization efforts all three elements of the compa­
ny's management strategy came into play. 
Industrial mobilization during WWI posed the first challenge 
to Link-Belt's smooth operation under scientific management. 
The trouble rose from a booming market as American industries be­
gan to supply the European combatants. In 1916, Link-Belt filled 
the largest number of orders in its forty-one year history. The 
boom revealed "every weak spot and laid bare every defect in 
organization, in facilities, in method" at Link-Belt, and "carried 
with it ugly portents," according to Charles Piez. In particular, 
the company faced increasing difficulty in recruiting and retaining 
employees. Workers of all skill levels demanded and received more 
money. In May 1916, Link-Belt offered its entire manufacturing 
workforce a 10 percent bonus, regardless of output or the type of 
work performed. Thereafter, the company advanced "certain wage 
rates . . . almost weekly." During January 1917, "in order to secure 
labor at all," the Chicago plant had to raise the hourly rate of 
common laborers from 23 to 27.5 cents in addition to the 10 percent 
bonus. This amounted to average earnings of 30 cents per hour, 
nearly 50 percent above the prevailing rate of January 1916. In 
April 1917, union demands for the eight-hour day at neighboring es­
tablishments forced the company to reduce its work week from 54 
to 50 hours and cut back to a 45-hour week a year later. Since pro­
duction demands necessitated long working hours, the shorter work 
week translated into extra overtime pay for Link-Belt workers.31 
In this tight labor market, the company could ill afford to 
depend on "scientific" methods to set wages or determine produc­
tion methods. As Link-Belt and all other metal manufacturers 
strained to keep pace with rising wages in the defense industries, 
its incentive wage came to closely resemble the community wage 
norm for a given occupation. Wartime wage inflation effectively 
negated the economic incentives of working under scientific man­
agement at Link-Belt. 
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Despite wage and hour concessions, a shortage of skilled work­
ers and labor turnover plagued Link-Belt. Superintendents and 
foremen gladly hired anyone who walked through the door, even 
applicants lacking NMTA labor bureau credentials. Labor turn­
over reduced efficiency and managerial control over production in 
three important ways. First, the firm's skilled workforce was 
"continually besieged by other employers with flattering offers." 
Second, new recruits were seldom trained well enough to begin 
producing Link-Belt's special-order products immediately. Fur­
thermore, they became "a source of expense rather than profit," 
by simply quitting their jobs if management proved too demand­
ing.32 Third, the process of on-the-job training enhanced the 
power of skilled -workers in defining and controlling work methods. 
These problems notwithstanding, Link-Belt managed to dou­
ble production and earn substantial profits by expanding facilities, 
running night shifts, and hiring large numbers of inexperienced 
workers. The aspects of scientific management directly affecting 
labor played a surprisingly minor role in this accomplishment. 
Although central planning and accounting, efficient routing, and 
the use of time study data remained in force, supervisory controls 
and systematic efforts to reduce costs by increasing worker effi­
ciency fell into disuse. In the wartime market, inefficiency had no 
effect on company profits. The pressing demand for Link-Belt 
products allowed the company to pass rising costs along to 
customers by qualifying all contract proposals with the warning: 
"prices are subject to change with market conditions. "33 
Once conditions returned to normal, management renewed the 
quest "for economy, method and efficiency." However, scientific 
management came to represent a set of guiding principles, rather 
than a system of specific methods. New initiatives often reflected 
Taylor's philosophy, but not his methods. For example, in coming 
years, Link-Belt's efficiency experts would characterize time studies 
taken with a "slow and clumsy" stopwatch as "half-baked." New 
rate-setting methods involved motion-time analysis and "syn­
thetically constructed" elementary times based on "practically 
universal" body movements. Moreover, new work methods and 
economic incentives often focused on white-collar workers. After 
the war, superintendents and foremen also implemented new 
efficiency measures on the shop floor, but they considered their 
efforts as outgrowths, rather than components, of Taylorism.34 
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Although company officials again argued that wages must be 
tied to production, Link-Belt's wartime experience had dramati­
cally transformed Taylor's most controversial practices. Both 
managers and workers knew that the bonuses and pay increases 
every few months from 1916 to 1920 bore no relationship to 
individual productivity. With time study thus exposed as just one 
of many factors in establishing piece rates, Link-Belt employees of 
the postwar period joined in the universal demand for wage 
adjustments based on the cost of living. No opposition developed 
over time study or piece rates per se, but growing pressure for 
across-the-board raises kept Link-Belt wages in line with the pay 
scales at neighboring plants.35 
As scientific management's overt significance receded at Link-
Belt, trade association activities and corporate paternalism took 
on greater importance. Charles Piez was particularly concerned 
about the postwar upsurge in labor conflict. On leave from Link-
Belt as Director of the U. S. Shipping Board's Emergency Fleet 
Corporation, he and Seattle, Washington's mayor had broken the 
five-day Seattle general strike of January 1919. Piez believed that 
Seattle's workers had relinquished control to radical, foreign 
leaders who aimed to "wrest control of industry from its own­
ers. . . ." During the steel strike several months later, he appealed 
to steel users "to keep 'hands off the strike situation and to accept 
inevitable business losses . . . rather than embarrass the steel 
companies by bringing pressure on them to surrender to the strike 
leaders." He called for "a fight to the finish," since he believed the 
ultimate control of industry was at stake.36 
Piez's fears and impressions filtered down to Link-Belt even 
before, he returned to the company in May 1919. Link-Belt officials 
carefully monitored national labor unrest and looked for signs of 
contagion in their own shops. In assessing prospects for the New 
Year of 1919, Link-Belt's acting president, Staunton Peck, sensed 
undercurrents of "anarchy, Bolshevism, socialism, populism, and 
other isms." He had evidence to suggest that an unnamed union 
(probably the IAM) had planted organizers in the Chicago shops. 
Carefully avoiding the attention of foremen, the organizers ap­
proached fellow workers, "pouring into them radical ideas about 
the wage scale and shop conditions."37 
Company documents do not explain how the union infiltration 
was discovered. Quite possibly, Link-Belt lathe operator James 
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Cousland provided the information. Cousland, who started work­
ing at Link-Belt in 1916, commenced spying on his coworkers 
shortly thereafter. From 1918 to 1936, Cousland sent weekly or 
monthly reports to the NMTA. An Association secretary copied 
the information and sent it to the Chicago plant superintendent. 
Cousland insisted that he only reported on "piece work trouble," 
workers' complaints about safety hazards, and production prob­
lems, not on "labor activities. "38 However, his denials are uncon­
vincing in view of Link-Belt management's own account, which 
identified agitation and dissatisfaction over "the wage scale and 
shop conditions" as the inspiration for "labor activities." There is 
no record of how the shops were purged of radical elements, al­
though it is likely that workers who publicly expressed grievances 
were fired. 
Dispelling distrust took more concerted effort. Upon resuming 
control at Link-Belt, Piez realized that the plants had grown to the 
point where he and other top executives could no longer person­
ally sway worker opinion. He favored regaining loyalty in the 
shops by preparing the superintendents, foremen, and subfore­
men "to meet this insidious doctrine that is being spread to the 
detriment of industry." He believed the first-line managers could 
"create sound public opinion" in the shops. But, before assuming 
this role, the supervisors had to cease supporting the "aggressive, 
vociferous, minority" of workers who advocated unionization. 
Piez persuaded Link-Belt's directors to expand a stock option plan 
to give production managers a personal stake in the company's 
growth, and to supplement the efforts of the NMTA Supervisors' 
and Foremen's Club to eradicate union sympathy among produc­
tion supervisors. To "build and maintain a high esprit de corps," 
foremen gathered in the plant superintendent's office for special 
weekly meetings to address "pure labor questions. "39 
Link-Belt officials knew that labor espionage and supervisory 
training programs provided only partial solutions to their prob­
lem. Piez opposed some popular programs of the 1920s, such as 
profit sharing and company unions, which he characterized as "a 
great deal of bosh." Consequently, Link-Belt expanded its welfare 
programs, self-help initiatives, and company-sponsored social 
affairs to reinvigorate employee loyalty. During the early 1920s, 
each plant organized an Employment Office and appointed a 
manager with a threefold agenda: to administer nonwork related 
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activities, to raise management's consciousness of the "human 
aspect of production problems," and to preserve employee mo­
rale. The Employment Office recruited labor, selected potential 
candidates for job vacancies, settled grievances, and processed 
dismissals and resignations. The employment managers compiled 
detailed histories of each active and former employee to identify 
workers suitable for promotion, pay raises, disciplinary action, or 
reinstatement. The records were also used for statistical analyses 
of labor turnover and accident rates. The office investigated 
worker complaints and offered solutions, recommended ameni­
ties such as men's locker rooms and women's rest rooms, and 
managed the operation of dispensaries and cafeterias. Finally, the 
employment managers oversaw the company's Beneficial Soci­
eties, Building and Loan Associations, Credit Unions, charitable 
activities, athletic teams, and worker education and training 
programs, and administered a growing number of other benefits, 
such as newly inaugurated paid vacations for shop workers. To 
enhance employee morale, individual plants hosted outings and 
elaborate social events featuring the talents of Link-Belt employ­
ees. In 1925, the entire corporation celebrated "half a century of 
successful operation" and Charles Piez's retirement as president.40 
Other than the recession of 1921-1922, when workers suffered 
wage cuts and layoffs, Link-Belt enjoyed a decade of growth, 
prosperity, steady employment, and minimal worker dissatisfac­
tion. The surviving records reveal no hints of strikes, union 
organizing efforts, or overt labor problems, and little manage­
ment paranoia.41 
If these factors did not entirely subvert union sympathy during 
the 1920s, the failing economy and insecure labor market of 1930­
1933 certainly had a chilling effect. Management employed a step-
by-step strategy developed during earlier economic slumps to 
minimize disruption of the •workforce. Initially, as special orders 
dropped off, nonessential overtime was eliminated and workers 
produced stock items or did repairs and odd jobs around the 
shops. As stopgap jobs ran out, foremen closed early on weekdays 
and suspended Saturday schedules and night shifts. When work 
fell off further, management instituted work sharing by limiting 
some workers to a three- or four-day work week. It later reduced 
benefits and periodically cut hourly wages, piece rates, and sal­
aries, but the company laid off employees only as a last resort. 
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Many Link-Belt employees worked without layoffs throughout 
the Depression, and those forced out of work or placed on part-
time schedules for extended periods often returned to their full-
time jobs when work picked up again. Consequently, Link-Belt 
employees considered themselves fortunate and felt satisfied with 
their work, or at least refrained from complaining about wages or 
working conditions. During this difficult period the company 
enhanced its reputation as a good employer.42 
As Link-Belt's business began a fitful recovery, management 
faced new challenges from the federal government. Link-Belt 
officials generally disapproved of government interference in 
industry. In public statements, advertising literature, and internal 
communications, they vigorously opposed New Deal legislation. 
However, as Assistant General Manager E. L. Berry phrased it, 
"in order to sort of cooperate with the spirit of the N. I. R. A.," 
the Chicago plant management organized the Link-Belt Employ­
ees Board. Existing records do not reveal whether fear of local 
labor activity or pressure from corporate headquarters prompted 
the decision.43 
On arriving at work one Monday morning in 1933, Chicago 
workers found a notice posted on the bulletin board suggesting 
that they establish an Employees Board and calling for nomina­
tions and an election of representatives. Although Link-Belt 
workers recognized this as a company initiative, they willingly 
gave it a try. As established, the Board provided a monthly forum 
for E. L. Berry and seven employee representatives to discuss 
health and safety; education, recreation, and benefit programs; 
wages, hours, and working conditions; "continuity of employ­
ment," industrial conditions, and "economy and waste preven­
tion." Dividing the plant into seven electoral areas ostensibly 
insured "fair representation to each department," but in fact, it 
diluted the potential power of the blue collar employees. Three 
divisions contained predominantly white-collar and professional 
personnel, one division combined white-collar, professional, and 
highly skilled craft workers, and three divisions represented the 
majority of Link-Belt's blue-collar employees. The seven elected 
"voting members" served advisory roles, while authority rested 
with management's "non-voting representative."44 
Louis Salmons, a maintenance electrician and former AFL 
member with nine years' service at Link-Belt, was elected as a 
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•worker representative. At the board's first session, Salmons pro­
posed holding an open meeting of "the whole rank and file . 
[to] let everybody have a voice instead of leaving it up to the 
representatives to use their own judgment on all matters." The 
other representatives —an engineer, a clerk, two foremen, and two 
oldtimers —unanimously voted Salmons down. For three years 
Salmons served on the board, persistently trying to represent his 
constituents by bringing up wage and hour grievances, poor 
working conditions, and work-related health problems. Assistant 
General Manager Berry acted promptly on suggestions for repair­
ing or improving facilities, but dismissed wage demands, declar­
ing that the company was losing money.45 
Dissatisfaction with the Employees Board and knowledge that 
workers had other options led Salmons to the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee [SWOC] in September 1936. He de­
scribed the Employees Board and working conditions at Link-
Belt and asked for the SWOC's assistance in organizing the plant. 
Assured that the organization would back him "100 per cent," he 
requested fifty application cards to start organizing Local 1604 of 
the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers.46 
Sensing that there would be retribution, Salmons proceeded 
cautiously. The application cards required an organizer's signa­
ture, so Salmons signed each one, guarding against someone else 
bearing the consequences of his actions. He asked seven coworkers 
to assist him in organizing, and they began passing out cards to 
fellow workers whom they considered trustworthy. Salmons' 
position allowed him to move freely through the plant doing 
routine inspection, maintenance, and troubleshooting when ma­
chinery broke down. Salmons started discussing the Amalga­
mated Association as he worked and, when the opportunity rose, 
he slipped Local 1604 application cards among literature he dis­
tributed for the Employees Board. "I was elected to represent the 
men . . . not [to] represent the company," Salmons recalled. "I 
took the stand that I would represent them. And when I couldn't 
represent them properly through the employees board, I took 
other steps to represent them."47 
After a week of discreet recruiting netted eleven members, the 
organizers met to discuss strategy. Salmons told his friends that 
management would soon learn of the organizing and fire him. He 
warned the other organizers: "I will have to work on the outside. 
Organized Production and Unorganized Labor • 149 
Then it will be up to you fellows to keep this thing going on the 
inside." Salmons was right. A batch of application cards disap­
peared from one organizer's toolbox, and some employees turned 
the cards over to E. L. Berry. The morning following the strategy 
session, Berry discharged Salmons. Salmons shrugged it off, 
bluffing: "It is all right, we have 370 men signed up." The rumor 
spread through the plant, generating interest in the "big drive" 
and making the inside organizers' efforts a bit easier.48 
Within six months, Local 1604's membership caught up with 
the rumor. Salmons went on the SWOC payroll and began rallying 
forces on the outside—at the plant gates, at the streetcar stop, and 
at the neighborhood tavern where Link-Belt workers frequently 
stopped after work. The tavern owner rented a back room to the 
union for meetings, posted the local's recruiting sign, and kept a 
stack of application cards handy. The insiders' ranks gradually 
grew to include organizers in every department, and evidence 
suggests that the Amalgamated •won broad support, fairly evenly 
distributed among the skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled blue-
collar ranks. While some workers with ten or more years' seniority 
played important roles in organizing the union, employees hired 
during the depression years —who identified least with manage­
ment and whose jobs were most vulnerable—seemingly joined in 
larger numbers. Meanwhile, the Regional National Labor Rela­
tions Board [NLRB] Director negotiated Salmons's reinstate­
ment. Berry's conditions for putting Salmons back to work in 
December 1936 were "no more running around the plant" and "no 
more organizing." Berry isolated Salmons by placing him at 
bench work where he repaired only small items brought directly 
to him, but the feisty electrician challenged Berry's second condi­
tion, responding: "there will be no more organizing in the plant, 
but there will be lots on the outside." After attracting about 400 
members, the union elected Salmons as President in April 193 7.49 
The company kept tabs on the union's activities for months as 
James Cousland attended organizing meetings and spied on work­
ers throughout the plant. Cousland briefly served as a union 
member, but his usefulness to the company diminished after the 
LaFollette Committee exposed him as an NMTA operative. Since 
the unionists could not directly link Cousland's spying to any 
damage, they reported his activities to the membership but took 
no further action against him.50 
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Link-Belt management and a substantial number of loyal em­
ployees found another way to fight back. After theJones & Laughlin 
decision held employer-dominated organizations illegal, the Em­
ployees Board disbanded and several former representatives formed 
a new organization, the Independent Union of Craftsmen [IUC]. 
During the three-day IUC recruitment drive, foremen conve­
niently disappeared or turned their heads while employees worked 
their way through the shops requesting, cajoling, bribing, or 
coercing fellow workers to obtain signatures on IUC petitions. 
Many workers willingly signed, particularly white-collar em­
ployees, skilled blue-collar workers with long terms of service, 
and those in line for promotion, while others felt they had no 
choice. In one flagrant move, a foremen "signed up" several 
illiterate workers without seeking their consent. Such tactics 
obtained signatures from 760 of approximately 1,000 Link-Belt 
employees in three days. A committee of self-appointed delegates 
presented the petitions to Berry on April 20, 1937, and the 
following day he signed an agreement officially recognizing the 
IUC as the employees' bargaining agent.51 
Imposing the IUC on the workforce and intimidating workers 
through discriminatory dismissals and layoffs stalled the Amalga­
mated's efforts for nearly five years. As in 1904 and 1919, when 
unionization threatened Link-Belt, management purged the labor 
activists. Nine workers lost jobs at Link-Belt because of their 
actual or suspected union activity during the organizing drive, and 
other workers believed that they were targeted for layoffs during 
the economic slump of 1937 because of their union affiliation.52 
Unlike past experiences, the fired unionists had means of 
fighting back after 1937. With Louis Salmons's determination and 
the SWOC's support and guidance, the aggrieved workers took 
their cases to the NLRB. The NLRB disestablished the IUC, and 
ordered the company to end its spying activities and reinstate the 
labor activists with back pay. Although Link-Belt won a favorable 
ruling in Federal Appeals Court, the union activists triumphed in 
January 1941, when the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court's decision.53 
Thus for Link-Belt executives, scientific management pro­
vided a vital mechanism for organizing and managing produc­
tion, but it offered no answer to another pressing problem, the 
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turmoil associated with union organizing campaigns and collec­
tive bargaining. Incentive wage plans and good working condi­
tions, coupled with the company's traditional benefit programs 
and later efforts in systematic personnel management, helped 
attract and retain a capable labor force, but they could not satisfy 
additional demands inspired by members of the metal trades 
unions. Although the company refused to deal with unions after 
1906, replaced strikers, resorted to labor espionage, and dis­
charged men identified as union partisans, the problem did not go 
away. Consequently, Taylor's promise of industrial harmony un­
der scientific management proved elusive. It took four decades of 
considerable conflict before Link-Belt executives reluctantly re­
turned to the bargaining table. 
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The Diffusion of Scientific Management: 
The Bedaux Company in America and 
Britain, 1926-1945 
_Dy the time of Frederick Winslow Taylor's death, the 
gospel of industrial efficiency preached by American scientific 
managers was commonplace on both sides of the Atlantic. In the 
following years of world war, reconstruction, and adjustment, 
scientific management attracted a new generation of advocates 
and practitioners, many of whom would have perplexed and 
shocked Taylor and his immediate circle. Of the entrepreneurs of 
scientific management who succeeded Frank Gilbreth, Harrington 
Emerson, Richard Feiss, and other pioneers, none was more 
successful than Charles Eugene Bedaux (1886-1944). Unlike Tay­
lor and his colleagues, Bedaux was and still is a mysterious figure. 
Secretive to a fault, he avoided professional contacts, refused to 
write for popular or technical journals, and spurned publicity. Yet 
he was a master salesman whose operations were global in scope 
and impact. Only in recent years, with the discovery of the papers 
of the British Bedaux Company, is it possible to gauge the impact 
of Bedaux and his extraordinary career.1 
Bedaux's success "was based on simple insights that he and his 
engineers applied, apparently with little variation, in a variety of 
industrial settings. The Bedaux system brought the intellectual 
principles of scientific management down to earth from their lofty 
pedestal and put those principles into action. Table 7.1 indicates 
the growth of the international Bedaux consultancies between 
1918 and 1931. According to a 1934 Bedaux publication, the 
Bedaux system had been used in twenty-one countries with 
nearly 100 applications in Britain and over 230 in the United States 
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TABLE 7.1 
Breakdown of International Bedaux Offices, 1918-1931 
Number of Plants Using Plants under Total 
Year Engineers Bedaux Application Plants 
1918 2 1 2 3 
1925 19 70 15 85 
1926 41 110 35 145 
1928 94 161 72 233 
1929 114 278 68 346 
1930 176 399 81 480 
1931 205 509 123 632 
Source: Bedaux Measures Labor, p. 9. 
and Canada.2 Bedaux's American clients included American Rolling 
Mill, General Electric, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Dow Chemi­
cal, Eastman Kodak, and Swift. Pierre Laloux estimated that by 
:937> 50° American firms, 225 British, 144 French, 49 Italian and 
39 Dutch firms had bought Bedaux's industrial services.3 Clearly, 
the Bedaux system commanded an international reputation dur­
ing the 1930s that remained unchallenged by any other post-
Taylorite system then available. Furthermore, by 1945 the British 
Bedaux Company had perfected a system of work measurement 
and labor management by which other similar systems •were often 
judged.4 
British managers became a particularly receptive audience to 
the Bedaux system during the late 1920s.5 Despite the highly 
publicized criticism of Taylor and Gilbreth in British engineering 
and technical journals, many British employers were nonetheless 
attracted to scientific management because of its promise of 
increased labor productivity without great investments in plant or 
machinery. Two diverse groups provide a rough measure of this 
potential. First were the personal efficiency experts such as Her­
bert Norris Casson, Edward Purinton, and T S. Knowlson, who 
offered diluted yet passionate forms of scientific management in 
the guise of short, readable pamphlets and how-to manuals. These 
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manuals carried such titles as How to be Healthy in Business (1911), 
How to Become Efficient: An Introductory Study of First Principles 
(1914), and Increasing Your Mental Efficiency (1915). Regardless of 
how sophomoric or jejune these manuals may seem, the experts in 
efficiency helped sell the principles of scientific management to 
British managers. 
Second, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, British industrial 
psychologists urged works managers and employers to experi­
ment with workshop reorganization. New methods of reorgani­
zation took the form of job grading and analysis, time and motion 
study, vocational guidance and selection, and wage incentive 
schemes, the most popular and widely adopted being the premium 
bonus system.6 These methods were freely borrowed from the 
generation of British mechanical engineers who were influenced 
by Taylorian "science." Led by Charles S. Myers, founder of the 
influential National Institute of Industrial Psychology, the indus­
trial psychologists professed to be critics of Taylor and Gilbreth 
and the engineers' approach to work.7 Yet by the 1920s, the 
psychologists' work came to signify nearly the same thing. Their 
language and techniques differed but their aims were quite close. 
The fact that the scientific manager aimed at "maximum" produc­
tion and the industrial psychologist at "optimum" production 
ought not to obscure the significance of either of these two 
movements. The more the industrial psychologist tried to dis­
tance himself from Taylorism, the closer he came to embracing 
similar ideals. As paid consultants in industry, industrial psychol­
ogists helped to highlight the entrepreneurial quality of the scien­
tific management movement as a whole.8 
In such an atmosphere, Bedaux's system of labor management 
and work measurement became the most widely utilized system 
of scientific management in Britain.9 By 1945, more than 500 
British firms had used the Bedaux System, including such indus­
try giants as Joseph Lucas, Pilkingtons, Joseph Lyons, Ferranti, 
and Imperial Chemical Industries. Extensive applications were 
made in the chemical and allied trades, food processing, motor 
vehicle components (although not motor vehicles), textiles, and 
mechanical engineering. The appearance and success of the system, 
despite frequent managerial indifference and labor hostility, has 
led more than one historian to remark that the history of scientific 
management in inter war Britain is largely the history of Bedaux.10 
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Early Training 
The Bedaux system was grounded in Taylor's scientific princi­
ples of work and management and in Harrington Emerson's 
twelve principles of "ethical" efficiency. This combination situ­
ates Bedaux well within the ranks of the American Taylorites. But 
what Bedaux added to the movement was his ability, unmatched 
by his contemporaries, to market and sell scientific management. 
As one of Bedaux's former British employers once remarked, 
Charles Bedaux was "the world's first true entrepreneur in scien­
tific management. "11 Bedaux's first biographer, Janet Flanner, put 
it this way in 1945: 
His genius was his promoter's faculty for making men want to 
believe what he said. He had a demagogic gift for convincing 
hardheaded businessmen that they were public benefactors, as 
he essentially believed he was himself. When some millionaire 
Scrooge in Chicago would frankly say that he was interested 
only in profits, Bedaux would tell him that he, the poor 
millionaire, was really interested in bettering man's conditions, 
in bettering himself, his community, his little Illinois world. 
The triple miracle of making the Scrooge believe this, buy the 
Bedaux system, and actually start bettering something besides 
his bank account was an accomplishment Bedaux pulled off 
so often that he dazed and even silenced his most critical 
employees.12 
While personal efficiency experts and industrial psychologists 
struggled to impress and win over the sometimes obstinate em­
ployer with simple advice and scientific research, Bedaux was 
much more direct in his approach. Only practical and immediate 
results in terms of increased profits would impress the average 
executive. Bedaux promised and in most cases delivered lower 
unit costs, increased output, and greater efficiency. 
Charles Eugene Bedaux was born at Charenton-le-Pont, De­
partment of the Seine, on October 10, 1886.13 For the first sixteen 
years of his life Bedaux led a rather precarious existence on the 
streets of Paris, doing odd jobs and usually avoiding school. The 
details of his formal education are unclear and there is no record of 
his having received a regular degree. The young Bedaux found 
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work in a bookstore and in a quarry, where his biographer, Jim 
Christy, says he first began to analyze motions and various work 
procedures.14 Early in 1906, the twenty-year-old Charles Bedaux 
left France and emigrated to the United States where he found 
work as a dishwasher, sandhog with the crews building the 
Hudson River tunnels, and insurance salesman. He also worked a 
short stint at the New Jersey Worsted Mills in Hoboken. It seems 
unlikely that such a meager training would have prepared Bedaux 
for a successful career as an industrial engineer, but between 1909 
and 1916 Bedaux conceived and perfected his own system of 
scientific management. 
In 1909, Bedaux found employment in the clerical department 
of the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company of St. Louis. He noted 
that inefficient production was due to a lack of common sense on 
the part of management. An efficiency engineer was secured to do 
time studies. Bedaux studied the work of the efficiency expert and 
concluded that the expert had accomplished very little. Bedaux 
brought his findings to the attention of management and was 
himself promoted to efficiency expert.15 The following year, 
Bedaux was introduced to Wilfred Sellers, who •was then Presi­
dent of the Sellers Kitchen Cabinet Company of Ellwood, Indi­
ana. The Sellers organization was proud to have devised a new 
approach to the "traditional kitchen" and stressed greater efficiency 
by the better arrangement of tabletops and appliances.16 Sellers 
and Bedaux became close friends, and Sellers told a number of his 
friends in the Grand Rapids area about Bedaux. It was at this time 
that Bedaux began to conceive his system -while engaged as an 
individual consultant for several furniture companies.17 
After a brief trip to Paris in 1912, Bedaux returned to the United 
States as consultant for the McKesson & Robbins Company of 
New York. It was at McKesson & Robbins the following years that 
Bedaux was introduced to A. M. Morrini, an Italian industrial 
engineer who came to the United States to investigate scientific 
management. Morrini left for France with three Emerson engi­
neers and Bedaux was secured as an interpreter for the group.18 
After his contract with Morrini ended, Bedaux worked with L. B. 
Duez, advising furniture factories in Paris, and automobile and 
airplane factories at Agenteuil. It was also at this time, according 
to Christy, that Bedaux read Taylor, Emerson, and other scientific 
management writers.19 Bedaux supposedly developed his own 
The Diffusion of Scientific Management • 161 
system at a direct reaction to Taylor's work. He rejected Taylor's 
approach to "Schmidt" and proposed that a more equitable method 
of measuring labor could be developed.20 The result was the Bedaux 
work unit, or B, which will be discussed in the next section. 
By 1914, Bedaux was confident that he could compete suc­
cessfully with the leading consultants. With the outbreak of war 
he served briefly in the Foreign Legion, then returned to the 
United States where he worked as Morrini's assistant at the 
Wolverine Brass Company of Grand Rapids. Bedaux broke his con­
tract with Morrini and with financial backing from a sales execu­
tive, Frederick Brearly, formed the Charles E. Bedaux Company 
of Cleveland. 
A training manual that he published shortly thereafter, The 
Bedaux Efficiency Course for Industrial Application, reflects his debts 
to Taylor and Emerson.21 For Bedaux, efficiency was the science 
that teaches the best way to produce the maximum result with 
minimum effort; it is logic, common sense, and the concentration 
of effort. "Efficiency applied to industry, scientific management," 
Bedaux wrote, "is not an occult science but it is, on the contrary, 
an elementary, organized, classified knowledge within the reach 
of all."22 Bedaux realized that efficiency was something new and 
vital. "Is efficiency a new science?" he asked. "When was it born 
and why was it born? Why do we see the word written and spoken 
everywhere, while a decade ago, although in the dictionary, it was 
practically unknown to humanity? What is efficiency?"23 In a 
series of object lessons, admonitions, and case studies, Bedaux 
diagnosed modern industry and offered his solution to the world.24 
The Bedaux System 
The Bedaux system was a labor management control system 
founded on the premise that all human labor could be measured in 
terms of definite units of effort and fatigue. Bedaux claimed to 
have solved the problem that plagued the Taylorites, namely the 
precise, scientific relationship between effort and fatigue. Bedaux 
identified a unit of work, which he called the B and defined as "a 
fraction of a minute of work plus a fraction of a minute of rest, 
always aggregating unity, but varying in proportions according to 
the nature of the strain. "25 Of course, the discovery that an hour of 
work contained sixty units of effort combined with rest should 
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hardly surprise us, but with this revelation Bedaux believed he 
had stumbled upon a fundamental law in the science of work. This 
law he proudly called the "principle of human power measurement." 
Bedaux used time and motion study, which he called "work 
study," to produce an elaborate chart of effort and relaxation 
values.26 All tasks were assigned a specific B rating, and from this 
rating the Bedaux engineer could determine the proper rate of 
remuneration according to the skill, experience, and respon­
sibility required of a specific job. The average worker, working 
under average conditions, with a sufficient supply of raw mate­
rials and with machinery in good repair should have been able to 
reach an output of 6oBs per hour (Normal Performance Level). 
However, the Bedaux engineers regarded a standard of 8oBs 
(Standard Performance Level) as being entirely possible, espe­
cially where labor, process, and management were ioo percent 
efficient. According to J. A. Edwards, Bedaux engineer at the 
short-lived application at J. R. Freeman & Son, 
The attainment of an 80 unit hour is rendered possible not by an 
increase in the operator's speed of working, but by the removal 
of certain unnecessary elements in the operation, by better 
arrangement of working materials, by adequate servicing, and 
by the analysis and elimination of the cause of lost time.27 
Bedaux himself reasoned that "less than 8oBs a hour" indicated 
the "incomplete use of labor and incomplete realization of maxi­
mum earning power. "28 The bonus for each premium B was one-
sixtieth of the base rate of wages, and Bedaux recommended that 
75 percent of the bonus be paid to the worker and the remaining 25 
percent to supervisors and indirect workers whose labor facili­
tated production in excess of the 60B standard.29 
The determination of wages under Bedaux's system was a 
complicated affair, which often confused workers as much as it did 
works managers. The Bedaux organization was aware of this 
tendency, and in the late 1920s and early 1930s produced short 
handbooks designed to explain the calculation of wages.30 Its 
distinctive jargon aside, the Bedaux method closely resembled 
L. H. Gantt's "task and bonus" system. It was based on prelimi­
nary improvements in plant organization and working conditions 
(though not the comprehensive reorganization that Taylor fa­
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vored), the use of time studies to establish standards, and a 
guaranteed base rate regardless of output.31 Individual perfor­
mance was measured through the aggregate number of Bs pro­
duced. At the end of each shift, the worker's total number of Bs 
were tallied, and posted the following day. The Daily Posting 
Sheet showed the hours worked and the B or "point hour" 
attained. Daily premium wages were also posted so the worker 
could check his performance and determine his wages. Wages 
were paid in two envelopes, one containing base wages, the other 
containing the premium earned. In this way, "an atmosphere of 
prosperity is . .  . produced that twice the amount given in the 
same envelope in the form of a raise would not create."32 In 
addition, each department head received a consolidated Weekly 
Analysis Sheet showing the performance of all operators and the 
average point hour attained for specific departments (see table 
7.2). The "Reference B Hour" refers to the B rating before the 
Bedaux system was installed. In nearly every case, the Reference B 
hours were surprisingly low. 
Such were the fundamentals of the Bedaux system. Bedaux 
engineers would enter the factory and over a period of three or 
four weeks conduct countless work studies in order to measure 
current efficiency and show how and where inefficiencies could be 
rectified by the more rational organization of machines and labor. 
Every evening the engineer had to prepare a detailed report 
outlining the progress of his work, which he submitted to man­
agement the following day. He also sent copies of his reports, with 
recommendations, to London where they were carefully reviewed 
by Bedaux's Technical Department.33 The reports pointed out to 
management the amount of savings that could be expected over 
any projected period of time. This was part and parcel of Bedaux's 
sales pitch: the only way the engineers could overcome employer 
obstinacy and hesitancy was to confront them with immediate 
profits. If the Bedaux Archives reveal anything, it is that works 
managers and employers were literally bombarded by statistical 
evidence that their factories could be run much more efficiently. 
Bedaux engineers reorganized machines, adjusted feeds and 
speeds, constructed new conveyor systems, and in many cases 
urged employers to invest in new and sometimes costly machin­
ery. For instance, during a ten-month application at Cooper's & 
Co., a Glasgow manufacturer of biscuits, Bedaux fees were 
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T A B L E 7 . 2 
Sample Bedaux Weekly Analysis Sheet (1929) 
Reference Daily B Hours 
Operation BHour T F S M T W Average 
packing 32.9 50 43 58 54 60 66 55.2 
soldering 18.7 29 46 54 43 42 46 43.3 
nailing 32.0 39 49 53 39 38 54 44.3 
wire/attach seal 24.2 40 40 51 35 36 42 40.1 
nail cases 15.9 19 13 29 13 13 — 17.4 
truck cases 27.4 32 30 38 27 28 32 31.2 
•weighing 17.5 39 35 39 33 38 36 36.6 
cutting hoop 18.8 43 43 49 43 43 40 43.5 
strapping 33.0 38 40 51 45 57 60 48.5 
nail strapping 29.9 50 40 53 43 49 60 49.1 
reverse cases 11.5 32 30 37 31 28 28 31.0 
truck to lorries 17.4 31 29 35 31 27 27 24.8 
AVERAGE: 23.2 37 37 46 36 38 45 39.8 
Source: Bedaux Archives, British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd., March 7, 1929, 
Film 3G. 
reckoned to be in excess of £3,000. Upon the recommendation of 
the Bedaux engineer, a further £12,000 was invested in new 
machinery. Wage costs also increased by £5,000 per year. The net 
effect of the application was that, at the end of the period, the firm 
was losing about £2,000 per year.34 
The Bedaux organization nevertheless proclaimed that any firm 
could expect annual savings of up to 3 5 percent, and in some cases 
would save even more. Unit costs would decrease by 20 percent 
and wages would increase by 15 or 20 percent. Management 
would gain valuable experience and be prepared to reorganize 
other departments as the need arose.35 Laborers would come to 
expect the increased earnings promised by the Bedaux engineers 
and gladly better their performance. "The main point to be 
mastered," as Bedaux himself once wrote, "should be the placing 
of labor in a frame of mind such that everyone grows to believe the 
efficiency man wishes nothing but good to the worker. "36 
The whole process of Bedaux applications was, at least when 
compared with other systems, extremely rapid. From 1926, the 
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year that Bedaux opened his London office, until 1948, more than 
46 percent of a total of 606 British applications were completed in 
twelve months or less.37 
Bedaux in Britain, 1926-1945 
The response to the introduction of the Bedaux system in 
Britain by labor and management was both varied and outspoken. 
While the British Bedaux company continued to attract a lengthy 
list of clients throughout the 1930s and 1940s, both managers and 
workers frequently expressed their hostility toward the system. 
Numerous works managers and foremen saw the Bedaux system 
as a direct assault upon their authority. They often reacted to the 
introduction of the system with sabotage, exposing the carefully 
conducted work studies of the Bedaux engineers as incorrect and 
unscientific. Workers reacted more sharply and deliberately. Work 
stoppages and strikes against the introduction of the system were 
numerous during the 1930s. Between 1929 and 1939, thirty-six 
work stoppages and strikes against the Bedaux system were 
reported to the Chief Conciliation Office of the Ministry of 
Labour. Strikes were most frequent in the chemical and allied 
trades, engineering, and the textile industry. In twenty-eight 
strikes for which reliable information is available, the average 
duration was twenty days. Twelve strikes lasted between thirty 
and sixty days, and strikes at Boulton & Paul (1931) and Richard 
Johnson & Nephew (1934) persisted for more than four months.38 
While the majority of these strikes were precipitated by Bedaux 
time studies, agitation by Communists also added to the overall 
hostility exhibited by the British worker toward Bedaux. The 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) and General Federation of Trade 
Unions (GFTU) issued independent reports on Bedaux and re­
solved that their members fight the system to a standstill.39 Where 
Bedaux could not be defeated, the TUC recommended that their 
members work to modify the system. Yet despite such suspicions 
and fears, Bedaux continued to attract even more clients as the 
years passed. 
By 1948, the Bedaux system was well known in British indus­
trial management circles and had been installed in more than six 
hundred firms with varying degrees of success. As table 7.3 
indicates, by the 1930s an average of twenty-five new clients were 
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being added every year. Nearly half of the applications before 1939 
were in food processing, chemical and allied trades, and textiles, 
but after the outbreak of World War II, metal manufacture, 
mechanical engineering, and textiles made up about 60 percent of 
Bedaux's business in Britain (see table 7.4). These figures call for 
further comment. First, it was rare that an entire plant was totally 
reorganized by Bedaux engineers. Second, there are a few in­
stances in which applications were not conducted by Bedaux 
engineers. Instead, works managers learned of the system through 
their contact with other managers and applied what they thought 
was the Bedaux system. In such cases the system usually ran 
aground because the firm's engineers were not trained in Bedaux 
methods. In the hands of "foolish or avaricious employers," such a 
development helped Bedaux earn an even poorer reputation among 
British workers.40 
British workers argued that the Bedaux system was antisocial 
and contrary to the principles of trade unionism. Percy Glading, a 
prominent leader of the London engineering workers, bitterly 
complained that the Bedaux system "has succeeded in increasing 
production in various industries where other well-known systems 
of payment by results, bonus systems, straight piecework sys­
tems, and similar swindles have been less successful."41 Horace 
Moulden wrote of Bedaux that "this system . . . promises to 
become a great factor in the path of trade unionism."42 "That 
hellish system," and "absolutely ridiculous" were phrases used by 
British workers in the 1930s to describe the system. Even the name 
"Bedaux" came to symbolize an attempt on the part of manage­
ment to increase the speed of production and cut established rates. 
For this reason, the British Bedaux office soon cautioned its 
engineers not to use the name of Bedaux while on assignment. 
When William Smyth, a Bedaux engineer, was assigned to Joseph 
Lucas in 193 8, he was requested "not to mention the name Bedaux 
at any time at . .  . [the] Works. This is a matter of policy we have 
determined from a point of view of labour relations and is most 
important."43 By the late 1930s, Bedaux terminology was also 
altered to quiet opposition. The Bedaux Office became the Bonus 
and Control Office, Premium Hours became Bonus Hours and the 
B Hour was simply referred to as Performance. Finally, the great 
symbol of the system, the B, was replaced by less obnoxious terms 
such as the Allowed Minute (AM) or Point (P).44 
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TABLE 7.3 
Number of British Firms Using the Bedaux System 
by Year, 1926-1948 
1926 3 1932 29 1938 22 1944 20 
1927 4 1933 15 1939 24 1945 31 
1928 5 1934 27 1940 23 1946 33 
1929 9 1935 16 1941 18 1947 44 
1930 13 1936 11 1942 26 1948 31 
1931 30 1937 22 1943 21 
Source: Bedaux Archives, Organization Charts, Films OC 1-6. 
TABLE 7.•4 
Distribution of the Bedaux System in Britain by 
Industrial Sector, 1926-1949 
Number of Firms Using Bedaux 
Trade Group 1926-1939 1939-1949 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 22 13 
Chemical and Allied Trades 26 28 
Coal and Petroleum 3 2 
Metal Manufacture 18 42 
Mechanical Engineering 10 57 
Electrical Engineering 9 6 
Motor Vehicle Components 8 1 
Textiles 36 115 
Services/Distribution 11 58 
Other 35 66 
TOTAL 178 388 
Source: Bedaux Archives, Organization Charts, Films OC 1-6. 
Nevertheless, by the 1940s, Bedaux's work study techniques 
had become the standard by which other systems were measured. 
The British Bedaux office trained numerous work study engi­
neers, many of whom either went on to open their own manage­
ment consultancies or who created work study departments with­
in specific firms. For instance, former Bedaux engineer Leslie Orr 
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left the British office in 1932 and joined British scientific manage­
ment devotee Lyndall Urwick to form Urwick, Orr & Partners.45 
Two years later, R. Bryson and W H. Craven left Bedaux and 
together established the P E. Group, and in 1943 E. E. Buttenleft 
Bedaux and set up Personnel Administration Ltd. Americans 
Frank Mead and Colwell Carney left the British office in 1938 and 
returned to the United States. After World War II they were both 
back in Britain and together established Mead, Carney & Part­
ners, a management consultancy specializing in work measure­
ment techniques.46 Bedaux engineers often remained at individual 
factories where they created their own work study departments, 
such as at Imperial Chemical Industries. By the late 1930s, similar 
developments were under way at Pilkingtons, Kodak, and Joseph 
Lucas. According to William Smyth, "in the field of work mea­
surement, and particularly, of time study, present day practice 
probably owes more to Bedaux than to Taylor. "47 
Conclusion 
The career of Charles E. Bedaux underlines the possibility of "a 
brilliant campaign of salesmanship" in an industrial world sensi­
tized to the possibilities of rationalized production.48 Bedaux had 
no original ideas or special insights into industrial management; 
he offered no more than had a score of competitors in the 1920s and 
1930s. By the standards of Taylor, his immediate followers, and his 
intellectual heirs in the Taylor Society, Bedaux was little more than 
a quack or charlatan. Yet by the 1930s he had become a leading 
practitioner of scientific management on both sides of the Atlan­
tic. Indeed, Bedaux's international reputation probably surpassed 
that of Taylor, Gilbreth, and their most orthodox disciples. Bedaux 
succeeded because his clients had already been educated to the 
potential of scientific management and because his approach was 
simple, logical, direct, and, from the executive's perspective, 
highly appealing. Unlike Taylor, Gilbreth, and others, he did not 
demand new investment, radical changes in management sys­
tems, or a long transitional period; a "mental revolution," if it 
occurred at all, was an incidental feature of a Bedaux reorganiza­
tion. Bedaux nevertheless promised increased output and lower 
unit costs, largely at the expense of the workers' mental and 
physical health. His efforts boldly emphasized the narrow line 
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between the highminded theorists, who offered workers a better 
life via planning, system, and order, and less exalted efficiency 
engineers who offered marginally higher wages for substantially 
greater effort. 
Was the British experience typical? Until more is known about 
the activities of Bedaux's American, French, Italian, German, and 
other European and global agents, it is impossible to be certain. 
British employers on average devoted more attention to labor 
costs and the possibilities of reducing those costs. The meager 
record that survives suggests that American managers of the 
interwar years were receptive to simple, nondogmatic appeals and 
were cognizant of the possibilities of the Bedaux system. Cer­
tainly there is no evidence that Bedaux suffered in the competition 
for their attention. The handful of references that have come to 
light suggest that Bedaux's approach was similar everywhere and 
that American managers and workers who were employed by 
firms that hired Bedaux had many of the same complaints as their 
British compatriots. In America as well as in Britain, the Bedaux 
Company insured that the controversies that had marked the early 
years of the scientific management movement did not disappear 
altogether. 
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JOHN C. RUMM 
O Scientific Management and Industrial 
Engineering at Du Pont 
Frederick W. Taylor's death did not signal the passing of 
scientific management. On the contrary, in the years after 1915, 
the techniques of scientific management were applied as part of a 
broad effort to rationalize production and enhance managerial 
control over the workplace. A new figure in American industry — 
the industrial engineer—played a key role in this continuing effort 
to apply scientific management. Industrial engineers utilized 
techniques derived from scientific management to reduce infor­
mation about production to a set of standard data that managers 
could use for more effective labor control. They sought to develop 
for management "scientific facts [that could] be used to reach a 
reasonable solution" to the question of "what should be consid­
ered a 'fair day's work.'>n In doing so, they hoped to effect what 
Taylor termed "the substitution of exact scientific investigation 
and knowledge for the old individual judgment or opinion, either 
of the workman or the boss, in all matters relating to the work 
done in the establishment. "2 
This essay reviews the application of scientific management at a 
leading American firm, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, 
This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Society for the History of Technology in Wilmington, Delaware, in October 
1988. The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of Edwin T. Layton, Jr., 
Steve Kreis, and Daniel Nelson on that paper; Marjorie McNinch, of the Hagley 
Museum and Library, for her assistance in locating Du Pont Company records; 
and Lyn Stallings and Brian Greenberg for their continuing support. 
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during the first half of the twentieth century. Until the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, efforts to apply techniques of scientific manage­
ment within the company were limited, largely because managers 
did not give their full support. As they struggled to reduce labor 
costs in the wake of the Great Depression, however, company 
managers increasingly turned to Du Pont's industrial engineering 
force for assistance in implementing techniques intended not only 
to increase efficiency, but also to enhance managerial control over 
the work force. By the 1950s, industrial engineers had succeeded 
in Taylorizing the workplace at Du Pont. 
Early Efforts to Apply Scientific Management 
at Du Pont 
Du Pont has long been regarded as a paragon of modern 
managerial and organizational techniques. The executives who 
reorganized the company at the turn of the century, including 
Pierre and Coleman du Pont, Arthur J. Moxham, J. Amory 
Haskell, and Hamilton M. Barksdale, introduced improved ad­
ministrative methods, new accounting techniques, and systema­
tic internal communication procedures. The result, as Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr. stated, was that by World War I "few American 
industrial enterprises had as modern a management as Du Pont. "3 
Yet these reforms affected the administration of the enterprise as a 
whole; they had relatively little impact upon factory management. 
For the most part, labor at Du Pont's fifty-odd plants was still 
managed under the paternalistic practices developed during the 
first century of the firm's existence.4 
Only in Du Pont's High Explosives Operating Department 
(HEOD) was much consideration given to reforming factory 
management. Senior managers emphasized the need to reduce 
labor costs, improve methods, and find the most effective way of 
performing tasks.5 The department held regular superintendents' 
meetings to discuss improvements and set up special commissions 
to develop and adopt new machinery and processes. In the spring 
of 1911, these efforts received new impetus with the formation of 
an "Efficiency Division. "6 The decision to organize it reflected 
the vogue for "efficiency" that followed the publication of Fred­
erick W. Taylor's The Principles of Scientific Management. Hamilton 
M. Barksdale, until recently director of HEOD and now the 
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company's general manager, read Taylor's book and decided that 
an effort should be made to apply scientific management at Du 
Pont.7 As Harry G. Haskell, Barksdale's successor at HEOD, 
reminded superintendents, "to feel satisfied of the men as work­
ing hard is not sufficient in our days; [you] must know that the men 
are all working well, and that is the gist of the efficiency idea." The 
Efficiency Division, he stated, would try to determine "by scien­
tific trial" whether employees were indeed working well.8 
Rather than utilize the services of Taylor or another consultant, 
the HEOD turned to two of its own staff in the Efficiency 
Division. Edward Montgomery Harrington, the director, was an 
MIT graduate (1886) with some twenty years' experience in 
the explosives industry; his assistant, W. Maxwell Moore, had 
worked for nearly a decade at Repauno, the HEOD's largest 
plant.9 From 1911 to 1914, the two men visited all of the HEOD's 
dozen plants, conducting time and motion studies of workers. 
They determined standard times and methods for tasks, set stan­
dard speeds for machinery, and made suggestions for rearranging 
the flow of work, improving tools, and installing labor-saving 
equipment.10 
The Efficiency Division's efforts were hampered, however, by 
several problems. Not the least was a lack of clear support for, or 
understanding of, its work. Its findings remained strictly advisory; 
plants were not required to adopt its recommendations. Harring­
ton sought to expand the work of the division to include studies of 
fatigue, the scientific selection of workers, and employment de­
partments, but these studies were referred to other divisions or 
were not approved.n Some HEOD officials and plant superinten­
dents were skeptical of its efforts or showed little understanding of 
scientific management. Neither of the company's other manufac­
turing departments—Black Powder and Smokeless Powder — 
established efficiency divisions, and officials in these departments 
took only passing interest in the work of the HEOD's. Apart from 
Hamilton Barksdale and his assistant, Irenee du Pont, both of 
whom received the division's reports and attended HEOD meet­
ings at which its work was discussed, other top company execu­
tives apparently paid little attention to its activities.12 
Another problem related to the hazardous nature of explosives 
manufacturing: the threat of an explosion prohibited the use of 
incentives that might encourage workers to speed up their pro­
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duction. This imperative conflicted with a key tenet of Taylorism 
and other efficiency systems —that workers should earn a bonus 
for completing a task in or before a standard length of time. As 
Harrington stated, it was difficult "to make employees see where 
they are to gain by changing methods of operation which may 
give increased production [but] with no monetary gain to them­
selves." The division never resolved the conflict.13 
The Efficiency Division also faced challenges over its approach. 
Harrington warned against expecting quick results, arguing that 
only prolonged studies of work would lead to increased efficien­
cy. 14 Senior officials and superintendents, however, sought imme­
diate gains in efficiency and measurable reductions in labor costs. 
As one superintendent bluntly stated, "the Efficiency Division 
would have to show a saving in dollars and cents or there would be 
no reason for [its] existence. "15 In 1913, Harrington estimated that 
the division had produced savings amounting to $6,500 during 
1912; he also admitted, however, that it had found "comparatively 
little for which [it had] recommended remedies. "16 The division's 
failure to produce more significant results disappointed senior 
officials, who expected a greater return on their investment. 
Hamilton Barksdale, for example, warned that if the quest for 
efficiency was "left to a desultory sort of consideration . . . [it] 
will not get anywhere." He urged Harrington to make a "clear 
cut, well defined method of getting at" efficiency, proposing that 
the division undertake trials of functional foremanship.17 
In September 1913, Harrington began these tests in a dynamite 
mixing house at the Repauno Plant. Only a day after "an old 
hand" was placed in the building as a functional foreman, how­
ever, an explosion levelled the house, killing him and three other 
workers, and injuring six others. Harrington shifted his experi­
ments to another building housing a different process. In Decem­
ber, however, an explosion destroyed another dynamite mixing 
house, killing and injuring several more workers, causing "a wild 
scramble among employees," and throwing residents in neighbor­
ing communities into a state of panic. As rumors spread that the 
accidents were the result of "the foremen . . . rushing the men," 
Harrington and Repauno officials suspended further experiments. 
Damages to plant property from the two explosions, together 
with payments made to dependents, exceeded $34,000, or nearly 
six times the estimated savings for 1912.18 
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Following the disasters at Repauno, the Efficiency Division's 
operations were scaled back considerably; early in 1915, the HEOD 
suspended its work entirely.19 This action temporarily ended 
further systematic efforts to apply scientific management at Du 
Pont. The division's experiences, moreover, suggested that future 
attempts to install scientific management would likely fare poorly 
unless managers at all levels gave their full support —something 
this initial effort never received. 
During World War I, "efficiency" or "time-study" departments 
were organized by some of the company's larger smokeless powder 
plants. At the Haskell Plant in New Jersey, for example, an efficiency 
section made time and motion studies, set standards for a "fair 
day's work," and installed labor-saving materials handling equip­
ment. Such efforts, however, should be placed in proper perspective. 
The resulting improvements were minor; as one plant manager ob­
served, "the labor situation did not warrant the expenditure of the 
money" required for full-scale efforts to improve efficiency. Inter­
est in efficiency emerged only at a late point in the war effort; not 
before the spring of 1918. Moreover, attention centered upon a small 
segment of the work force—laborers and construction gangs — 
rather than on the much larger group of production workers.20 
Similar limited efforts were made to apply techniques of scien­
tific management during the 1920s at plants operated by Du Pont 
or by its subsidiaries. "Planning" departments in some plants 
conducted time and motion studies to analyze jobs and develop 
standard work crews.21 Other plants used scientific management 
techniques to resolve specific labor problems. In 1921, for exam­
ple, the Du Pont Viscoloid Company (a wholly owned subsidiary 
that manufactured "pyralin" plastic articles) formed a "Time 
Study Section" to study the jobs of production workers at its 
Arlington Plant in New Jersey.22 The Viscoloid Company's effi­
ciency engineers installed a "task and bonus system," similar to 
that devised by Henry Gantt, under which workers began earning 
a bonus on each piece produced when their output attained a 
certain level (typically 45 percent) of the standard established for 
their task. By 1927, the system covered nearly all production 
workers, most of whom earned bonuses.23 Another subsidiary, 
the Du Pont Rayon Company, in 1926-1927 adopted a similar plan 
to reduce turnover among female workers in its Richmond and 
Buffalo plants. These employees worked at highly repetitive 
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manual tasks; their work was tedious and fatiguing, and annual 
turnover often exceeded ioo percent. To keep workers from 
leaving, the levels at which they began earning bonuses were set 
very low—as little as eight percent of standard. Turnover fell 
sharply after the system was installed; at Richmond, for example, 
it dropped to 5 percent by 1930. The earnings of many workers 
rose markedly as they reached or even exceeded the theoretical 
maximum 100 percent standard.24 
These instances should not obscure the fact that interest in apply­
ing scientific management techniques at Du Pont during the 1920s 
was not widespread within the company as a whole. Two particular 
factors served to reduce interest. One was a preference for other 
company measures designed to increase efficiency, chiefly the 
"Merit Pay Plan." Open to all hourly workers employed more 
than one year, the plan paid a monthly bonus of 5 to 20 percent 
over their regular pay, based on length of service and attention to 
factors such as care, quality, and attendance. Officials who pro­
moted Merit Pay argued that it was preferable to other incentives 
since it not only promised to increase efficiency, but also, thanks 
to its service provision, to stabilize employment. However, high an­
nual rates of turnover (170 percent in 1923) and an annual cost of 
$770,000 to administer the plan, convinced senior managers in 1925 
to end Merit Pay as a companywide program. Some departments, 
however, continued their own merit pay plans through the 1940s.25 
Another factor that lessened interest in scientific management 
among executives was Du Pont's prosperity during the 1920s. 
Apart from the years immediately after World War I, the compa­
ny's business expanded as production shifted from explosives to 
chemicals and synthetics. Sales rose from $74 million in 1923 to 
$203 in 1929, fueled by new products such as tetraethyl lead, 
rayon, and cellophane. This prosperity, along with the need to 
strengthen Du Pont's position within the chemical industry, led 
executives to emphasize research and development, diversifica­
tion, and market expansion more than efficiency.26 




The company's rosy earnings picture changed dramatically 
with the onset of the Great Depression. Du Pont's sales dropped to 
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$186 million in 1930, and to $118 million by 1932. Hardest hit were 
the departments and subsidiaries that made acids, fertilizers, 
paint, coated fabrics, and other chemical products used in the 
automotive, mining, steel, construction, and agricultural indus­
tries. Struggling to maintain profits despite decreased production 
and falling sales, managers faced two alternatives: raising prices 
or cutting manufacturing costs. They chose the latter option. 
Labor, as a major cost item, did not escape the pressure for 
economy; the need to cut costs heightened interest in measures 
aimed at improving labor efficiency.27 
These developments coincided with the emergence of industrial 
engineering as a separate function at Du Pont. In 1928, an "Indus­
trial Engineering Division" (IED) was formed within Du Pont's 
Engineering Department to wage what one official termed a 
"continuous struggle to reduce operating costs."28 The compa­
ny's hard fortunes during the depression years of the 1930s gave 
added impetus to cost-reduction efforts; indeed, Du Pont's Exec­
utive Committee advised departmental managers to give full 
attention to "perfecting the efficiency of their operations, by 
intensive study of manufacturing processes, elimination of waste, 
discard of superfluous practices, development of labor-saving 
devices, substitution of mechanical for manual operations, and 
other means of reducing costs. "29 The IED quickly moved to the 
vanguard in coordinating cost-reduction and efficiency work 
within the company. 
The rapid growth of the IED offers a good measure of the 
interest Du Pont management took in its work. From a staff of 
twenty-eight engineers in 1928, its ranks swelled to over 200 by 
1940, and to some 500 six years later. The IED's engineers specialized 
in every aspect of production, including chemical processes, 
materials handling, packaging, waste recovery, water filtration, 
power conservation, instrumentation, maintenance, lubrication, 
equipment development, and plant design.30 Its ranks also in­
cluded engineers, trained in such techniques of scientific manage­
ment as time and motion study, wage incentives, and job analysis, 
whose efforts were directed at making "continuing studies . . . 
which should result in . . . more effective use of manpower. "31 
The techniques applied by industrial engineers who were con­
cerned with labor efficiency dovetailed with managers' perceived 
need for "fair standards of productivity to be expected of employ­
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ees."32 As one company executive observed, among the respon­
sibilities facing management was that of "making certain that our 
working force produces a fair day's work for a fair day's pay under 
good operating conditions."33 Increasingly, however, managers 
asserted that the diversified and varied nature of Du Pont's pro­
duction made it much harder to be sure that workers were 
performing efficiently. One manager, whose plant turned out over 
3,000 separate products, stated that while he once felt confident 
"that he knew what a day's work was and that his operators were 
effectively busy," he now believed that "it is impossible for him 
and his supervisors to know the content of a day's work in a multi­
product unit. "34 Company managers also believed that foremen 
and lower-level supervisors could not be relied upon to evaluate 
workers' performance. "The foreman doesn't know what a nor­
mal work pace is," one official stated, since "he is expected to be 
judge and prosecutor at the same time; and he omits part of a job 
because he doesn't analyze it sufficiently."35 Another official 
stated the problem somewhat more pointedly: "The bodies are 
moving, but how effectively we don't know."36 This need to 
determine "how effectively the bodies were moving" led Du Pont 
managers to devote increased attention to scientific management 
from the 1930s onward. 
Work Measurement, Incentive Wages, and 
Labor Standards 
Initially, Du Pont's industrial engineers focused upon improv­
ing the efficiency of chemical workers in production operations 
demanding a high degree of manual labor. They assumed that "the 
science of time and motion study" would "increase [chemical 
workers'] productive efficiency considerably. "37 Labor costs con­
stituted a lower percentage of overall costs in chemical production 
than in the manufacture of rubber, automobiles, steel, and other 
products; however, in the production of many chemicals they 
remained high. In the "batch" operations, which typified the 
manufacture of small quantities of paints, dyes, resins, explo­
sives, coated fabrics, and other specialized products, production 
remained highly labor intensive. Workers hauled and conveyed 
raw materials and semifinished products during processing; cleaned, 
repaired, adjusted, and set up equipment; and sorted and inspected 
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finished products. Finishing operations in the production of rayon, 
plastic, or cellophane articles also demanded considerable manual 
labor. Continuous-flow automatic (or nearly so) equipment was 
used for the high-volume processing of acids, ammonia, meth­
anol, and other fluid chemical products. The force of workers 
needed to operate such equipment was small, but manual labor 
was still needed to handle ingredients, charge boilers with fuel, 
maintain equipment, and remove wastes and byproducts.38 
The application of scientific management techniques at a Du 
Pont plant began with a preliminary survey of its operations to 
"indicate the number of men in [each] building and what each one 
is doing and how they can best be handled to improve their work 
or become better fitted for it." Based on the survey, industrial 
engineers consolidated processes, rearranged the layout of work 
areas, installed materials handling equipment, and trimmed work 
crews.39 Engineers then made motion and time studies of workers 
in specific operations. To analyze motions, they utilized strobo­
scopic, micromotion, and memo-motion (time-lapse) photography, 
and the chronocyclegraph, in which flashlight bulbs were fastened 
to a worker's wrists and long-exposure photographs were taken to 
create "light patterns" tracing the movements followed in per­
forming a task. While Du Pont engineers relied on the traditional 
stopwatch to make time studies, they also consulted published 
tables of predetermined standard time values for basic motion 
elements. Using such tables, they simply "synthesized" the time 
values of individual elements to obtain the net time for a task.40 
The net time, along with any allowances for fatigue or difficult 
working conditions, established the "standard time" for an opera­
tion; a standard or "normal" production level was also defined. 
Together, they comprised the "job standard," in which, barring 
unusual conditions, workers were expected to achieve normal 
levels of production. Engineers also defined a "100 percent effec­
tive point," a theoretical maximum limit that only the best 
workers could achieve. Workers were rated in terms of their 
efficiency: if thejob standard for an operation was 500 pounds in 
four hours and a worker produced 250 pounds, he or she was rated 
50 percent efficient.41 
Thejob standards and ratings served as the basis for incentive 
wages designed to stimulate employees to become "more efficient 
and better operators." Encouraged by news of the satisfactory 
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results obtained in plants that had installed incentive plans during 
the 1920s, officials in other Du Pont departments and subsidiaries 
increasingly became interested in placing their production em­
ployees under an incentive wage plan. By 1938, at least thirty 
plants had installed such plans, covering 9,400, or 27 percent, of 
the company's 34,000 hourly employees. Coverage ranged from 
three percent of the work force at some plants, to as much as 90 
percent at others.42 
Du Pont's wage incentive plans took various forms. At least 
three plants installed the Bedaux Company's system. While gen­
erally good results were reported with the Bedaux System, it 
contained some undesirable features that limited its wider use 
within the company. Du Pont managers objected to the Bedaux 
consultants' "insistence on their plan being worked in, even if 
some of it does not fit," while the sizable expenditure required to 
install the system — over $200,000 in some cases — dissuaded other 
plants from applying it.43 A few plants used a similar though 
cheaper plan, the "KIM System," named for the three engineers 
(King, Irvin, and MacLachan) who developed it.44 Another alter­
native—and the one most widely pursued at Du Pont—was for 
industrial engineers to study existing systems, both within and 
outside the company, and then to borrow liberally from them to 
create an "in-house" version tailored to the conditions of a partic­
ular plant. Ammonia Department officials, for example, sent an 
industrial engineer to the Dye Works to "skim off as much of the 
cream as we can" about the Bedaux System, rather than hire 
Bedaux consultants to install it at its plants.45 
Though they differed in detail, all of the incentive plans shared a 
common principle: employees earned "extra wages for extra ef­
fort" based upon their ability to meet or exceed the standard 
established for their job.46 Typically, an employee began earning a 
bonus when he or she attained a 75 percent efficiency rating. Loren 
I. King, the IED's "Wage Incentive Consultant," described how 
such a plan covered workers who soldered wires at one plant: 
We . .  . set a rate for each bunch of wires to be soldered say 15 
minutes and set the normal at 20 minutes giving the operators 5 
minutes in which to make a bonus. Penalty values are set up just 
as are bonuses set up. If an employee fails to do his job in the 
normal time or fails his duty altogether he is penalized.47 
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The amount of the bonus decreased as the worker's output rose 
above the standard. The advantage, as one observer noted, was 
that "the required increase in production is greater than the 
attainable increase in pay, so that the company shares in the gains 
of a man's increased output and the labor cost per piece declines as 
the pay goes up. "48 
Initially, most incentive wage applications covered only pro­
duction workers whose duties required considerable hand work. 
At some plants, however, engineers devised plans for operators of 
continuous-flow equipment, whose duties were more "mental," 
such as taking readings from instruments or adjusting dials that 
regulated temperature, pressure, and other variables. The plans 
set standards for accuracy in monitoring instruments and control­
ling process variables, for conserving power, water, and materials, 
and for attaining predetermined levels of quality and yield. Such a 
plan was installed at the Belle Plant in West Virginia, which 
manufactured ammonia and antifreeze. As the industrial engineer 
who developed the incentive plan recalled, 
Usually if [an] operator was watching a chart, for example a 
temperature chart, [a] pressure chart, and so forth, the basic 
approach would be how accurately, how closely did he control 
the temperature, which was critical to the operation of course, 
or the pressure. And some of the operators were far more adept 
at this than others and it showed up in the performance of the 
operation. 
Operators who met or exceeded the standards received bonuses; 
those who did not were penalized.49 
The efforts of industrial engineers to study jobs and to place 
workers under incentive plans produced mixed reactions among 
Du Pont employees. Some workers opposed such efforts. A 
carpenter at the Dye Works, for example, recalled he "told the 
management plain" that the "B-Doe" would "make a man run on 
one of these rip saws, buzz saws, Lord knows, maybe he'd cut his 
damned hand off." Management considered his protests, but 
"they still installed it and run it for quite a while. "50 Similarly, the 
former manager of the Belle Plant stated that "the men were 
suspicious" during time studies, refusing to answer questions 
about their work.51 The caption of a cartoon published in one 
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plant's employee magazine, showing a stopwatch and a clipboard, 
was pointed: identifying time study engineers as "the enemy of all 
piece workers," it asserted that "they never lie boys."52 
Workers also complained about job standards and incentive 
wages. Works Councils (Du Pont's employee representation plan) 
at several plants asserted that workers "[did] not understand" the 
incentives and could not "calculate at least approximately their 
current earnings."53 Some employees of the Dye Works were 
"kicking" over the Bedaux System, a foreman reported, because 
"they are not getting their rate of which they are right," and 
because the plant penalized them for mistakes by "cutting their 
rates or taking their Bonus away."54 The "Employes Mutual 
Association" (an independent union) at the Ilion Plant of Du 
Pont's Remington Arms subsidiary wrote Lammot du Pont about 
"excessively tight" job standards, which forced operators "to 
work at a speed that not only is detrimental to the safety rules of 
the plant but also to the health and good will of the employees." 
Remington officials sent industrial engineers to Ilion to review the 
standards and resolve the situation.55 
On the other hand, while employees may not have been wholly 
pleased by their job standards or incentive plan, many apparently 
welcomed the opportunity to earn extra money. The Dye Works 
carpenter who initially opposed the Bedaux System, for example, 
nevertheless praised management for being "always liberal enough 
to set a price that'd give you the time to do it" (i.e., to make a 
bonus). As he recalled, many employees also learned how to turn 
the system to their own advantage: "[The Company would] put a 
price on [a job] and maybe two or three fellows would have to 
work on [it] and . . . naturally they'd talk among themselves and 
find out what was the best way to do it in which you could make 
more money." Evidence suggests that many Dye Works employ­
ees learned "the best way to do" their jobs to earn more money: by 
the 1950s, workers covered by the Bedaux System were receiving, 
on average, $688 per year over their regular base pay.56 At some 
locations, employees whose work was not covered under an 
incentive plan protested such "discrimination," demanding that 
they be given an opportunity to add to their earnings. The 
Grasselli Chemicals Department, for example, citing "continued 
requests for extension of the [Wage Incentive] System to now 
uncovered operations," reported that it was "being extended as 
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fast as accurate studies and evaluations can be made." Similarly, in 
response to numerous requests, in 1939 the Dye Works began 
placing maintenance, craft, shipping, clerical, and laboratory 
employees under the Bedaux System; by 1955, the plan covered 99 
percent of the work force.57 
If workers were divided over wage incentive plans, so too were 
company managers. Some managers asserted that incentives were 
necessary to insure that workers give their full effort to keeping 
output levels high. Other departments reported that industrial 
engineers' efforts had produced huge savings and gains in produc­
tivity. The Grasselli Chemicals Department, for example, stated 
that its expenditure of $141,500 on time studies and incentive 
wages had resulted in savings of nearly $850,000. The Organic 
Chemicals Department claimed that the Bedaux System had 
caused productivity to increase nearly 31 percent while labor costs 
fell from $3.47 to $2.81 per pound.58 
These sanguine opinions, however, were not held unanimously 
within the company. By the late 1930s, many departments were 
cutting back or eliminating their incentive plans due to employee 
dissatisfaction, soaring labor costs, failure to achieve prior levels 
of quality and output, and the work of administering the plans. 
The former manager of the Belle Plant, for example, recalled that 
its plan "became . . . burdensome to the local financial people, 
the control people, the payroll [people]." When the decision was 
made to abandon it, he said, "a lot of [them] sighed a sigh of 
relief." At the Dye Works, management realized that the full-scale 
extension of the Bedaux System had backfired: clerks objected to 
the extra paperwork needed to compute payrolls, supervisors 
found inflated reports of work done, and labor costs rose so high 
that German and Japanese dye manufacturers undercut the prices 
of its products. The local union, however, rejected proposals to 
write the system out of its contract until management granted an 
increase in base rates to "buy out" the plan.59 
By the 1940s, despite the belief that "fundamentally, there is 
nothing wrong with [this] system of payment," the trend at Du 
Pont was running "toward lessening the number of employees paid 
on wage incentives."60 Some plants changed to "Good Perfor­
mance" plans, under which groups of workers shared monthly 
bonuses based on output and quality. Others gradually phased out 
incentives altogether. At the rayon plants, for example, operators 
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who reached maximum levels of efficiency "were changed to a 
straight hourly rate with practically no loss of earning." By 
the early 1950s, only a few plants still retained incentive wage 
plans.61 
While company managers abandoned incentives, they regarded 
time study and job standards as essential tools for controlling 
labor. "Labor measurement based on time study," stated one 
supervisor, "is a pre-requisite when planning for the effective use 
of labor. "62 Only "the organized analysis of work," another 
official asserted, would give management "the necessary elements 
of control. "63 By the 1940s, most Du Pont plants formed "Meth­
ods and Standards Sections," staffed by industrial engineers, to 
develop information and controls to assist managers in planning 
production. Using techniques derived from scientific manage­
ment, these industrial engineers "place[d] the management of 
[labor] on a truly business basis."64 
Methods engineers conducted a continuous program of job 
analysis in the plant, studying the work of production workers 
and also of "indirect labor" such as maintenance, construction, 
laboratory, warehouse, shipping, and clerical employees. They 
made time and motion studies of jobs to determine standard time 
values for each operation and to see that proper methods were 
being followed. Engineers also set labor standards for each job, 
establishing "the content of a fair day's work, or what should 
normally be expected from each individual for his day's pay. "65 
This ongoing job analysis program was only one of the duties 
performed by the Methods and Standards sections. Another was 
the preparation of written work plans. Supervisors and foremen 
sent all work orders to the section, where analysts converted them 
into detailed plans before jobs were begun. An industrial engineer 
described the process: 
The analyst studies the job first. He determines the best meth­
ods, tools, materials, safety requirements, and standards for 
manpower (by using standard time data). He writes store tickets 
for needed material. He prepares work sketches or photographs 
to assist foremen . . . and workers in visualizing the work. 
[The] result . .  . is a completely analyzed job written in clear, 
concise form.66 
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This work plan established the "standard practice" for the job — 
defined as "a carefully thought out, officially approved method of 
performing a function. "67 Such a work plan, asserted one methods 
engineer, would "cause each operation to be performed in a 
stipulated manner at a designated time for an acceptable cost," 
enabling management to plan production more effectively.68 More­
over, if this work plan was " 'religiously' adhered to," a Methods 
and Standards manual promised, it would reduce "the good 
operation to a habit or routine [and release] the full faculties of 
management to be directed along other paths of progress."69 
Du Pont managers relied on labor standards and work plans 
developed by Methods and Standards Sections to estimate work 
loads and to schedule crews. "Job methods planning," one analyst 
stated, gave managers "a measurement tool . .  . to calculate the 
labor required for anyjob. "70 It also provided them with a tool for 
evaluating workers' performance. Supervisors could compare the 
job standard and work plan with the actual time of the job and the 
methods followed to measure how well workers performed the 
task. Labor standards, a methods engineer stated, formed "a 
common unit of measurement, understood by management and 
labor," which provided "a reliable means of objectively measur­
ing . . . performance."71 Standards were also used to rate jobs to 
determine payment differentials and to establish job promotion 
ladders based on the relative difficulty of different tasks.72 Be­
cause each standard represented a specific output of an individual 
product, managers also utilized standards as administrative tools 
for production control. Based on forecasts of anticipated sales and 
orders, they estimated the volume of production, scheduled equip­
ment utilization, predicted the labor costs of different products, 
and monitored inventories. At the end of the period, they com­
pared actual production with the estimates to determine the causes 
of delays and overruns. Standards were also used for allocating 
labor and overhead costs among various products. "The use of 
[labor] measurement data," stated one engineer, "takes the ele­
ments of guesswork out of many of the problems . . . which 
management is called upon to evaluate. "73 
In addition to developing labor standards and preparing work 
plans, Du Pont's Methods and Standards sections engineers over­
saw one other element of the company's efficiency efforts: its 
"Work Simplification" program. Developed by Allan Mogenson, 
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an editor of Factory Magazine who was retained by the IED as a 
parttime consultant during the 1930s, work simplification was a 
training program designed to "[tap] the available brains in the 
plant for their constructive ideas. "74 Methods engineers delivered 
classroom lectures to groups of foreman and workers on basic 
principles of motion economy, instructing them how "to develop 
time and labor savings methods and to put that thinking into 
operation." The trainees then went back to their work sites, 
where, under an instructor's supervision, they identified jobs 
needing study and improvement. The trainee broke the job down 
into its constituent elements; prepared a written description for 
each element; plotted the job on process flow or work distribution 
charts; questioned how individual elements might be eliminated, 
simplified, or combined; and then implemented the improved 
method.75 IED representatives stated that work simplification 
produced significant cost reductions, reduced the need for more 
sophisticated forms of job analysis, and fostered a "cooperative 
approach" to improving work methods. Moreover, they asserted, 
it would be "easier to sell" workers on the need to change their 
methods, since decisions about such changes would be based on 
"facts, not opinions" and made by workers themselves.76 
From the 1920s to the 1950s, industrial engineers at Du Pont 
developed and implemented a variety of techniques, derived from 
scientific management, to provide managers with data for reduc­
ing production costs and controlling labor. "Those responsible for 
production," wrote a senior supervisor of one Methods and 
Standards Section, now "had available [to them] information, 
validated by established facts, on which to base their decisions. "77 
In short, Du Pont engineers effectively "Taylorized" the work­
place. 
The Broader Context: Industrial Relations at Du Pont 
These efforts to apply techniques of scientific management to 
cut costs and enhance managerial control should be considered 
within the broader context of Du Pont's industrial relations envi­
ronment. As early as the early 1930s, Du Pont officials launched a 
none-too-subtle effort "to create an atmosphere of understand­
ing . . . which will permit management to make and carry out 
those decisions which must be made if we are to operate sue­
Industrial Engineering at Du Pont • 191 
cessfully." During the 1930s and 1940s, this campaign relied on 
plant and companywide employee magazines, leaflets, films, 
posters, and lectures.78 In 1950, the company began a broader, 
more ambitious effort—its "HOBSO" ("How Our Business Sys­
tem Operates") program, in which workers received classroom 
training on the American system of free enterprise. By 1953, over 
80,000 employees had attended HOBSO sessions.79 Among the 
messages employees received through such forums was the need 
to lower costs, maintain quality, and increase productivity. Du 
Pont held out the promise of job security, longer service, and 
"better living" (also the title of its company employees' magazine) 
in exchange for "more work, better work, and more continuous 
work" from employees.80 The alternative was stated implicitly or 
even explicitly: as one worker recalled being told, "If we didn't 
modernize we couldn't compete with other companies and it 
would mean all our jobs."81 
These actions helped to create a climate for efficiency within the 
company. Moreover, from the 1920s through the 1950s, one essen­
tial fact distinguished Du Pont's overall employee relations envi­
ronment: unions never mounted a serious challenge to manage­
ment. Although various national unions, including the CIO, 
District 50 of the United Mine Workers, the Textile Workers 
Union of America, and the International Chemical Workers Union, 
at different times waged vigorous campaigns to organize Du Pont 
employees, they never represented more than eleven percent of the 
company's eligible work force. Instead, until 1937 most employ­
ees were represented by Works Councils, and thereafter by their 
successor organizations, independent plant unions (in most cases 
the break between the two amounted to little more than a name 
change). The Works Councils were dominated by the company, 
which actively resisted any efforts by representatives to hold 
meetings off plant property or to join their colleagues in other 
plants. With few exceptions, the independent unions were poorly 
financed, waged few strikes, and gained few concessions from 
plant managers. Although some independents tried to federate for 
greater strength, Du Pont's policy of local bargaining blocked 
their efforts; the company was never forced to negotiate at the 
corporate level.82 
For its part, Du Pont management took a tough and unyielding 
stance towards unions, whether national or independent. Company 
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managers refused to cede any authority over production. They 
denied unions any voice in setting work rules and output quotas, 
evaluating jobs, developing labor standards, and determining 
work schedules; they also refused to link wage hikes to produc­
tivity increases.83 In the early 1950s, senior executives reassessed 
Du Pont's policy vis-a-vis unionism; the result was a shift from a 
preference for independent unions, to a goal of eliminating exist­
ing unions and maintaining, at all costs, the nonunion status of the 
company's unorganized plants. The Employee Relations Depart­
ment conducted industrial relations training seminars for manag­
ers, sent specialists on "fire-fighting" visits to plants to head off 
any labor problems, and prepared wage surveys so that depart­
ments could time increases to defeat organizing efforts. At the 
same time, managers sought to reduce interest in unionism by 
cultivating workers' loyalty to the firm. The company paid high 
wage scales (at or above local going rates for comparable work) 
and offered a full package of benefits, including pensions, disabil­
ity wages, vacations, termination allowances, group life, acci­
dent, and health insurance, and a thrift program. Managers used 
safety contests, recreational programs, plant tours, and other 
occasions to continually reiterate the theme that mutual interests 
linked managers and workers. These efforts had dramatic results: 
the percentage of unionized workers fell from 94 percent in 1946 to 
66 percent by i960, while none of the twenty-five new plants built 
by Du Pont during the same period •was successfully organized.84 
From management's perspective, most workers responded fa­
vorably to the company's efforts to improve their efficiency. The 
director of Du Pont's Employee Relations Department, Emile du 
Pont, maintained that the effort to educate workers led them to 
work more efficiently, lessened their resistance to technological 
change, and caused productivity to increase.85 Indeed, levels of 
output per man-hour rose by 165 percent while labor costs rose 
only 12 percent from 1939 to 1955, suggesting that many workers 
had become more efficient.86 
Generalizing about how workers responded to the efforts of 
industrial engineers to install scientific management at Du Pont is 
made difficult by the size of the work force and the virtual absence 
of employee records (most independent unions, for example, did 
not maintain files). The available evidence, however, indicates that 
at least some workers responded negatively —and even aggres­
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sively—to industrial engineers' attempts to alter their jobs. Even 
if management was unwilling to negotiate, workers persisted in 
making wage incentives, work loads, job evaluations, and other 
job-related concerns the focus of union organizing efforts and 
grievance sessions. Indeed, as recently as 1988, an internal compa­
ny memorandum on unionism voiced concern over increased 
"militancy and opposition to management initiatives around the 
issues of Operational] Effectiveness], wage increases . . . and 
productivity improvements. "87 
If the surviving evidence of one unauthorized work stoppage is 
any indication, workers were willing to take shop floor actions to 
protest changes in their jobs. In 1946, some 150 operators at the 
Seaford, Delaware, nylon plant left their stations and went to the 
cafeteria to protest their increased duties resulting from a recent 
analysis of their jobs. They were required to tend twice as many 
machines, but at the same wages as before. The workers com­
plained that they had "too many machines to run"; while they 
"agreed that they could do the work," they refused to do so unless 
management increased their wages. The standoff was brief (last­
ing only a few hours) and production never stopped; foremen of 
the affected sections ran the machines.88 But the incident demon­
strated that at least some workers were unwilling to accede silently 
to unilateral efforts by management to alter their work. The 
available records shed no light on whether workers engaged in 
day-to-day actions to maintain some element of control over their 
work. In his study of operators in an automated chemical factory 
in New Jersey, David Halle found that workers "[became] well 
versed in concealing information and practices [about their jobs] 
from management so as to manipulate them."89 Presumably, at 
least some Du Pont workers responded in similar fashion to the 
efforts of industrial engineers to "Taylorize" the workplace. 
Conclusion 
Addressing a group of supervisors and employees at the Dye 
Works in 1919, Du Pont Company president Irene"e du Pont 
denounced as "fallacious" the notion that workers served their 
interests when they restricted output. Instead, he maintained, 
workers should adopt "the principle of 'all-pull-together' [to] 
produce as efficiently as possible." The key, he said, was for 
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"every employee [to become] a unit in the brain of the company." 
Lest anyone gain a misguided notion of what he meant, however, 
he quickly elaborated on this comment: 
I do not mean by this that a skilled mechanic ought to try to 
work out some complicated chemical reaction. . .  . We want 
thought applied where it will do the most good. Intelligent 
following of detailed instructions worked out by the chemists 
and technicians will yield astounding results in this extraordi­
nary complex manufacture. That is: if experience shows that a 
certain material should be boiled ten minutes, boil it exactly ten 
minutes—not nine or eleven. If a charge should require 1,000 
pounds of caustic, put in 1,000 pounds and not 950 and put it in 
just when instructions require that it should be put in.90 
The worker's role in production was limited to carrying out 
accurately the instructions of superiors. 
Irenee's remarks echoed those of Frederick W. Taylor. Here was 
the substitution of scientific knowledge for the judgment of the 
workmen. Here, too, was the task set forth for industrial engineers: 
reducing workers'jobs to a set of "detailed instructions," which they 
would be given by supervisors and told to execute. From first to 
last, Du Pont's industrial engineers sought to achieve that objective. 
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S T E P H E N P. W A R I N G 
 Peter Drucker, MBO, and the Corporatist 
Critique of Scientific Management 
In the years following World War II, Peter E Drucker was 
the most prominent management writer and consultant in the 
world. One commentator has claimed that Drucker's writings 
were "read by more managers than those of any single author, 
living or dead."* Such popularity allowed Drucker to become the 
foremost postwar champion and critic of Frederick W. Taylor's 
scientific management. Drucker's critique, unlike those of the 
union officials of the 1910s, was not based on some specific 
deficiency or danger. Rather it reflected a sense of the limitations 
of contemporary business practice in contrast with the potential of 
an approach based explicitly on internal cooperation and harmony— 
an approach rooted in European corporatist philosophy and Druck­
er's early theoretical training. 
Drucker often expressed respect for Taylor, who had created 
"an all but systematic philosophy of worker and work." The 
influence of Taylor's philosophy, he added, was "the most power­
ful as well as the most lasting contribution America has made to 
Western thought since the Federalist Papers."2 Later Drucker 
praised Taylor for anticipating the human relations ideas that 
developed after World War II.3 
Because such comments represented only one side of Drucker's 
ideas, he had been hard to understand. At least one scholar has 
taken the praise of scientific management out of context from the 
rest of Drucker's writing and has thus overlooked the ways in 
which Drucker criticized Taylorism and proposed alternatives.4 
Indeed Drucker has seldom been credited for having his own 
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theory of management. Commentators have typically described 
him as an inconsistent thinker, an enigma, a "guru." As one 
business journalist put it, Drucker has been "known for many 
concepts" despite the absence of "a clear and identifiable message, 
body of research or theory to his name." Such perceptions may be 
due in part to the "eclectic" way in which he has illustrated his 
essays and lectures, using examples drawn from history or music 
or art as well as contemporary business.5 Because of his appar­
ently unsystematic style, one historian has concluded that Drucker's 
"real contribution" to management had been not so much in "the 
cash value of his ideas as in the rigorous activity of mind" by 
which they were formulated and that managers could learn more 
from "watching him think than from studying the content of his 
thought. "6 
Nevertheless, searching beneath stylistic impressions reveals 
that Drucker developed a managerial theory that sought to go 
beyond Taylorism. With such writers as Douglas McGregor and 
Chris Argyris, Drucker charged that Taylor's ideas had helped 
make American management excessively bureaucratic.7 Taylor's 
principles had called for managers to centralize power, separate 
planning from performing, and specialize tasks. This had helped 
lead to bureaucratic firms with managers divided from managed. 
Managers were thus isolated from, and ignorant of, many produc­
tion matters. And managers manipulated people just like any 
other factor of production, thus oppressing and underusing their 
personnel. Consequently Taylorism, so the critics charged, cre­
ated problems that debilitated American business. 
Drucker's therapy for Taylor's bureaucratic disease, like that of 
McGregor and Argyris, was for managers to integrate planning 
with doing and synthesize tasks. This quest for an alternative to 
Taylorism and bureaucracy was a quest for new, corporative 
principles of management. It called for managers to stop treating 
people, especially professional employees, as factors of produc­
tion and begin treating them as members of a community. One 
scholar has wrongly concluded that "nothing" in American thought 
has been similar to the German idea that the business corporation 
was a "social institution" and "the central locus of identity, 
loyalty, and community." Such a conclusion seems to have been 
made without knowledge of what American managers have learned 
from Peter Drucker, an Austrian immigrant, and how they have 
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voiced a desire for "an ethic of mutuality" and a disgust for 
"bourgeois egotism."8 
The key to Drucker's corporatism is the technique he labelled 
"management by objectives and self-control," called "MBO" in 
the business vernacular. The story of Drucker's method and 
managers' reaction to it has not been told by a historian.9 But the 
story tells much about recent efforts to transcend Taylorism and 
establish corporatism. And the story also illustrates the failure of 
Drucker's efforts, largely because his corporatist principles dif­
fered little from Taylor's bureaucratic ones. Druckerism, rather 
than being antibureaucratic and a genuine alternative to scientific 
management, proposed new Taylorist techniques. 
European Philosophy, American Practice 
Drucker's search for remedy for Taylorism began in the 1940s 
and early 1950s, when he set out to synthesize European political 
theory with American business practice. The synthesis became 
management by objectives, a technique designed to make capital­
ism corporative and corporatism capitalist.10 
Capitalism and corporatism had been important parts of Druck­
er's youth in Vienna, Austria. He absorbed ideas from the conserva­
tive, Fascist, and especially Catholic versions of corporatist think­
ing popular in Austria after World War I. Such thinkers as Heinrich 
Pesch and Othmar Spann had been disturbed by the selfishness, irre­
sponsibility, and class conflict that accompanied industrial capital­
ism. They believed that these trends alienated workers, fostered 
socialism, endangered private property, and threatened freedom. 
To overcome these problems, they envisioned a harmonious polity 
composed of functional economic groups, or corporations. 
These corporations, as corporatists defined them, took prece­
dence over their members. Corporate goals were not merely the 
sum of the goals of their members. Yet because corporations were 
by definition organic groups, members would recognize that 
their needs and group needs were identical and would sponta­
neously subordinate themselves to the group. In exchange, indi­
viduals received income, status, and fulfillment. Seeking freedom 
from the group amounted to self-destructive and antisocial behav­
ior, for real freedom was in the corporation, especially in service to 
it. Because corporatists envisioned natural harmony between 
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members and groups, moreover, popular sovereignty was at best 
irrelevant, at worst divisive and counterproductive. Government 
would come from a natural elite; and since this elite possessed 
superior wisdom and virtue and performed necessary functions by 
mediating conflicts and leading members toward common goals, 
its power was self-justifying.11 
Given the lack of harmony in interwar Austria, however, these 
corporatists had from the beginning faced the problem of creating 
either corporate eggs or corporate chickens. In other words, they 
had either to convince individuals to adopt common goals so that 
together they could construct a corporatist system, or they had to 
construct a corporatist system that synthesized the goals of con­
flicting individuals. Above all, they needed a natural elite, but 
could not find one. The authority of traditional leaders of corpora­
tist schemes, clerics and aristocrats, had been discredited in an 
increasingly industrial, scientific, and democratic society, and 
business managers were unsuitable given workers' distrust. Even­
tually some of the idealogues would help establish a fascist dic­
tatorship that used coercion to establish cooperation, a solution 
that contradicted their presumption of corporate consensus but 
sustained the hierarchy, privilege, and private property that they 
had been anxious to defend.12 
After fleeing the Nazis and beginning an academic career in 
America in the 1930s, Drucker wrote at length about the good and 
bad of European culture. In 1939 he expressed admiration for 
three corporatist thinkers of the Restoration era, conservatives 
Joseph de Maistre and Vicomte de Bonald and right Hegelian 
Friedrich Stahl (about whom he had written his first book). He 
admired their "Christian" conception of "authority," which stressed 
the "duties" of property ownership, not merely its "privileges," 
and which called for responsible exercise of power in the interest 
of "its subjects."13 Beyond this, according to his "oldest friend" 
Berthold Freyberg, he was trying to do for the twentieth century 
what Stahl had attempted for the nineteenth. He wanted to create 
a social and political structure adapted to the present but preserv­
ing the best of the past, and offering through "responsibility" and 
"commitment" a "synthesis" of power and freedom. Stahl had 
failed because he could not find the appropriate institution. But 
Drucker came to believe that he had found the right vehicle in the 
properly managed business corporation.14 
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That Drucker should turn to a capitalist institution was another 
legacy of his central European roots. Bourgeois intellectuals in 
interwar Austria had been torn between desires for a corporatist 
and a liberal-capitalist order, reflecting a social conflict between 
an old professional and a new entrepreneurial middle class. Drucker 
had been affected by the old and the new. He had been born into a 
prominent family that respected public servants more than busi­
nessmen. But as a young man he had worked in business and his 
education, while scarcely technical, was more practical and pro­
fessional than most of his class.15 
Drucker had also respected another Viennese, the economist 
and historian Joseph Schumpeter, and had learned from him the 
importance of the entrepreneur. For Schumpeter the entrepreneur 
was the economic leader whose marketing and administrative 
skills converted "inventions" into "innovations" and thus created 
jobs and new wealth. But late in life Schumpeter had come to 
believe that entrepreneurial success was undermining capitalism 
and entrepreneurialism. Above all, a new elite of business manag­
ers increasingly thought like employees, was interested in perpet­
uating current projects, and felt little incentive to innovate. These 
managers were motivated by an ethic of consumption rather than 
production, and were committed to short-term personal gratifica­
tion rather than long-term service to family and society. Capital­
ism, Schumpeter lamented, was in the process of transforming 
itself into socialism.16 This prospect apparently appalled Drucker. 
By 1940 his search for a new social order became a quest for ways 
of integrating Schumpeter's innovating entrepreneur with Stahl's 
conservative, responsible ruler. He wanted business managers 
who could reconcile capitalist with corporative values. 
In The End of Economic Man, published in 1939, Drucker ex­
plained what had happened when central European managers had 
failed to meet social responsibilities. They had, he said, valued 
people only for their labor and treated them as factors of produc­
tion. Treated like things, people had felt isolated and governed by 
irrational, "demonic forces" beyond their control. Society had 
ceased to be a "community of individuals bound together by a 
common purpose" and had become a "chaotic hubbub of pur­
poseless isolated monads." Confused and desperate, some were 
drawn to the nihilism of Marxism, which in turn undercut 
traditional values and institutions and paved the way for Fascist 
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dictatorships. Both Fascism and Marxism, as Drucker saw them, 
were escapist; they could establish order but never fulfill human 
needs. What people needed was a new "noneconomic society" that 
could provide freedom, "status," and "function," and it was the 
task of business managers to help create such a society by shaping 
the proletarian into the industrial citizen and the company into a 
community.17 
In subsequent works, particularly in The Future of Industrial 
Man (1942), Concept of the Corporation (1946), and The New Society 
(1949), Drucker emphasized that only satisfying work could fulfill 
the needs of individuals for autonomy, security, dignity, useful­
ness, belonging, and peer respect. Work was needed as much to 
provide "status and function" as income and only the hierarchical 
corporation could provide satisfying work. People were frustrated 
when managers valued labor only as a commodity or when 
workers just sought money from their jobs. In these cases, the 
firm and the worker valued each other only as a means to an end. 
But the "apparently irresolvable conflict between the absolute 
claim of the group" and "the absolute claim of the individual" 
could be resolved if each accepted responsibility for satisfying the 
needs of the other. Through responsible acts of "citizenship" by 
manager and worker alike, the "two autonomous sets of pur­
poses, " the ends of society and of the individual, could be brought 
into "harmony" and thus "fulfilled in one and the same move­
ment."18 
Drucker found such corporative ideas both in German tradi­
tions and in American management publications of the 1930s. The 
German ideology of industrial leadership held that management 
was a "calling," which was more than an avenue to status and 
wealth; it imposed obligations on managers to serve employees 
and the public good.19 American management theorists such as 
Chester Barnard claimed that the manager integrated organiza­
tion and its members.20 A manager, Drucker said, took "respon­
sibility for the whole" by getting his subordinates to work toward 
a common goal. But true to his European heritage, he expressed 
these responsibilities in a Viennese way and compared the mana­
gerial task to that of an orchestral conductor. The conductor 
selected the piece, the goal. Each musician knew the score and 
played one instrument. But the conductor harmonized all the parts 
so that the goal was achieved. "The conductor himself," Drucker 
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explained, "does not play an instrument. He need not even know 
how to play an instrument. His job is to know the capacity of each 
instrument and to evoke optimal performance from each." "In­
stead of'doing,' he leads."21 
Drucker liked the orchestral metaphor because it assumed that 
harmony in the corporation came from consensus rather than 
from control. Concurrently it assumed that firms could no more 
do without managers than orchestras without conductors. The 
"hierarchy of command" in the business enterprise was a natural 
"hierarchy of skills and functions." Managers were skilled in 
selecting goals and in integrating specialized tasks. And without 
hierarchy, organization was not possible. There was no escape 
from management; the choice was between management and 
mismanagement. For Drucker management was "grounded in the 
very economic and technological nature of modern industrial­
ism."22 
As for managerial goals, Drucker acknowledged that economic 
goals must come before social ones. If the firm went bankrupt, 
managers would be unable to create a corporate community. 
Corporate "survival" depended on making a profit that not only 
covered costs but provided insurance against future risks. To 
make such a profit, managers must "create" customers by provid­
ing them with useful products and services. Profit, in Drucker's 
analysis, was the result of, and reward for, economic service, not 
the cause of it. But profit was "the ultimate test of business 
performance," indeed "the only possible test."23 
The primacy of economic performance, however, should not 
obscure that the business corporation was "as much a social 
organization, a community and society" as it was "an economic 
organ." In the "new society," which was an employee society, the 
firm had a responsibility to realize social values and fulfill individ­
ual needs. 
Still, as Drucker developed his theories, a central problem 
emerged, a problem that originated in his admission that the 
survival of the firm took precedence over the needs of any 
employee.24 This priority could prevent the firm from acting 
responsibly toward its citizens. It means that the interests of 
individual and firm might not be in harmony, a condition that 
contradicted his belief that managerial power was indispensable 
and self-justifying. Two dimensions of legitimacy were involved, 
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one dealing with the assumed usefulness of a managerial elite to 
society as a whole, the other with the congruence between partic­
ular elite decisions and the needs of every organizational member. 
In other words, employees could condone management as an 
institution but condemn individual managers or specific deci­
sions. Reconciling these two dimensions of legitimacy would 
continue to cause Drucker difficulty. 
For Drucker legitimate power was "authority" based not on 
"submission to force," but on "the rule of right over might."25 
The ruled, in other words, must voluntarily grant the ruler's right 
to command and thereby their own obligation to obey, thus 
empowering the ruler. Real legitimacy, however, would transcend 
passive submission to managerial authority. It would inspire the 
ruled to active commitment to organizational goals, and instill the 
"self-discipline" that would produce peak performance.26 They 
would voluntarily subordinate personal needs to corporate needs. 
Then the firm could become a harmonious community. 
Yet Drucker acknowledged that managerial power, because the 
firm could never "act primarily in the interests of those over 
whom the enterprise rules," would always have some illegitimacy. 
The firm served customers, not employees; managers could not 
solve this problem through paternalistic forms of "enlightened 
despotism." When corporate interests conflicted with employee 
interests, managers had to sacrifice those of the employee. Nor 
could the problem be resolved through schemes of employee 
ownership and democratic decision making. Even if the enterprise 
were a "government of the people and by the people," it could 
never be a "government for the people." Hence, workers could 
passively submit to corporate authority, withdraw their efficiency, 
and refuse to "subordinate" their needs to the corporate "wel­
fare."27 
Legitimacy caused Drucker so much trouble because he was 
trying to find ways of authorizing despotic bureaucracy in a 
society that valued liberal democracy. In a liberal government 
citizens granted legitimacy by freely choosing a constitution, 
leaders, and political ends and means. Yet legitimizing corporate 
government in a liberal way would of course undercut Drucker's 
management theory of value, so he rejected free citizenship and 
would only allow employees to choose personal goals within the 
limits of managerial objectives. Such choices were less acts of 
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consent by citizens than of convenience and necessity by subjects. 
Constrained in "voice," employees could only "exit" to become 
entrepreneurs. 
As Drucker struggled with the conflict between the need of 
society for managerial power and the need of the individual for 
satisfaction, he concluded that conflict could be minimized through 
methods that would lead employees to adopt "managerial atti­
tudes" and seek fulfillment through commitment to the corporate 
good. Workers needed to be persuaded that employment as a 
social contract was both an agreement of "association" and one of 
"subjection." But they could experience some degree of "self­
government" at work. Control over jobs, work methods, and 
work environments would allow workers to be participants in 
their "government." Participation would lead them toward the 
"Christian" conception of freedom, which was ethical, "respons­
ible choice," not "license" or a right to "freedom from some­
thing." In addition, he thought that the firm should reward the 
committed worker.28 
In the 1940s Drucker believed that labor unions could become a 
"loyal opposition" and help inculcate a "managerial attitude."29 
After 1949, however, Drucker largely dropped this idea. With the 
waning of organizing drives, unions no longer concerned him 
much. And more importantly, he became attentive to a new type 
of nonunionized worker. 
Initially Drucker labelled these new workers the "new indus­
trial middle class," but eventually he called them "knowledge 
workers."30 More recently several historical economists have 
named them "independent" workers. Formally educated, inde­
pendent workers applied general knowledge and skills to unique 
situations. These managers, professionals, technicians, and scien­
tists had been in part created by the way Taylorism and bureau­
cracy had centralized controls and specialized tasks. But Taylor-
ism did not work well to manage them. Their work was difficult 
to "routinize," and so they had substantial autonomy. Managers 
expected independent workers to "internalize the formal objec­
tives" of their organization and to accept "a kind of implicit 
contract," exercising initiative and solving problems while at the 
same time respecting "corporate authority."31 
Managers depended on the skills and autonomy of knowledge 
workers but were also threatened by them. Druckerism responded 
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to that threat in the same way that Taylorism had responded to 
industrial craftsmen. Indeed, Drucker would argue that "just as 
the economic conflict between the needs of the manual worker and 
the role of an expanding economy was the social question of the 
nineteenth century," so "the position, function, and fulfillment of 
the knowledge worker is the social question of the twentieth 
century. "32 
Knowledge workers, as he saw it, were the new skilled workers, 
and their tasks and self-perceptions were different from those of 
manual workers. They used knowledge rather than "physical 
force or manual skill" and produced ideas rather than things. Each 
saw himself as a professional, if not as an intellectual, and collec­
tively they saw themselves "as 'part of management' without 
being 'managers,' and as 'workers' without . . . considering them­
selves 'proletarians.'" They did not command people, but their 
command of information influenced management.33 
Because of their independent tasks and bourgeois self-images, 
these "knowledge professionals" caused peculiar problems for 
managers. Their work had to be managed because most of them 
were dedicated to their careers, professional "ethos," or technical 
specialty rather than to the enterprise. They possessed the knowl­
edge that the firm needed but not the "responsibility" to see that 
their projects were often irrelevant to "the goals of the whole," 
especially to the survival of the firm. Yet they could not be easily 
managed through the traditional forms of bureaucracy. They 
refused to be treated as inferiors or subordinates, and bullying 
tactics would likely lead them to sabotage or exit.34 
For independent workers, Drucker doubted that Taylorism was 
useful because planning could not be separated from doing. The 
worker was hired to apply professional knowledge, to think, 
innovate, adapt to change. He was both planner and performer, 
and managers could not "take the knowledge out of the work" 
without destroying its usefulness. Furthermore, since the knowl­
edge worker must design his own work, a control system in which 
managers regulated work through formal, written rules was self-
defeating. Unskilled labor and machines could seldom be ade­
quate substitutes for professionals. Nor could the productivity of 
independent work be measured in quantitative terms. Other ways 
would have to be found that could make the necessity of autonomy 
into a virtue and get the new workers to manage themselves.35 
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Thus, as early as the mid 1950s, long before "intrapreneurship" 
became a fad, Drucker was calling for corporatist government 
consistent with entrepreneurship.36 
To reconcile corporatism and entrepreneurship and achieve 
legitimacy and rationality, Drucker called for business reorganiza­
tion. Knowledge work organizations would be less "pyramids" of 
power like those of the military or the church, but more "concen­
tric, overlapping, coordinated rings" like those of a university or a 
hospital. In such decentralized structures, the relationship of 
managers to knowledge workers would be one of mutual depen­
dence. Although managers would still select corporate goals, they 
would allow professional "juniors and colleagues" to choose work 
processes and standards. And in conjunction with their integra­
tion of corporate effort, managers would teach the knowledge 
worker to work "under orders" and "subordinate the authority of 
knowledge to organizational objectives and goals." A new opera­
tional "organization ethics" would emerge, leading to a new 
corporate "common law" and "constitution." The knowledge 
worker could become a corporate "citizen" with corporate "vir­
tue. " He could help the firm, develop himself, and "harmonize" 
organizational goals and individual needs."37 
Before Drucker, such management writers as Chester Barnard, 
Henri Fayol, and especially Mary Parker Follett had emphasized 
that goals should be clear and legitimate. Follett had argued that 
managers should obey "the law of the situation" to "depersonal­
ize" directives.38 To learn more about management "as an inte­
grating mechanism," Drucker in the late 1940s sought work inside 
a major corporation. He approached Westinghouse but was turned 
away because he talked like "a Bolshevik. "39 He turned to General 
Motors and in 1942 the company asked him to study its top 
management structure. Before finishing his study in 1945, he 
became acquainted with a managerial tool that seemed to provide 
at least some of what was needed. Alfred R Sloan had used 
something very similar to management by objectives at GM since 
the 1920s. Donaldson Brown had given the method theoretical 
expression in a 1927 paper entitled "Decentralized Operations and 
Responsibilities with Coordinated Control." 
Sloan developed his technique to cope with the problem of 
operating a large, complex agglomeration of business units that 
sometimes worked at cross purposes. It worked through design­
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ing a central marketing strategy, creating several semiautonomous 
operating divisions, and using a central staff to provide advice, 
coordinate efforts, and measure performance of the divisions. 
Managers made policy by negotiating with one another up, down, 
and across the organizational chart. The system combined, in 
Sloan's words, "the initiative, responsibility, development of 
personnel, decisions close to the facts, [and] flexibility" of decen­
tralization with the "efficiencies and economies" of centralization. 
Drucker found such business "federalism" intriguing, and he 
discussed it in some detail in his 1946 book on General Motors, 
Concept of the Corporation. 
In his autobiography, Drucker recalled that Charles E. Wilson 
of GM had told him that a generation of "Federalists" had de­
signed the "structure" and "constitutional principles" of big busi­
ness, and that the subsequent generation of "Jeffersonians" would 
have to foster "citizenship and community."40 Drucker would 
attempt to do so when he helped convert Sloan's technique for 
managing a multidivision firm into a technique for managing 
managers and knowledge workers. 
Management by Objectives and Self-Control 
Drucker worked out his ideas with Harold Smiddy, a vice 
president at General Electric who had been impressed by Drucker's 
book on GM. Smiddy hired Drucker as a consultant, and with 
Drucker's prompting began using participative management tech­
niques. Superiors, the two men decided, could best get subordi­
nates to work under "self-control" if goals and methods were 
jointly defined. Smiddy began clarifying objectives with his 
employees and in 1952 made the process part of company policy. 
Drucker labelled it "management by objectives and self-control."41 
Its purposes were to direct managerial vision, to promote mone­
tary rationality, to legitimize managerial power and corporate 
goals, to fulfill individual needs, to guide knowledge work, and to 
unify ethics and entrepreneurship. By achieving these aims, he 
intended it to synthesize capitalism and corporatism. 
Drucker first prescribed management by objectives in the 
sections entitled "Managing a Business" and "Managing Manag­
ers" in 1954 in The Practice ofManagement. He altered the prescrip­
tions slightly thereafter. He quickly broadened it, for example, 
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from a technique for managing managers to one for managing 
knowledge workers. 
The technique had four parts: centralized determination of 
corporate goals, decentralized definition of operational targets 
and task organization, measurements of performance against ob­
jectives, and a system of rewards and punishments based on 
results. 
First of all, Drucker wanted managers to set corporate strategy. 
Corporate goals comprised the "compass bearing" of the corpo­
rate ship, guiding it to its destination and preventing it from 
becoming "the plaything of weather, winds and accidents." Man­
agement must have a clear understanding of the "mission and 
purpose" of the firm. And determining this purpose required 
more than study of what the firm was doing, for studying present 
efforts might perpetuate obsolete processes and projects. It re­
quired careful market analysis of business opportunities because 
the customer decided "whether the efforts of a business become 
economic results or whether they become so much waste and 
scrap." Managers must learn who their customers were, who they 
could be, what their unsatisfied wants were, what they regarded 
as value, and what products would satisfy them. After such 
questions had been answered, entrepreneurial goals could then be 
set.42 
The second step in clarifying goals was to convert these broad 
aims into specific operational objectives. Managers should pro­
ceed, in other words, from learning what their business was and 
envisioning what it could be to marshalling the means to achieve 
its goals and devising a plan for utilizing these means. Operational 
objectives must set forth what was to be achieved in marketing, 
product innovation, output, resource allocation, personnel per­
formance, corporate social responsibility, and performance mea­
surement. The objectives must then be kept current with chang­
ing market conditions. There should be no attempt to "outguess" 
the business cycle or project the past into the future, for such 
attempts to escape risk were dangerous in a competitive and 
innovative economy. Profit making, Drucker emphasized, should 
not be the only objective. Overemphasis on profits would lead to 
shortsightedness, postponement of desirable investments, and 
continuation of obsolescent projects. Commitments to future 
actions should be used to make decisions about "present means" to 
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achieve "future results." When everyone in the firm knew these 
objectives, they could better organize their efforts to produce 
market results.43 Obviously Drucker realized that clear goals 
could contribute not only to entrepreneurial effectiveness of man­
agers, but to their political effectiveness as well. 
He believed that only top managers should select goals. But 
central control could lead to goals that subordinates did not 
understand or accept. Balancing despotism and legitimacy was 
always precarious, and initially Drucker offered only a few iso­
lated examples of how to juggle both. But by the 1960s he would 
point to the "consensual decision-making" of Japanese corpora­
tions as the one best way to set goals, and would even claim that 
his books and seminars had taught the Japanese this system.44 His 
celebration of Japanese management anticipated the American 
Japanophilia of the 1980s.45 
His view of decision making in Japanese corporations over­
played how initiatives came from the bottom up and downplayed 
how managers used consultations to legitimize decisions from the 
top down. He claimed that employees throughout the firm began 
by defining the problem to be solved. They decided what the 
question was before answers were solicited. Then discussions 
explored alternatives and their implications. The result usually 
was that "every decision comes up from below" and was "an 
expression of a general will." Finally, top management selected 
"the appropriate people" to make the decision, and once it had 
been made, their orders would be "obeyed without argument or 
reservation." Implementing ideas came swiftly because the deci­
sion process was seen as a means to action rather than as an end in 
itself. And because plans resulted from "consensus" rather than 
"compromises," the peculiar combination of "autocracy" and 
"democratic participation" insured that decisions never had to be 
sold to subordinates; "authority from the top down" was always 
matched by "responsibility from the bottom up." The system, 
Drucker said, could never be completely imitated by the West 
since it was rooted in Japanese culture. But the underlying princi­
ples, he thought, might "point the way to solutions for some of 
our most pressing problems."46 
After top management had established corporate strategy and 
made general operational objectives clear, subordinate managers 
and knowledge workers were to negotiate with their superiors and 
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draw up very specific work assignments, performance goals, 
expected contributions, production targets, timetables, and re­
source allocations. In negotiating with his superior, each subordi­
nate was to set personal objectives that would substitute for 
narrow, systematic work rules and job descriptions imposed from 
above. The negotiation was to go beyond a human relations 
counselling interview that merely intended to give the worker a 
"sense of participation." Real participation, defining jobs and 
goals "actively and responsibly," would cause each to "commit 
himself with "a positive act of assent" to "the ultimate business 
goals" and assume "genuine responsibility." His manager could 
then hold him to "exacting demands." This would be "upward 
responsibility," which would be formalized in what Smiddy had 
called the "manager's letter. "47 
In this [biannual] letter to his superior, each manager [or 
knowledge worker] first defines the objectives of his superior's 
job and of his own job as he sees them. He then sets down the 
performance standards which he believes are being applied to 
him. Next, he lists the things he must do to attain these goals — 
and the things within his own unit he considers the major 
obstacles. He lists the things his superior and the company do 
that help him and . . . that hamper him. Finally, he outlines 
what he proposes to do during the next year to reach his goals. If 
the superior accepts this statement, the "manager's letter" 
becomes the charter under which the manager [or knowledge 
worker] operates.48 
Such goal setting was in many ways reminiscent of the nine­
teenth century "inside contracting" system for managing skilled 
workers in manufacturing firms. Under this system skilled crafts­
men had acted as subcontractors who bid on specific projects and 
organized the work themselves. Managers had found the workers 
hard to control and had converted the subentrepreneurs into 
employees.49 But management by objectives could combine the 
advantages of subcontracting with those of bureaucracy. The 
negotiation process would atomize workers and get each to con­
tract to individual goals, possibly encouraging Schmidt-like ef­
fort and Stakhanovite competition. Moreover, because the nego­
tiations assumed that managerial power was legitimate, conflict 
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would be transformed from quarrels over control to disagree­
ments over goals. And since managers could better control their 
new skilled workers without directly controlling their work, they 
could benefit from contract and control, entrepreneurship and 
employeeship. 
The transparency of negotiations and written contracts would 
help managers bridge the "communications gap." "Downward" 
communication, Drucker said, did not work because superiors 
did not understand the problems and goals of subordinates, and 
effective communication depended on some "prior agreement on 
meaning." Only after subordinates had communicated "upward" 
their "values, beliefs, and aspirations," could superiors reconcile 
corporate and individual goals. The manager and subordinate 
would understand one another and could better cooperate. A 
"common language" would help each person "see" what the other 
"sees." Superior and subordinate could concentrate on their shared 
"objectives of performance" and unify their efforts in genuine 
team work.50 
The third part of management by objectives was some system 
for measuring performance of employees relative to self-deter­
mined objectives. Drucker emphasized that measurements of 
"results against goals" must be beneficial to both the individual 
and the corporation. "Feedback" would give the individual worker 
information that could be used to exercise "self-control" over the 
work. And while measurements should not become merely tools 
of "control from above," they should encourage rationality. With 
proper feedback, each employee could make independent deci­
sions that would product market results.51 
Finally, management by objectives would set up rewards and 
punishments based on clear standards of performance. Appraising 
performance, Drucker concluded, was one of the most important 
tasks of the manager, and doing it fairly required "integrity," "the 
one absolute requirement of a manager." The system should 
develop "managerial vision," foster "internal, self-motivation," 
and encourage employees to "drive themselves." Employees should 
not be judged on potential or personality. Superiors should hold 
them "strictly accountable" for results and periodically review 
their contributions. And all rewards and punishments, including 
salaries, perks, promotions, demotions, and terminations, were 
to be based on performance relative to the objectives of the 
The Corporatist Critique of Scientific Management • 221 
company. Performance was not to be judged purely on the "bot­
tom line," however, as that measured only business results, not 
individual ones.52 
According to Drucker, the combination of business goals, per­
sonal objectives, feedback on performance, and appropriate re­
wards would "harmonize the goals of the individual with the com­
monweal." It would substitute "management by self-control for 
management by domination," making management by objectives 
as much a "constitutional principle" as a managerial technique. 
Each worker would become a "manager" and assume responsibility 
not only for his job and work group, but for the economic and 
social welfare of the organization. "Control from the inside" 
would be stricter, more exacting, and more effective than "control 
from the outside." As a "manager," each worker would take action 
not because he was ordered to, but because "the objective needs of 
his task" demanded it. Hence, "by converting objective needs into 
personal goals," management by objectives could guarantee per­
formance and "genuine freedom, freedom under the law."53 
Since corporate law was determined by managers, freedom for 
Drucker was, as one commentator has suggested, a Hegelian 
"rationale for subordination."54 Given his presumption that the 
managerial will should override individual wills, his ideal of 
corporatist virtue amounted to Max Weber's concept of bureau­
cratic rationality and Taylor's notion of a "mental revolution." All 
three assumed that functionaries would suppress goals in conflict 
with the corporation, accept managerial ends as givens, and 
methodically select means to attain them. Still Drucker realized, 
as Weber had, that rationality and harmony depended on the 
legitimacy of managers and their goals. 
In later years Drucker expanded his ideas by insisting that 
managers select socially responsible goals. He rejected the notion 
that a "hidden-hand" in the marketplace naturally converted 
"private vices" into "public virtues." He had never believed that 
competition automatically solved social problems or absolved 
managers of moral obligations.55 Nor had he accepted Milton 
Friedman's argument that businessmen should stick to "business" 
and should refrain from appointing themselves guardians of the 
common good. They were running social organizations that 
could help society and realize "social values." Like anyone else, 
they also had "a self-interest in a healthy society," and so they 
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should follow normal ethical imperatives.56 Moreover, for Drucker, 
managers were the only true "leadership group" in modern 
society. If they did not "take responsibility for the common 
good," then no one else could or would. 
Managers, then, had to find ways of achieving economic goals 
and meeting social responsibilities. But they should transcend 
Andrew Carnegie's notions of business philanthropy. The idea of 
doing well in business in order to do good outside business, 
Drucker said, couldjustify using immoral methods to accumulate 
wealth.57 Managers should strive to do the opposite—do good in 
order to do well. They should choose profitable strategies that 
also solved social problems. He admired Japanese managers who 
"put national interest first" and pursued their private interests in 
ways that promoted the public interest.58 
For American examples, Drucker cited Henry Ford, who raised 
wages to sell more cars, and Julius Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck, 
who promoted county agents and 4-H programs.59 Similarly, he 
argued that business managers should forego strategies that might 
help their firms but hurt the commonweal. They should adopt the 
fundamental principle of the Hippocratic oath, "Above all, not 
knowingly to do harm," and find out whether a prospective 
strategy would be dangerous. Chemical companies should have 
tested the health and environmental impacts of DDT and then kept 
the product off the market.60 
Later Drucker endorsed what he called the "Confucian ap­
proach" to ethics. In an interdependent "society of organiza­
tions, " he said, everyone, from the highest manager to the lowest 
worker, should accept that they had responsibilities to everyone 
else. They should establish networks of "mutual obligation," help 
others achieve their goals, and nurture "harmony and trust." This 
"ethics of interdependence," he acknowledged, had no conception 
of "rights" with which members could claim "entitlements" and 
exemption from mutual obligations. For instance, he thought 
"whistle-blowers," rather than being heroic champions of the 
public good, were virtueless "informers" who violated their 
responsibilities. All organizational members should be good citi­
zens, obey "Confucian" imperatives, and accept "the fundamen­
tal relationships" of society.61 
By acts of "statesmanship," by selecting goals that tried to solve 
social problems and avoid creating new ones, responsible business 
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managers could help to harmonize private and public interests in 
ways that the market alone could not. Of course all this assumed 
that corporate leaders could, in Drucker's words, attain the "pri­
vate virtue" that alone could define genuine social problems, 
achieve consensus, and mediate private and public interests.62 
For and against MBO 
In the quarter century after 1954, Drucker's management by 
objectives stimulated great interest among managers and academics 
much as Taylor's scientific management had before. Interest was 
measured in a fifty-five page survey of American, British, and 
Canadian publications on MBO, which listed over 700 books, 
articles, monographs, dissertations, and theses.63 Also like Taylor, 
Drucker had to defend his ideas from managerial critics. Empiri­
cal studies of MBO in practice and political discussions of Druck­
er's principles showed the essentially bureaucratic form of his 
corporatism. 
Several reasons account for the popularity of MBO. The forma­
tion of more multidivision and conglomerate firms isolated top 
managers, produced more middle managers, and made governing 
difficult.64 Structural changes affected the labor market; indepen­
dent workers increased from 27.8 percent of the work force in 1950 
to 32.8 percent in 1970, and that percentage grew even larger 
during the 1970s.65 Managers complained that knowledge work­
ers and middle managers were hard to evaluate and discipline; 
professional people were creative resources and resented being 
treated as factors of production.66 And given a demand for alter­
natives to Taylorism, academics and consultants in addition to 
Drucker were supplying corporative solutions.67 Douglas McGre­
gor, for instance, advised managers to abandon the oppressive 
tactics of a Taylorist "Theory X" and adopt a "Theory Y" that 
organized work to satisfy workers' needs and meet organizational 
goals. McGregor recommended management by objectives be­
cause it evaluated workers based on performance and encouraged 
them to assume responsibility for improving their work. He 
had learned about the technique from managers at General Mills, 
who had been among the first to adopt Drucker's management 
by objectives when their company had reorganized into divi­
sions.68 
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Even though the system was popular, empirical studies of its 
practice did not emerge until the late 1960s. It was adopted more 
because of logical appeal than because of proven usefulness.69 
In 1974 two business educators surveyed the Fortune 500 largest 
industrial firms to determine how many used the system. They 
found that nearly one-half claimed to use the technique but 
considerably fewer used it throughout the company and fewer still 
regarded it as a success. Additional study found that many com­
panies that thought they were using Drucker's brand of manage­
ment by objectives really were not. Many were simply setting 
corporate objectives and implementing them using traditional 
centralized authority. Subordinates were not being granted auton­
omy, either on the job or in setting performance goals. Goals and 
work rules were imposed from above. In some cases a laissez-faire 
method was used; managers told subordinates that results mat­
tered but did not engage in any systematic negotiations. All 
things considered, the authors concluded that only about ten 
percent of the Fortune 500 used a management by objectives 
system like Drucker's, a proportion that compared favorably with 
the early application of Taylorism. And while these companies 
generally regarded it as having been successful, it was not clear in 
what sense it had been successful, whether in terms of consensus, 
productivity, or control.70 
Although bureaucratic criticisms of Drucker have been few 
(which shows how bureaucratic his ideas have been), managers 
and business academics have often denied that participatory man­
agement was rational. Interpreting participatory management as a 
dangerous form of anarchism, they believed corporative tech­
niques such as MBO coddled workers rather than controlled 
them.71 As the sociologist Richard Edwards has argued, manag­
ers saw advantages in written directives, narrow job descriptions, 
and close supervision even if it came at the cost of lower per­
formance and less commitment. They preferred predictable 
performance to peak performance because it was more easily 
controlled and less risky; or they believed conformity to company 
rules was more realistic than commitment to the corporate com­
munity.72 
Drucker recognized the continued popularity of bureaucratic 
thinking and scientific management and in 1976 he sought to 
deflect criticism by praising Frederick W. Taylor for first express­
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ing corporative management principles. Revising his previous 
interpretation of scientific management in his typical cranky and 
polemical style, Drucker said that Taylor had wanted to reorga­
nize unhealthy and burdensome tasks, to replace the "boss" with 
"servants" of labor, and to develop workers' potentiality and 
personality. Taylor had believed "above all" that managers should 
select, train, and develop the individual for the job he was "best 
fitted for" and help him become a "first rate man" by scientifically 
designing his task and providing him with the necessary informa­
tion and tools.73 By emphasizing Taylor's corporatist rhetoric and 
by ignoring how his technical principles had called for simplified 
jobs and separate planners and performers, Drucker tried to 
camouflage the iron cage with a corporatist curtain. In the pro­
cess, he acknowledged that his corporatism was only superficially 
different from scientific management. 
Numerous observers concurred, concluding that MBO did not 
go beyond Taylorism. These observations were verified by the 
most thorough case study, which was carried out by Stephen J. 
Carroll and Henry L. Tosi at Black and Decker in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Their opinion surveys showed that management by 
objectives did not work quite the way Drucker had expected. 
Managers at all levels believed that the system improved commu­
nication and planning. But they complained about MBO's red 
tape, the excessive attention given to quantifiable goals, the 
slighting of self-improvement goals, and the anxiety that resulted 
when they were held responsible for failures that were beyond 
their control. Upper-level managers felt their authority was threat­
ened by the negotiations and lower-level managers complained 
that they had little discretion.74 
Carroll and Tosi doubted that corporatism was either more 
harmonious or more productive than bureaucracy. After the intro­
duction of management by objectives, managerial employees 
"were no more satisfied with pay or their jobs than before," and 
they did not experience "any more control over their work, any 
changes in their jobs, or any more job interest . . . than before." 
Management by objectives best created harmony and improved 
performance, Carroll and Tosi concluded, when superiors relin­
quished power to subordinates. But redistributing power itself 
required a change in "both the philosophy and practice of man­
agement. " And managers had little incentive to make such changes 
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given that clear goals and feedback improved performance much 
more than participation in setting goals.75 
In the late 1960s several psychologists accused Drucker of 
trying to achieve corporatist harmony through cooptation and 
control rather than cooperation and consensus. They charged that 
Drucker's MBO was too bureaucratic to achieve corporatist vir­
tue. Most prominently, Harry Levinson contended that Drucker's 
system could not satisfy employee needs. The system, Levinson 
said, put corporate goals first and gave the individual no power to 
pursue ends that conflicted with job assignments. It insured that 
the individual would feel like "an object," an "instrument for 
reaching a goal." To make matters worse, the employee was 
forced to set personal goals within the confines of corporate 
strategy so that if he failed to reach them, he would be "hoisted on 
his own petard." Workers under these conditions felt "like rats in a 
maze" who only got to choose their own "bait." The underlying 
reward-punishment psychology only made things worse. Carrots 
and sticks caused employees to act less out of virtue and more out 
of selfishness; they were being bribed and bullied, not self-
motivated. By treating people as "patsies to be driven, urged, and 
manipulated," management by objectives often intensified "the 
hostility, resentment and distrust" between manager and man­
aged that it was supposed to eliminate and encouraged the with­
drawal of efficiency that it was designed to overcome. Because of 
its contradictions, it was "self-defeating," "really just industrial 
engineering with a new name, applied to higher managerial 
levels." It could achieve self-motivation, Levinson concluded, 
only if it began with the needs of the individual, then proceeded to 
corporate goals and work assignments.76 
Another psychologist, Abraham Maslow, revealed the Utopian 
qualities of Drucker's corporatism by exposing its assumptions. 
The system, Maslow argued, assumed a sound market standing so 
that "eupsychian growth and self-actualization" would be com­
patible with corporate performance. (In this regard Maslow proved 
prophetic, the firm in which he had observed MBO in operation 
dropped the system when it went through hard times in the early 
1970s.)77 It also assumed that people wanted challenging, respons­
ible jobs; that all work would be "self-actualizing," that subordi­
nates could respect, even love, their superiors; that bosses would 
surrender power; that managerial "wolves" would not prey on 
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corporate "lambs." And more generally it assumed that employ­
ees and managers were healthy and homogeneous, not "psycho­
paths, schizophrenics, paranoids, brain injured, feeble-minded, 
perverts," or "addicts," among other things.78 
Finally Maslow contended that management by objectives 
assumed that corporations could become "synergic" institutions 
in which persons pursuing selfish ends "automatically" helped 
others and persons acting altruistically "automatically" helped 
themselves. In synergy, all choices were good, all acts rebounded 
to personal and public advantage, and "virtue" paid. Not sur­
prisingly, the only examples he could find of this were from a 
nonindustrial culture, the Blackfeet Indians.79 Although Maslow 
believed these prerequisites for management by objectives could 
be met, others might be doubtful. 
Drucker conceded that Maslow's observations were cutting and 
made a "real impression. "80 He also admitted that his system had 
become a "fad" in the 1960s and had been "oversold and over-
promoted." But he thought that when applied properly, it had 
worked. In 1974 in Management, his 839-page magnum opus, 
he restated his old arguments. His version of management by 
objectives, he acknowledged in addressing Maslow, was "a stern 
taskmaster" and was not "permissive." The "responsibility and 
self-discipline" that it demanded required "strong and healthy" peo­
ple. But he denied that there were realistic alternatives. Taylorism, 
with its carrot-and-stick approach, no longer worked in "devel­
oped countries." Knowledge workers must be "self-directed"; 
they needed negotiation and some autonomy. 
Nor did Drucker think that basing management by objectives 
on individual rather than corporate goals could ever be as rational 
as Levinson claimed. Corporate survival had to take precedence 
over individual goals. To think otherwise, to want "organization 
without alienation," was the illusion of "romantics," for in a real 
sense, "organization is alienation." Finally, Drucker argued, the 
survival of the firm required "clear, unambiguous, designated 
command authority vested in one person." Production collapsed 
when managers were removed, as "proven" when industries were 
nationalized.81 Management, he later emphasized, "will not 'wither 
away.' "82 Such a defense of management helped make Drucker a 
best-selling author. In 1974 the sales of Management temporarily 
surpassed those of another technical book, The Joy of Sex.83 
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Nevertheless, in recent years Drucker has downplayed the 
formal technique of "MBO" as a means of making business 
bureaucracy more corporative. This was less a change in philoso­
phy than in public relations. While distancing himself from MBO, 
he continued to argue for task synthesis and integrated planning 
and doing. He has also asserted that in the last forty years 
managers have listened to him and learned to treat "professionals" 
as "colleagues."84 
In the 1980s, he tried to teach bureaucrats how entrepreneurship 
could make them into more rational capitalists. One commentator 
claimed that Drucker's lesson on the creation of customers has 
been central to marketing theory from the 1950s on.85 But by the 
1980s, after a decade of penetration of American markets by 
foreign firms, many were denying that American managers had 
attained Drucker's ideal of the entrepreneur who combined pri­
vate profits and social service. Rather, managers had become 
ivory-tower number-crunchers and bureaucratic parasites who 
preyed on producers and the public and feasted on short-term 
profits.86 
Drucker, of course, had always held that profit was the ultimate 
test of business performance, a lesson that was still followed. But 
if the critics were right, managers had ignored his simultaneous 
insistence that corporate survival, indeed the survival of capital­
ism itself, required long-term planning and intelligent risk tak­
ing, constant technical innovation with accompanying elimina­
tion of obsolete products and processes, effective protection of 
market standing, and strategies that served workers and the 
public.87 
Drucker himself denied that any national decline in entrepre­
neurship had occurred during the 1970s.88 Indeed he contended 
that entrepreneurial pressures and computer technology were 
hastening the evolution of a "new" form of business organization 
that was reuniting planning and doing. The new environment was 
creating "information-based organizations" with self-directing 
employees such as hospitals, universities, and symphony orches­
tras. Each would employ, Drucker predicted, more knowledge 
workers and two-thirds fewer middle managers than Taylorist 
"command-and-control organizations. "89 
Such messages helped Drucker's reputation grow ever larger in 
the 1980s. Admirers hailed him as the "father of the new manage­
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ment," who first combined entrepreneurial and corporative man­
agement principles.90 Tom Peters, the decade's leading entre­
preneurial prophet, expressed his "amazement" and "perhaps 
dismay" that Drucker had written "everything" on managing for 
innovation in 1954 in The Practice cf Management.91 
Born-again Druckerites, however, ignored history and the way 
that Drucker's corporatism duplicated Taylor's bureaucratism. 
Particularly Druckerism replicated the centralized power of 
Taylorism. Even as Drucker described the "low hierarchy" of the 
"new" organization, he emphasized that "central management" 
was needed; even orchestras needed conductors and hospitals 
administrators. Top managers still had to impose control through 
something like management by objectives.92 
Drucker's insistence on the importance of top management re­
vealed that he never called for a full fusion of planning and doing. 
His persistent advocacy of decentralized operations and central­
ized coordination still depended on professional managers. And if 
such managers were isolated from production, the objectives they 
helped to set could be as confined to quantitative standards and 
short-term profits as they had been in the old bureaucracies.93 
These same managers could remain primarily concerned with 
controlling subordinates and minimizing risk, not with allowing 
freedom to innovate. Transcending bureaucracy would seem proble­
matic since Drucker has admitted that at best only three to five 
percent of American firms have been well managed.94 
To conclude, management by objectives did not go beyond the 
principles of scientific management. Managers who applied it 
were typically unwilling to reverse Taylorism, surrender power, 
and synthesize planning and performing. To do so would have 
deprived them of their reason to exist. Nor did Drucker's criticism 
of Taylorism ever call for managers to abdicate from power. Such a 
revolutionary call would have cut him off from his managerial 
audience. Indeed, he was never revolutionary; he simply called for 
managers to be responsible and rational, especially in governing 
professional workers. Drucker's theory always made managerial 
will superior to all other wills, and this made him very popular 
among managers. 
Accepting the prevailing Taylorist conception of the manager 
also helps explain why Drucker's avowedly corporatist prescrip­
tions actually led to bureaucratic management practice.95 The 
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sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter, echoing Maslow, has called 
Drucker a "management Utopian" who had an excessive faith in 
managers' ability to apply his ideas. His vision of "the world-as­
it-ought-to-be" obscured sight of "the world-as-it-is." Faith 
prevented his understanding the "human limitations," managers' 
lust for power and money, and the "organizational limitations," 
those bureaucratic imperatives for centralization and specializa­
tion, that so often prevented significant restructuring.96 
Accordingly, Drucker's management by objectives mainly per­
petuated a Taylorist separation of planning and performing. His 
advice that managers establish harmony in a hierarchy was little 
different from Taylor's advice that they get control over a hier­
archy. Corporatist advice was only one part of a shift from the 
"authoritarian" management of the first half of the twentieth 
century to the "hegemonic" kind of the last half.97 But Taylor and 
Drucker had essentially the same theory of good business govern­
ment. Both believed that the best government was that ruled by 
scientific managers. Drucker and other corporatists transcended 
Taylor's techniques but not his management principles. Thus 
Taylorism, reborn and transformed, was alive and well after the 
Second World War. 
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EPILOGUE

.Focusing on influential individuals, business organiza­
tions that ranged in size from a few hundred to several thousand 
employees, and comparatively brief periods in the decades after 
1915, the essays in this volume cannot supply definitive judgments 
about the fate of scientific management after Taylor's death or 
about the evolution of managerial technique in the twentieth 
century. Yet because the activities of Richard Feiss, the Gilbreths, 
Edwin Gay, Mary Van Kleeck, Charles Piez, Charles Bedaux, 
Peter Drucker and Joseph & Feiss, Link-Belt, and Du Pont manag­
ers were notable parts of the post-1915 history of scientific man­
agement in the United States, these essays help to illuminute the 
larger picture. 
They show, for example, that Taylor's death did not halt the 
evolution of scientific management and may, in fact, have acceler­
ated the pace of innovation. Just as Taylor did not invent scientific 
management, his death did not leave it in a final or definitive form. 
The movement that Taylor inspired retained its vitality through 
the 1920s and probably later. The reconciliation of the Taylor 
society veterans and the Gilbreths led to the emergence of a more 
sophisticated conception of time study and more powerful analyt­
ical tools, precisely the kinds of innovations Taylor had in mind 
when he initially subsidized Sanford Thompson's time study 
research. The potent synthesis of industrial engineering and per­
sonnel work, anticipated at Joseph & Feiss, and common at such 
firms as Link-Belt by the 1940s, was another notable instance of 
this process. Additional research would presumably supply other 
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examples. In terms of managerial technique, then, Taylor's suc­
cessors had transcended his work by the 1920s. Taylor remained an 
important and provocative historical figure, but his works were 
no longer a relevant or reliable guide to industrial practice. As 
Edward Eyre Hunt wrote in 1924, the progress of scientific 
management since his death had been "sure and swift."1 
Certainly the broader implications of scientific management 
became clearer after Taylor's death. In 1915, Taylor's work was 
largely discussed and debated in terms of industrial production. A 
decade later, no one would have suggested that scientific manage­
ment was "just" industrial engineering or even that its most 
important impact was on the operation of the factory. World War I 
was the most immediate stimulus to a larger perspective, but the 
conversion of substantial groups of academics and intellectuals to 
the cause of scientific management and the continued growth of 
large organizations with extensive administrative bureaucracies 
committed to management as a self-conscious activity were also 
significant contributing factors. The possibilities of improving 
the performance of nonbusiness institutions also help explain the 
popularity of the principles of scientific management. Compara­
tively few Americans went as far as Mary Van Kleek, but there 
was widespread recognition of the possibilities of economic and 
social planning. 
Ironically, in view of this apparent influence, the impact of 
scientific management on the shop floor, and on the worker and 
working conditions, is difficult to summarize. In the 1940s, as in 
the 1910s, the manager's conception of the challenge of production 
management and the consequent need for change and improve­
ment varied widely. Richard Feiss, Charles Piez, and the Du Pont 
and Bedaux engineers were all devoted to scientific management, 
but that fact provides only the most general guide to their activ­
ities and to the experiences of employees they managed. If some­
one had convened a meeting of Link-Belt, Du Pont and Bedaux 
client employees in 1940, the workers could have discussed at 
length their employers' commitments to cost cutting and anti-
unionism, but it is not clear what other concerns they would have 
had in common. Judging from these accounts, a history of scien­
tific management "from the bottom up" would be no more 
conclusive about the impact of managerial initiatives in the mid­
dle decades of the century than studies examining scientific 
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management and labor during Taylor's lifetime. The addition of 
evidence from the service sector would likely introduce even more 
variations. 
Thus, while scientific managers were unquestionably inter­
ested in work, they were preoccupied with details. The executives 
who appear in these essays were only rarely concerned with the 
distribution of skills or with distinctions between planning and 
implementation of policy. They took the existing system of 
production as a given and tried to perfect the fine points. The 
experiences of the Du Pont and Bedaux companies suggest that 
there were many details to attend to, and that such attention paid 
substantial dividends. When scientific management was used to 
the workers' disadvantage, as it was at some of the Du Pont plants 
and in many of the Bedaux installations, it was usually applied in a 
traditional way to reduce wage rates and to increase, not decrease, 
the worker's responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, Taylor reemerged in the 1940s as an apostle of 
narrow, specialized tasks and the removal of decision making from 
the shop floor. This Taylor was the figure that Drucker rebelled 
against and the straw man of other social scientists' accounts. That 
their antidotes, like MBO, did not represent a meaningful break 
with existing practices is hardly surprising. What was surprising 
was their disregard for the part of Taylor's message that was as 
relevant in 1955 as it was in 1915. As the real Taylor had empha­
sized, scientific management was "not any of the devices which 
the average man calls to mind when scientific management is 
spoken of. . . .  " It was a commitment to knowledge, reason, and 
continuous attention to detail that was equally antithetical to old-
fashioned empiricism and to new-fashioned panaceas. 
These essays suggest, then, that the ideas that Taylor and his 
allies promoted in the early years of the century have continuing 
value for understanding the operation of the business firm and for 
many efforts to organize and direct other activities in the half 
century after Taylor's death. They provide no evidence of central­
ized direction, uniform goals, or predictable results. Scientific 
management encompassed diverse and often contradictory activ­
ities. It was not an automatic or inevitable consequence of eco­
nomic development; Taylor, his followers, and his critics did 
matter. But they were less important for their specific contribu­
tions than for their role in creating an intellectual milieu that 
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encouraged contemporaries to think about organizations and the 
principles of organized activity, and to act accordingly. If Taylor 
had returned in the 1940s, he might well have concluded that his 
call for a mental revolution had been answered. 
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